The distribution impact of the social security program, 1962-1972 by Wolff, Nancy Lee
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1984
The distribution impact of the social security
program, 1962-1972
Nancy Lee Wolff
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wolff, Nancy Lee, "The distribution impact of the social security program, 1962-1972 " (1984). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations.
8228.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8228
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This rtiprodiiction wt» mWe from » copy of a document sent to us for mkrofitming. 
White the most advanced technotogy h» been used to photograph and reproduce 
this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the 
quality of the material submitted. 
The following explanation of technk)ue» is provided to help clarify markings or 
notations which may appear on this reproduction. 
1. The sign or "target** for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it wm pwsible to obtain the mining 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This 
may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages 
to assure complete continuity. 
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an 
indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, 
duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For 
blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If 
copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pa^s in 
the adjacent frame. 
3. When a map. drawbig or chart, etc.. is part of the material being photographed, 
a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is 
customary to begin filming at the upper left hand comer of a large slwet and to 
continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, 
sectioning is continued again-beginning below the first row and continuing on 
until complete. 
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactori^f reproduced by xerographic 
means, photographic prints can be purchased at additkxnal cost and inserted 
into your xert^phic copy. These prints are available upon request from the 
Dissertations Customer Services Department. 
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best 
available copy has been filnwd. 
hntemational 
300NiZMb Road 
Am Artwr.UI 48106 

8506883 
Wolff, Nancy L«# 
THE DISTRIBUTION IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM. 1962-
1872 
lowÊ Stêtê Unlvtnltf PH.D. 1884 
University 
Microfilms 
intsmstionsi mN.2«biioM.«<nAito.Mi4(iw 

Th« distribution impact of the social 
security progm, 1962-1972 
by 
Rancy Lee Wolff 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Economics 
Approved: 
In Charge of Major Mofk 
Members of the Committee: 
lows State University 
Ames* lofHi 
1984 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Pag« 
1 
5 
5 
5 
12 
14 
14 
15 
17 
19 
31 
38 
38 
39 
41 
43 
44 
45 
50 
50 
52 
53 
il 
TABLE OP CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF INQUIRY AND RESULTS 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. 1935 Old-Ag# Inturanc* Program 
B. Spouaal Banaflt Provialon 
C. Prograaaiva Banaflt Formula 
D. Actuarial Reduction for Early Ratiramant 
E. Dalayad Ratiramant Credit 
F. Eaminga Teat 
6. Coat-of-Living AO uatment 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
THE LITE-CTCLE MODEL 
METHODOLOGY 
A# Faimeaa Standard 
B. Study Sample 
c. Riatorieal Contribution Baaa and Tax Rates 
D. Interest Rates 
E. Survivor Probabilities 
F. Computational Formulas 
c. Annuity-Type Counterfactuals 
H. Earnings Test 
X. RedistriWtion Components 
J. Behavioral Responses 
i l l  
Pa*# 
VI. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 56 
A. Functional Fom 56 
1. Singl# nodol 56 
2. Marriad modal 59 
B. Ragraaaion Variablaa 60 
1. Dapandant variablaa 60 
2. Indapandant variablaa 65 
VIX. RESULTS 74 
A. Daecriptiva Statiatica 74 
1. Iha banafit ineidanea of tha 1972 old-aga inauranea 
progrn, all houaaholda 74 
2. Tha affaet of diffarantial Ufa axpaetaneiaa of 
malaa and famalaa on tha banafit ineidanea for 
fully-inaured benefieiariea 84 
3. The effect of retirement year on the benefit 
incidence of aingle trarkera only 95 
4. The benefit incidence of the 1972 old-age inauranea 
program; Married, both retired houaeholda only 97 
5. The effect of aocial lacurity paynenta on the 
diatribution of income, both retired houaeholda 
only 116 
B. Ragreaaion Raaulta 123 
1. Single modela 124 
2. Married modela 140 
3. Summary of regreaaion findinga 161 
VIII. SIMfAlCr AND CONCLUSIONS 174 
A. Summary 174 
B. Conclueiona 176 
1. Overall program# aaaesement 177 
2. The effect of aex differential# in survivorahip 
on the program'a performance 180 
3. The effect of the wife'a work atatu# on the 
program'# performance 182 
4. The distribution of apouaal benefit# 183 
C. Concluding Remarks 184 
iv 
Pag* 
IX. REFERENCES 186 
X. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 192 
XI. APPENDIX A. ESTIMATION OF MARKET YIELDS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT 
SECURITIES AT CONSTANT MATURITY. 1937-1952 194 
XII. APPENDIX B DATA SET DESCRIPTION 200 
XIII. APPENDIX C. TABLES 208 
XIV. APPENDIX D. COMPARISON OF COMPOUNDING SCHEMES 215 
XV. APPENDIX E. RESULTS 217 
XVI. APPENDIX F. DISAGGREGATION OF THE 1937 TO 1950 REPORTED 
EARNINGS MEASURE 225 
V 
LIST OP TABLES 
ftga 
Ttbl* 5.1. Dcacription of annuity eountarfactuals 51 
Tabla 6.1. Dafiniclons of tha dapandant varlablaa uaad in tha 
aingla ragraaaion aquation# 57 
Tabla 6.2. Dafinitiona of tha indapandant varlablaa uaad in 
aingla ragraaaion aquations 58 
Tabla 6.3. Dafinitiona of tha dapandant variablas uaad in tha 
marriad ragraaaion aquations 61 
Tabla 6.4. Dafinitiona of indapandant varlablaa uaad in marriad 
ragraaaion aquationa 62 
Tabla 6.5. Fareantaga diatribution of LTEAR, aingla population 
only 67 
Tabla 6.6. Fareantaga diatribution of FLTEAR by household typ# 68 
Table 7.1. Benefit incidence of tha 1972 old-age insurance 
program 75 
Table 7.2. Effect of tha earnings test and cost-of-living 
indexing on tha distribution of redistribution 
(expresied in percentage terma) for socioeconomic' 
adjusted annuity benefits 80 
Table 7.3. Changes in tha percentage of redistribution under 
different survivorship probability assumptions 81 
Table 7.4. Total annuity benefit received in 1972 controlling for 
survivorship assumption, indexing, and earnings test 86 
Table 7.5. Percentage point gap between poorest and richest 
income groups 87 
Table 7.6. Effect of differential life expectancies of females on 
benefit incidence for single workers controlling for 
total OAl contributions 88 
Table 7.7. Effect of differential life expectancies of males on 
benefit incidence for single workers controlling for 
total OAI contributions 89 
vi 
Pig« 
Tabic 7.8. Efface of diffaraneial lifa axpactanciaa of famalaa on 
banafie incidanea for married vorkera controlling for 
total OAI eontributiona, famalaa only 92 
Table 7.9. Effect of differential life expactanciaa of malaa on 
benefit incidence for married workera controlling for 
total OAI eontributiona, malaa only 93 
Table 7.10. Effect of retirement year on benefit incidence for 
aingla workera 96 
Table 7.11. Population diatribution for married, both retired 
houaeholda by family income in 1977 and family type 98 
Table 7.12. Effect of the wife'e work atattM on wife-only benefit 
incidence holding family income conatant (type-6, 
eaminga a^ juated) 99 
Table 7.13. Compariion of OAI and type-6, eaminga adjusted 
annuity banefita for married women with different 
labor-homemaker choice# holdii^  family income 
conatant 100 
Table 7.14. Effect of the wife'a work atatua on huaband-only 
benefit incidence holding family income conatant 
(type-6, earnings adjusted) 103 
Table 7.15. Comparison of OAI and type-6, adjusted annuity 
benefits for married men in one-earner and two-earner 
households holding family income constant 104 
Table 7.16, Effect of the wife'e work status on family benefit 
incidence holding total family income constant 106 
Table 7.17, Diatribution of income for both retired population, 
before and after payment of social security benefits 117 
Table 7.18, Distribution of social security benefits to both 
retired population by percentage share 119 
Table 7.19. Distribution of redistribution components by quintile 
group controlling for family type and sex 121 
Table 7,20, Distribution of income for married, both retired 
population before and after apportioning the 
redistribution component 122 
vil 
Pig« 
Ttbl* 7.21. Singl* r«gf«##ion model variables and expected 
coefficient eigne for modela 1, 2, 3, and 4 by 
aurvlvorahip aaaumption 125 
Table 7.22. Summary statistics for independent variables employed 
in the single regression models 126 
Table 7.23, Single regression results* Model 1 under different 
survivorship assumptions 128 
Table 7.24. Single regression results* Model 2, under 
different survivorship assumptions 131 
Table 7.25. Single regreaaion results* Model 3 under different 
survivorship aaaumptiona 133 
Table 7.26. Single regression results* Model 4, under different 
survivorship sssumptions 136 
Table 7.27. Single regression results* Comparison of models 1, 
2, and 4 uaing gender-merged survivorship 
probabilities 137 
Table 7.28. Single regression results* Comparison of models 1, 
2, and 4 using socioeconomic-ad)uated 
survivorship probabilities 138 
%ble 7.29. Married regression model variables and expected 
coefficient signs for models 5, 6, 7, and 8 by 
survivorship aaaumption 141 
Table 7.30. Summary statistics for independent variables 
employed In the married regression models 143 
Tmble 7.31. Married regression results: Model 5 under different 
survivorship assumptions 144 
Table 7.32. Married regression results; Model 6 under different 
survivorship assumptions 149 
Table 7.33. Married regression results: Model 7 under different 
survivorship assumptions 153 
Table 7.34. Married regression results: Model 8 under different 
survivorship assumptions 156 
Table 7.35. Married regression results: Comparison of models 5, 
6, and 8 using gender-merged survivorship 
probabilities 159 
vill 
Pag« 
Tabic 7.36. Married ragraaaion raaultat Coopariaon of nodala 5» 
6, and 8 uaing #ocloaconomle-a«yuacad aurvivorahip 
probabilltiaa 160 
Tabla 11.1. Mirkat yialda on O.S. govamoane aaeuritiaa ae 
eonatant maturiey, 1937-1972 197 
Tabla 11.2. Eatimacion arror 198 
Tabla 12.1. Summary ataeiatica 202 
Tabla 12.2. Aga dlaerlbueion by raca, marital atatua, and #a% 203 
Tabla 12.3. Yaar of ratiramant diatribution by marital atatua, 
aa%, and aga 204 
Tabla 12.4. Diatribution bf yaara of achool eomplatad and family 
incoma in 1972, man only 205 
Tabla 12.5. Diatribution Iqr yaara of achool eomplatad and family 
incoma in 1972, woman only 206 
Tabla 12.6. Diatribution of claim atatua by lax, marital atatua, 
and %a 207 
Table 13.1. Annual ratum rate on U.S. government bonda and 
atock market, 1937-1972 209 
Table 13.2. Cdnaiawr price index, U.S. city average, all itema, 
1937-1972 210 
Table 13.3. OAl contribution and tax baae, 1937-1972 211 
Table 13.4. Sex-neutral survivor probabilities 212 
Table 13.5. Age-aex-race specific survivor probabilities 213 
Table 14.1. Comparison of accumulated contributions 216 
Tsble IS.l. Aggregate data for Table 7.1 218 
Table 15.2. Changes in the percentage of redistribution due to 
indexing for married, both retired households 219 
Table 15.3. Changes in the percentage of redistribution under 
different survivorship probability assumptions, 
noneaming test adjusted for married, both retired 
households 220 
ix 
Page 
Table 15.4. Swmwry percentage point coopariaona for married, both 
retired houaeholda by annuity type, lex, and household 
type 221 
Table 15.3. Male to female differencea in percentage of 
redistribution controlling for family income and 
family type 222 
Table 15.6. Family type differencea in percentage of 
rediatribution controlling for family income and sex 223 
Table 15.7. Nonindexed to indexed differences in percentage of 
rediatribution controlling for family income and 
houaehold unit 224 
X 
LIST OP P16URES 
Page 
Pigure 7.1. Progreaaivity of the OAl program uaing 
aoeioeeononie-adjuatad annuity beneCita controlling 
for eaminga teat and indexing 78 
Pigure 7.2. Progreaaivity of the OAl program uaing different 
aurvival probability aaatmptiona 85 
Pigure 7.3. Graphical compariaon of rediatribution eomponenta, 
expreatad in percentage teraa» by sex and houaehold 
type 108 
Pigure 7.4. Oiatribution of rediatribution conponenta in 
percentage terma by houaehold type 111 
Pigure 7.5. Progreaaivity of the OAl program by houaehold type, 
femalea only 113 
Pigure 7.6. Progreaaivity of the OAl program by houaehold type, 
malea only 114 
Pigure 7.7. Progreaaivity of the OAl program by houaehold type 115 
Pigure 11.1. Compariaon in five-year estimation errora: Eatimated 
0.8. yielda relative to known yields for 1953-1970 
and corporate bond yields relative to yielda on 0.8. 
aecurity yielda for 1953-1970 199 
1 
X. STATEMENT OP INQUIRY AND RESULTS 
For nearly five daeadat, tha iocial aaeurity program^  has grown In 
aeopa, worker coverage, budgetary significance, and, until quite 
recently, popularity. However, the federal Old-Age, Survivors, 
Disability, and Health Xnaurance (OASONl) program haa entered a new phase 
in its long, convoluted history—a phase marked by public confusion, 
critical debate, budgetary insolvency, and controveray. This 
dissertation investigates a cauae of the controveray, the income 
rediatribution objective of the program. The old-age inaurance portion 
of the social security program haa two primary objactivea: 1) to insure 
retirees against economic risk over an uncertain retirement period when 
potential eaminga are low or lero; and 2) to rediatribute income within 
an «%e cohort and acroaa generations. The former objective alters the 
pattern of income receipts across the individual's life cycle, whereas 
the latter altera the diatribution of lifetime income within an age 
cohort and across generations. (Krer time, policymakers have shifted the 
emphaais of the progrma way from traditional inaurance principles, or 
"individual equity," toward a diatribution of benefita baaed on the 
presumptive needs of retired persons and their dependents, or "social 
adequacy." 
"^Social security* is broadly definW as the federal Old-Age, 
Survivors, Disability, and Health Inaurance (OASDHl) program. Prior to 
1966 «ben the health inaurance program ww added, it was referred to as 
OASDl. This paper confines its analysis to the old-age (OA!) portion of 
OASroi, «iiich includes primary worker, spousal, transitional, and special 
age-72 benefits. 
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The prlaery, although mot exelualve, «phaala of the program has 
become an attempt to extend e minimum standard of income security to all 
"effectively" retired persons in pursuance of social justice. The 
apparent dual nature of the progrn wes not problematic until recently 
because tsxes were kept at acceptable levels, covered retirees were 
generally net gainers, and, to a lesser extent, the program was conve­
niently csst in a traditional insurance-like framework. The first 
generstion of OAI beneficieries received exorbitant rates of return on 
prior OAl contributions owing to the fact that they had few years of 
coversge in the progrès and a relatively long benefit collection period. 
Subsequent generations have benefitted from the relative immaturity of 
the program, irtiich made possible extremely low tax rates and frequent 
increases in benefit levels. As the system matures, meaning the contri­
bution period eclipses the entire work history, the size of the inter-
generational transfer will diminish. In addition, the probability of 
beii% a net loser will increase, drawii^  further attention to the cause 
of the potential loser-gainer scenario—the redistribution objective,* 
This dissertation does not address the legitimacy of the redistribu-^  
tioo objective; instead, it seeks to examine the program's effectiveness 
in redistributing income within mâ across retirement cohorts. Four 
interrelated issues are investigated; 1) Does the OAI portion of the 
P^arsons and Nuoro (1977) find that within the next 50 years the 
intergenerational transfer will disappear completely; hence, each retire­
ment cohort wiU distriWte amongst its members the amoimt of money they 
initially paid into the program. Similar results regardi^  the diminu­
tion of the intergenerational transfer were found hf Freiden et al, 
(1976) and Burkhauser and Marlick (1981) (see Chapter 111), 
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•oeial ««eurity program radiaeributa Income in favor of lotf income 
beneficiariea? 2) Doea Che current OAl program radiafcribute benefice in 
favor of women, aa a group, at Che expenae of their male counterpart#? 
3) Row doea the wife'a work atatua affect the diatribution of OAl 
benefita within and acroaa family typea? 4) Are apouaal benefit# di#tri-
butad principally to needy, dependent apouaea? Anawera to the aforemen­
tioned queation# are needed to aaaeaa the effectivenea# of the current 
OAl program in aatiafying ita intented objectivea and to ahed light on 
inequitiea and inadequaciea reaulting from apecific proviaiona in the 
law. 
The diatributional impact of the OAl program ia iaolated by 
"diaentangling" or "decoupling** the inaurance portion of the OAl benefita 
from the rediatribution portion. The inaurance diaantanglament employ# 
the actuarial atandard of Burhhauaer and Warlick (1981), whereby a 
retired worker'# 1972 OAl benefit level i# compared to the benefit level 
the worker would have received from purchaaing an actuarially fair life 
annuity with hi# or her accumulated OAl contribution on the date of 
retirement. (Burkbauaer «id Warlick define thia difference aa the 
"tranafer component.") Ihe life-cycle framework deviaed by Burkbauaer 
and Warlick i# extended in thi# diaaertation to account for the monthly 
disburaement of OAl benefit# and price indexing. This approach allows us 
to measure the distributional effects of the progressive benefit formula, 
spousal benefits, and price inditing. 
Chapter 11 presents a brief historical overview of the OAl program 
with emphasis placed on features of the law to be examined in this study. 
4 
Evidence from previoua empirical studies investigating the distributional 
impact of the social security program are discussed in Chapter HI. The 
life-cycle model and conditions for an actuarially fair retirement system 
are presented in Chspter XV. In Chapter V, the assumptions underpinning 
the modelt the data set and sorting technique, computational formulas, 
annuity-type counterfactuals, and redistribution estimates are briefly 
explained. The generalised quadratic regression models by marital 
status, and a detailed discussion of the model variables are presented in 
Chapter VI. In Chapter VII, descriptive evidence and evidence from the 
estimation of the rsgresslon models are presented and Interpreted. A 
summary and wncluslons appear in Chapter VIII. 
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. 1935 Old-Ag# Inmurane# Prograa 
The foeial Mcuricy progrm in etw United Scacea ia a dynamic 
federal income maintenance program, which haa evolved over ita brief 49-
year hiatory from a atrictly worker-only retirement program to a full-
fledged, comprehensive old-age social inaurance program. The 1935 old-
age program provided retirement benefita to covered workera only. 
Benefit levela were a function of total covered wages earned by the 
worker over her work hiatory, and financed by a flat-rate payroll tax 
leviW on the employee and employer. Although the OAl program waa 
partially funded, it was not distributionally neutrsl. Initial benefit 
levels were determined by a mildly progreaaive benefit formula, and 
benefit paymenta were not adjuated to reflect different life expectancies 
of male and female beneficiaries. Hence, even in the early years of the 
program (prior to 1940, when the first benefits were paid) aome redia-
tribution within a cohort, though not across cohorts, ws mandated. 
B. Spousal Benefit Provision 
A major drawback to the initial program was its relative ineffec­
tiveness in providing adequate income protection for dependents of 
covered workers, and soon-to-be and already retired workers. Incremental 
changes in benefit coverage and fundii% principles were introduced in the 
form of mendments to the Social Security Act of 1935 to enhance the 
effectiveness of the program in pursuit^  the goal of income adequacy for 
6 
«g«d paraont—•the nation'a mat idantifiabla Inpovariahad group* The 
1939 aoandoanta providad apouaal and aurvlvor banafita for woman oiarriad 
to eovarad workara. 
Tha 1937-1939 Adviaory Gouneil'a racommandation for noncontributory» 
aupplamantal aaeurity banafita to wivaa and widowa of eovarad workara waa 
a eonacioua attaapt to amallorata tha aeonomie hardahlpa Impoaad on thia 
group of woman baeauaa of tha ineidantal ratiramant or daath of tha 
primary aamar who, at that tima, did not hava auffieiant aaminga 
hiatory to aatiafy hia own aeonomie naada in ratiramant lat alona thoaa 
of hia dapandanta,^  Tha raeaipt and abaoluta alia of tha aupplnantal 
banafita wara linkad to tha hwaband'a aaminga hiatory, praaarvii^  tha 
Uluaion of an inauranea program, Tha awpplamantal banafita providad 
family protaction, although eontributiona wara baaW on an individual 
workar'a amploymant and aamiiHia Matory axeluaivaly. Tha OAl program 
lagialatad in 1939, and to a larga axtant oparating today, affactivaly 
aubaidizad tha traditional family atructura eharaetariatie of that time 
period. It ia, howavar. Important to nota that tha Council'a 
raeMoandatiott waa raflaetiva of tha aocio-cultural-aconomie mlliau of 
that period. 
The typieal American family in the late 1930a waa characterised by 
life-long marriagea where the female aaaumed the primary reaponaibility 
N^oncontributory, supplemental security benefits were not extended 
to husbands of female workers until 1950, In 1950, husband and widower 
benefits were extended to the Iwsband of a female worker if he could 
prove that one-half of his support came fro# his working wife or deceased 
wife. The "dependency test" was stricken from the law after it was 
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1977 (Califano v. 
Goldfarb), 
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for nuturanc* and home management and the male assumed the "breadwinner" 
role. Harried tiomen» aa a group, had weak labor force attachments and, 
as a consequence, were disproportionately represented outside the labor 
force. (In 1939, only otw out of four married women worked outside tfw 
home, and three out of 20 households had both husband and wife employed 
outside the home simultaneously.) Most women, therefore, lacked 
independent OAX protection. The presumption of dependency, on behalf of 
ell women, was consistent with demgraphic characterietice and did 
eliminate a severe inadequacy present in the original version of the 
strictly worker-only retirement progrn. 
The Cduncil realised that in the near future, and especially in the 
distant future, married women would be dually entitled to both primary 
and spousal retirement benefits. The provision of overlapping benefits 
to married women as independent earners and dependent spouses was 
inconsistent with the intent of the noncontributory, supplemental 
security benefit provisions—protecting a needy group from economic 
hardship resulting from the "breadwinner's'* retirement or death. To 
avoid the overlapping benefit problem, the dual-entitlement provision was 
introduced in injunction with suppleowntal benefits as a variant of a 
means test. Accordii^  to the dual-mntitlement provision, if a married 
woman is entitled to two benefits simultaneously—primary and spousal 
(survivor)—she will receive the larger of the two benefits. The base of 
her benefits is her own primary benefit amount which is then augmented by 
the difference between her supplemental benefit and primary benefit 
amounts. The dual-entitlement provision was a ooncontroversial addition 
8 
to the progran because it pertained to a small fraction of the entire 
beneficiary population, and it vas consistent with the generally accepted 
social adequacy goal of the program. 
As mentioned above, the provision of spousal and survivor benefits 
to women married to covered workers in accordance with the dual-entitle-
ment rule was noncontroversial in light of the demographic character­
istics of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. However, as women, especially 
married women, increased their participation in the labor force, a 
greater proportion of female beneficiaries qualified for independent as 
well as dependent's benefits.^  Since the dual-entitlement provision 
guarantees th# dually entitlW women the larger of the two benefits, she 
must forego th# other benefit to which she is entitled. The design of 
th# program gives preferential treatment to dependent, nonworking married 
women vis-i-vis independent, working married women. A nonworking married 
woman receives dependent spousal benefits (equal to 50 percent of her 
husband's ^ imary insurance amount (PIA)) at a sero marginal cost, 
trtiereas a workii% married woman receives dependent spousal benefits at a 
marginal cost equal to h#r total OAI contributions, or primary worker 
benefits at a marginal cost equal to SO percent of her husband's PIA, 
îh« working married woman may, either totally or fractionally, duplicate 
protection already afforded to her when classified as a dependent on her 
'Hiere was a 20-fold increase from 1950 to 1971 in women receiving 
primary-worker benefits. At the end of 1971, there were 23 million adult 
beneficiaries of which 13.8 million were women. Fifty percent of the 
female beneficiaries were receiving primary-worker benefits and 50 
percent were claiming auxiliary benefits. The average monthly check for 
female beneficiaries wss $100 (Bixby, 1972). 
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husband's account* Hsnct, the duel-entitlement provision acts aa an 
implicit tax on the Horkii^  married woman, aince aha receivea only 
marginal accrationa to bar benefit level in return for her contributions 
into the program. The dual-entitlement provision implicitly pénalités 
the working woman for aaeking financial independence and subsidisea the 
financial dependency of the nonworking married wotMn. The effect of the 
dual-entitlement proviaion may, eapecially in light of legislated 
increases in the payroll t« and the relatively low earninga potential of 
moat femalea, have an increaaingly aavere work-diaincentive effect, and, 
in addition, may erode the progress women, ss a group, have made in 
achieving financial liberation. 
In addition to generatix^  inequitiea acroaa married women who have 
made different labor-hwamakar decisions, ths provision of noncontribu-
tory, mpplemental benefits generates inequities across household types, 
depending on marital statua and the diviaion of earnings within the 
household. A two-earner household with equal earnings (a household where 
the husband and wife are gainfully employed outside the home) will 
receive lower combined benefits relative to a one-earner household (a 
household i*ere either the Iwsbsnd or wife is gainfully employed outside 
the home) if the combined eamii^ s of the two-earner unit is less than 
the taxable maximum for a single-earner, A two-earner household receives 
higher benefits compared to a one-earner household when their combined 
eamii%s are greater than the taxable maximum for a single earner; 
however, the two-earner couple pays more in the form of contributions to 
receive the higher benefit level (Bixby, 1972). The inequities between 
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tha ona-aarncr and t«o-tarnar houaaholdi have bacoma mora pronounead in 
light of tha historic four-dacada upatring in tha amploymant participation 
of woman. 
Singla paraona, of aithar tax» ara placad in a strategically 
inferior position in a retirement program that provides family protection 
based on an individual worker financing scheme. Single households are 
aaaigned the same tax liability aa married houaeholda; however, the 
married household is afforded a greater package of benefits. Single and 
married workera are treated equally on the contribution aide of the 
program, but they are treated as unequala on the benefit side since the 
married houaehold ia eligible for dependent benefits not similarly 
extended to a aingle peraon. 
The inequities resulting from the 1939 amendments may, at firat 
bluah, appear juatified in light of the social adequacy objective. 
However, the features of the progrès and the incidental inequities must 
be juxtaposed to modem demographic characteriatics to aacertain whether 
or not the actual effect of the law is consistent with its intent. The 
payment of spousal benefits presumes the financial dependency of the 
married woman and a traditional foaily structure. The traditional 1939 
family does not typify the fasâly of the 1980s or of the future. The 
modem family is characterised by interdependency rather than dependency. 
That is, the typical family tod^  is an interdependent economic unit in 
which partnera, of either sex, have occupational choice and, to a large 
extent, are not forced to asswie sterotypical roles mandated by societal 
norms, Hpmen, aa a group, are exercising their right to occupational 
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choica and «««king eovcrtd «nployocnc outside the home*^  This protracted 
trend vill intensify the inequities among women «ho have made different 
labor-homemsker decisions. These inequities are a direct result of 
noncontributory, supplemental security benefits coupled with the dual-
entitlement provision. 
There remeins a shrinking proportion of women who choose to be home-
makers and, therefore, msy need income protection in their retirement 
2 years. According to the OAZ progrn, the group of modem-day homemakers 
is presumed to be an identifiably needy group. Information on the 
pattern of lifetime work for married women is incomplete; however, most 
empirical evidence s%%gests that there is m inverse relationship between 
fmily income (net of the wife's earnings) and a wife's labor force 
participation (Boskin, 1973; Cain, 1966; Carfinkel and Mssters, 1977). 
This evidence suggests that the homemaker choice is a more viable option 
for high-income families, which would tend to refute the needy-group 
argument supporting the provisions of noncontributory, supplementary 
benefits, Rolden (1979), using a sii^ le-period analysis, found that 
supplemental benefits were disbursed proportionately to couples in all 
income categories. Thus, spousal benefits were beiim distributed to 
I^n 1940, 17 percent of married wwen were represented in the labor 
force compared to 52 percent in 1981. The labor force participation of 
women is expected to continue its upward trend in the future. The 
actuaries of the Social Security Administratis* project a labor force 
participation rate of approximately 67 percent in 1990 for women age 25 
to 54. 
I^n 1984, only six percent of all families were made up of the 
traditional nuclear family where the mm works and the wman is a full-
time homemaker. 
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•poutas who ware not n««dy according to povarty aeandarda. this Isaua is 
addrasaad in a lifa-eyela contaxe to datamina if aupplamantal banafits 
adaquataly aarva tha 1939 objactiva of protacting a group of agad paraona 
axparianeing aeonoaic hardahip. In addition, aax diffarantiala in 
survivorahip ara amployad to datamina if votMn» aa a group, are mada 
diffarantially battar off ralativa to thair mala counterparts sinca OA! 
banafits ara not adjusted to account for different life expectancies 
between men and %fonen of the aame age. 
C. Progreasive Benefit Formula 
Traditional inaurance funding principles were abandoned in 1939 for 
deficit financing, or what is more commonly referred to as "pay-as-you-
go" financing. The deficit financing provision mandated intergenera-
tional transfer# from the currently working population to the retired, 
nonworking population.^  The disbursement of benefits to retired persons 
was based on a progressive benefit formula. The formula has become 
slightly more progressive over time. 
The OAl program, by design, favors lowincome households through the 
retirement benefit formula uaed to determine the worker's primary 
T^he "Ponsi-like" financing scheme is financially sound provided 
economic and population growth exceed the growth in the size of the 
retirement population (Pecbman et al., 1968; Samuelson, 1958). 
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insurance mount (PXA) (rem her average monthly earnings (AME).^  the 
retirement benefit formula ia atructured to pttf higher marginal and 
average benefit ratea aa the benefit baae (AMB) decreaaes. Therefore, 
the replacement rate (the ratio of retirement benefits to preretirement 
earnings) is higher for lovincome households relative to high-income 
households. But high-income households receive more cash benefits per 
month in absolute dollars. The original OAI benefit formula was mildly 
progressive. The formula applied to average monthly earnings limited to 
$230 and paid 40 percent of the first $50 plus ten percent of the next 
$200. This formula has been periodically revised to favor low-income 
households. In 1972, the formula paid 108.01 percent of the first $110 
plus 39.39 percent of the next $290 plus 36.71 percent of the next $150 
plus 43.15 percent of the next $100 plus 24 percent of the next $100 plus 
20 percent of the next $250. 
This study exmminea the distributional impact of the progressive 
benefit formula to ascertain «4iether, in fact, low-income beneficiaries 
receive preferential treatment in the disbursement of benefits vis-l-vis 
high-income beneficiaries. The progressivity of the benefit formula has 
T^he average monthly earnings is a summary measure of the worker's 
earnings history calculated by summing the total taxable earnings in the 
computation years divided by the number of months in the computation 
period. The AME measure was replaced by a wage indexed base called the 
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) in 1977. The AD» indexes the 
worker's earnings so that taxable earnings earned at different points in 
the life-cycle are expressed in terms of the overall earnings levels 
prevailing in the year of eligibility. The PXA is the basis for all 
benefit payments and is a function of the worker's AME (or AUCE after 
1977). 
14 
been dieputed beeauM of empirical evidence suggeeting that socio­
economic characteristics influence life contingencies. 
D. Actuarial Reduction for Early Retirement 
The actuarial reduction in the monthly benefit amount peyaWe on 
entitlemnt applies to retired workers and dependenta aged 62 to 64. The 
intent of this provision was to equalise the total actuarial value of 
benefits received by the beneficisry independent of the age of 
retirement. In 1936, provisions were added to the law permitting female 
beneficiaries to accept retirement benefits at age 62. If the female 
beneficiary applies for early primary benefits (in advance of age 65), 
her PXA is reduced by 5/9 of one percent per month under sge 65 (maximum 
reduction of 20 percent). Dependents* benefits are reduced by 25/36 of 
one percent per month under age 65 with a maximum reduction cap of 25 
percent. Identical provisions were extended to male beneficiaries in 
1961. 
E. Delayed Retirement Credit 
The benefit level (PIA) is Wjusted upward if the primary benefi­
ciary elects to retire after age 65. Like the actuarial reduction 
provision, the accretion feature was intended to equalize the actuarial 
value of the benefit stream independent of the age of retirement. As of 
1972, a mvered worker's benefit level was adjusted upward if she remains 
actively employed and she does not accept retirement between ages 65 and 
72. Benefits were increased tqr 1/12 of one percent for every month the 
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covered worker postpones retirement after age 65.* Accretions in benefit 
levels ere truncated at age 72. This adjustment in benefits for delaying 
retirement is less than the actuarial adjustment for the shorter life 
expectancies of older beneficiaries; hence, the postponement of retire­
ment is translated into a real loss in benefits over the remaining life 
span.* 
r. Bsrnings Test 
The earnings or retirement test is a type of means test which 
reduces benefits to beneficiaries who continue to work past the sge of 
65, An earnings test has been in effect since 1935. According to the 
1935 earnings test, all retirement benefits would be withheld if 
the beneficiary received any labor earnings during retirement. The 
extortionate nature of this test was, however, relaxed prior to the 
payment of the first benefits in 1940. The 1939 version of tlw earnings 
test permitted labor-related earnings up to $15 per month without the 
loss of retirement benefits; however, all benefits were forfeited if 
earnings exceeded $15. Since 1939, the earnings limit has been augmented 
periodically. 
In 1972, retirement benefits were reduced if the beneficiary 
remained employed after receiving retirement benefits and her earnings 
1983, workers who postpone applying for retirement benefits 
receive benefits that are increased (y three percent for each year 
acceptance is delayed past %e 65 up to a maximum of 15 percent. 
T^he lose in benefits may be partially or fully offset by the 
worker's higher PIA as a result of the worker's extended earnings 
history. 
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«art in «xc««# of 19 percent of the annual taxable maximum. Beneflta 
were reduced by one dollar for every two dollara of poat-retireMnt 
earninga between $1,680 and $2,880, but beneflta were reduced by one 
dollar for every dollar of earninga above $2,880.* However, benefita 
2 
were not reduced for worker-beneficiariea who were 72 or older in 1972. 
From a policy point of view, the earninga teat ia conaiatent with 
the baaic purpoae of aocial aecurity, which ia to fractionally replace 
loat earninga becauae the aged worker retirea from the labor force. But, 
from the beginning, the earninga teat haa been controveraial and atrongly 
criticiied. The **$1 for $2 and $1 for $1" withholding rate (or "$1 for 
$2" wlthholdii^  rate aince 1973) haa been criticised becauae the with­
holding rate appliea to labor income only (excluding nonwork income 
aourcea like dividende, rente, and penaion peymenta) and for diacouraging 
healthy older peraona from aeeking gainful employment in the market. The 
burden of the SO-to-100 percent withholding rate falla heavieat on the 
low-income aged becauae of their greater reliance on aocial aecurity and 
employment earninga for financial aecurity durli^ i retirewnt. Studiea of 
the financial holdinga of tl% {%ed ahow that moat low-income peraona do 
not have acceaa to private penaiona, private inaurance, aavinga, and 
S^ince 1973, benefita were reduced by one dollar for every two 
dollar* of earnings above the eamii^ s ceiling. Beginning January 1, 
1983, worker-beneficiariea age 65 to 70 loat one dollar of beneflta for 
every two dollara of earninga over $6,600 ($550 per month), whereas 
younger retirees, %e 62-64, forfeited on# dollar of benefits for every 
two dollars of eamii^ s over $4,290 ($410 per month), Both earnings 
limits are automatically indexed. 
B^eginni% in 1983, the earnings test applies only to worker-
beneficiaries who are 65 to 70. 
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other nonwork income source* to augment their retirement benefits 
(Freidman and Sjogren, 1981; Murray, 1972; Sherman, 1973). Moat evidence 
suggests that the financial status of lo%Mincome persons remains 
unchanged at the outset of retirement in spite of "social security" for 
several reaaona: 1) retirement benefits only partially replace 
employment earninga; 2) retirement benefita are reduced if the retiree 
has supplemental post-retirement earninga in excess of the earnings 
ceiling; and 3) low-income persons generally have insufficient nonwork 
income sources. 
G. Cost-of-Livix% Adjustment 
In the mid-1960*, influential persons in Cdngress and the executive 
branch began to puah for a bigger role for social aacurity aa an income 
source for the elderly. Congress approved benefit increases of 15 
percent in 1969, ten percent in 1971, and 20 percent in July of 1972. In 
October, 1972, Congreaa paaaed the Social Security Anendmenta of 1972. 
The major feature* of thia legialation were proviaiona for indexing the 
wage baae uaed in computing initial benefita aiwt for using the consumer 
price index to adjuat paymenta to current beneficiariea. Although 
automatic indexing was legislated in 1972, it did not become effective 
until 1975. legislated increase* were substituted for automatic indexing 
in 1973 and 1974.* Benefits paid to current beneficiaries are annually 
T^be «pension of social security beginning in 1969 is described in 
Martha Derthick. Policymaking for Social Security (1979). 
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indexed whenever the consumer price index (CPl) rises hf more than three 
percent.* 
The social security retirement system is intended to insure 
beneficiaries against the economic risk of longevity. Indexing of 
benefits enhances this form of insurance in an inflationary environment* 
Becsuse women, as a group, have a longer life expectancy than men, they 
receive on average more benefits from indexing. Indexing of benefits for 
retired workers keeps intact the relative benefit structure, since all 
benefit atreoM are adjusted by the same index. 
B^enefits are adjusted annually if the CPl changes by three percent 
or more. If the CPl changes by less than three percent in a year, 
benefits will not be indexed until the cumulative change exceeds three 
percent. 
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111. UTBRATUHS REVIEW 
Although the otjoctlv# ch#r#ct#ri#tic# of th# OAl program, including 
the extant of inauranca protection, have changed over time, ita initial 
intent of providing adequate protection againat long-term uncertaintiea 
aaaociatad with the ceaaation of labor force participation becauae of old 
age haa remained undiminiahed. Specific featurea that have been added to 
the program over time, compromiaing ita 1935 inauranca principlea, 
ultimately influence tiM eetimated aiie of the rediatribution component. 
However, the gradual ahifting towarda aocial adequacy haa engendered 
biaaea in the program'a operation. The alleged biaaea include the 
preferential treatment of women, traditional family atructurea, low-
income houaeholda, and nonworkii^  peraona age 65 to 71. A more aubtle, 
but no leaa important, Maa incidental to the program concerna 
differential aurvlvorahip. Mortality atudlea indicate that aiwclfic 
aocloeconomle characterlatlea influence aurvlvor probabllltiea 
(Antonovaky, 1972; Gove, 1973; Kltagawa and Rauaer, 1973; Metropolitan 
Life, 1975),* fo a retirement program that paya beneflta for the 
duration of life, peraona with lower aurvlvor probabllltiea (or ahorter 
life expectanclea), aa reflected by apeclfle, identifiable socloeconmsle 
S^urvivor probabllltiea meaaure the likelihood of an individual life 
age % surviving to life age %+l. 
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factor#, iubaidlM paraona with ralativaly highar aurvlvor probabllltlaa 
(or longar Ufa axpactanciaa).* 
Tha affacta of tha aforaoantlonad biaaaa (program- and ttorkar-
apacific) hava baan Invaatlgatad in nuaaroua empirical atudiaa uaing 
différant data baaea (rapreaantative individual and individual caaa 
hiatory approachaa), model aaaumptiona, equity meaaurea, and program and 
fairneaa definitiona. Ro*wver$ independent of the methodology employed, 
virtually all empirical atudiaa indicate that aocial aecurity 
baneficiariaa retiring prior to 1975 received above-normal rataa of 
return on their contribution dollara, independent of income claaaifica-
tion and other aocioeconomic charactariatica (Aaron, 1974; Brittain, 
1972a; Burkhauaar and Warlick, 1981; Cnpbell and Campbell, 1967; Chen 
and Chu, 1974; Freiden, Wimer md Hoffman, 1976; (Mconkwo, 1976; Osawa, 
1974). Althoi^ h there ia conaanaua on the "money'a-worth** iaaue, there 
ia laaa agreement concerning the overall prograaaivity of the program 
(Aaron, 1974; Freiden, leimer and Hoffman, 1976; Okonkwo, 1976; Oaawa, 
1974). 
Analyses using aingla-period methodology have acknowledged the OAl 
program ac being the moat effective U.S. government program in 
rediatriWting income to an impoverished group (Oanaiger, 1977; Dansiger 
and Flotnick, 1975; Lampman, 1971; Oaawa, 1974). The croaa-sectional 
findings purporcii^  the "success" of tha program, in terms of decreasing 
Hhe effect of socioeconomic factors on mortality is more pronounced 
for persons aged 25-64; however, the effect of these characteristic# is 
still relevant, in most cases, at advanced ages (i.e., age 65 and 
older). 
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income inequality acroaa all income claaaea, can be explained by aeveral 
factora. Firat, the progreaaive benefit formula replacea a larger 
percentage of the lotr-wage earner'a preretirement earninga than for the 
high-wage earner. The rediatributive function of the formula would tend 
to reduce poat-retirement income differential* within a retirement 
cohort, ceteria paribua. Second, a large percentage of the aged ia 
eligible for retirement benefita. The blanket coverage of the program 
enhancea the income poaition of all incovM claaaea within a retirement 
cohort and improvea their income atanding relative to the tiorking popula­
tion. The third factor pertaina to the abaolute aime of the tranafera to 
the aged. Public aaaiatance ia conaidered to be the moat economically 
efficient prograa of all income-maintenance programa; however, social 
aecurity, while being economically leaa efficient, haa the greateat 
rediatributive impact. Thia apparent diaparity between economic 
efficiency and rediatributive impact ia beat explained by the following 
analogy: a 100 percent share of a peanut ia still a peanut, but a SO 
r^cent share of an elephant ia half an elephant. That ia, the amount of 
total benefit# received by the targeted population depends on economic 
efficiency and the total amount of the outlay. In 1971, social security 
(OASDI) and railroad retirenwnt program# paid out $39 billion in cash 
benefits compared to caah benefits totalling $10 billion under public 
assistance. The last factor to be discussed concern# the use of cross-
sectional methodology to aasess the performance of a life-cycle program. 
Cross-sectional inveatigation# into the performance of the social 
security program assess the rediatributive impact of the program by 
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examining the degree of income inequality before and after the payment of 
retirement benefit#. Clearly, thia approach fail# to account for the 
"income amoothing" function of the program; hence, it tend# to overetate 
the rediatributive impact of the program.* Result# derived from the 
#ingle-period analyse# are atrongly disputed by researchers using life-
cycle models of the OA! program. 
Many researchers have investigated the effect of the social security 
program (OAl, 0A81, and 0A8DX) on the distribution of lifetime income 
trithin a life-cycle framework. The diatributional impact haa been 
measured in term# of lifetime internal rates of return, lifetime 
contribution-benefit ratios, and Burkhauser-Varlick-type "transfer" 
components (initial OASl benefit levels less the benefit received from a 
life annuity purchaaed with the worker'a accumulated 0A81 contributions 
on the date of retirement). The absolute sise of the distributional 
impact measure has been found to be sensitive to specific identifiable 
factors, such a# date of retirement, marital status, sex, race, income 
class, education level, and age at entry and retirement. The empirical 
estimates of redistribution also depend on the richness of the data base 
and the model assumptions regarding benefit inclusion, payroll tax 
shifting, life expectancy tables, and market interest rates. Several of 
the major findings from studies using each measure are discussed below. 
t^he "income smoothing" feature of the program focuses on the 
transfer of labor earnings from th« worker's high earnings years to her 
retirement years through the contribution-benefit mechanism of the 
program. 
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Studiai inv«te£gating th« «xtane to which the locial security 
program radiatributam lifatima incooa among aubgroupa of an aga cohort 
uaing an intamal rata of raturn maaaura hava ganarally found that tha 
intamal rata of ratum on OAI (OASDl) contributiona ia nagativaly 
ralatad to ineona» data of ratiramant, aga at ratiramant (ralativa to aga 
65), education laval, and poaitivaly ralatad to aga at antry. Internal 
ratea of return ware alio found to be higher for women, nonwhite racea, 
and married peraona. Furthermore, ratea of return were found to be 
higher for all lubgroupa the leaa the aaiumad backward shifting of the 
employer'a share of the payroll tax. Similarly, the absolute aiae of the 
rate of return for specific socioeconomic groups varied depending on the 
extent to which life expectancy tables were disaggregated. Also, real 
internal ratea of return were foui^  to be aignificantly smaller than 
nominal ratea, where the gap between the real and nominal meaauras 
inereaaed the larger the inflation rate relative to the annual rate of 
growth of retirement benefita. 
The moat comprahenaiva atudies uaing the internal rate of return 
maaaure have been conducted by Okonfcwo (1976) and Freiden et al. (1976). 
Okonkwo, uaing longitudinal age-earning profilea eatimated from four 
auccesaive O.S. population censuses and life expectancies disaggregated 
by sex, race, and education levela, found that the internal rates of 
return were higher for couples relative to single persons, higher for 
nonwhites relative to whites, and higher for households located in the 
south as opposed to the north. He also found that rates of return varied 
inversely with education level; specifically, workers with eight years of 
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•chooling received the highest return end vorkers with 16 or nwre yeers 
of schooling received the lowest internel rete of return, independent of 
race, méritai status, region, sex, or type of tsx (OAI, OASDX). However, 
the degree of redistribution, measured by the gap between the internal 
rates of return across education levels, for the white subgroup is 
reduced by t*m longer life expectancies for white persons with more 
education; hence, the degree of progressivity (attributable to the 1974 
benefit formule) was weekened when a<^ usting for the larger survivor 
probabilities for whites with more education. In concluaion, Okonkwo 
argues that the social security program redistributes income to blacks 
snd lowHlncoae whites as intended by the law, but that the redistribution 
effect is dampened by the differential survivorship probabilities. Aaron 
(1974), on the other hand, finds that differential mortality rates fully 
offset the progressivity built into the retirement benefit formula; 
hence, the redistribution flow is reversed, having a perverse effect on 
the distribution of lifetime income. 
Freiden et al, (1976), using the Continuous Work History Survey and 
survivorship probabilities disaggregated by age, sex, and race, found the 
OAI program to be "very" progressive. That is, internal rates of return 
were fourni to be significantly higher for low-income subgroups relative 
to high-income subgroups. Like Okonkm, Freiden et al. found that women 
received higWr real rates of return than men, everything else equal. 
Other studies have estimated contriWtion-benefit (C-B) ratios and 
"transfer" components to measure redistribution. These studies generally 
support the findings of the studies employing internal rates of return. 
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Th# C-B •tudi«« tlMW that the C-B oaaaura la nagativaly calatad co eha 
oarkat intaraae rata uaad to aeeuaulata eontrlbutlona and dlaeount 
banaflta (Brlttaln, 1972a; Chan and Chu, 1974). Burkhauaar and Varllek 
(1981), ualng tha 1973 Exaet Kateh Fila to aatlnata annuity-typa 
"tranafar" coaponanta, found that all Ineooa daaaaa In tha 1972 ratlra-
mant cohort raealvad poaltlva banaflt tranafara from tha (MI program. In 
addition, thay found that tha «mount of radlatrlbutlon, naaaurad In 
abaoluta dollara, waa roughly aqual for high- and low-lneoma aubgroupa. 
Th# mlddla-lncoma aubgroup raealvad tha largaat tranafar from tha program 
ovarall. 
Th# hlghar rataa of ratum aaaoelatad with marital atatua, data of 
ratlramant, ag# at ratlramant, and Incoma can b# axplalnad by th# 
progr«*8 daalgn In injunction with dlffarantlal iurvlvorahlp probablll-
tlaa. Other factors Influanclng the alza of OAI ratuma, auch aa tax, 
raca, md éducation, can b# explained by differential aurvlvorahlp 
probabllltlea. 
The higher returns associated with marital status are attributable 
to tw Independent factors; 1) the QAI progrm, by design, subsidizes 
the traditional (one-earner) family atructure throi^ h the provision of 
spousal benefits In accordance with the dual-entitlement rule; and 
2) married persons. Independent of race and sex, have longer life 
expectancies, on average, than their nonmarrled, divorced, or widowed 
counterparts. 
The first factor is related to the program's design whereby a 
nonworking married person receives dependent spousal benefits (equal to 
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SO percent of the epouec'e primary ineurance amount (PIA)^ ) at a aero 
coat, whereaa a working married person receivea dependent apouaal 
benefita at a coat equal to her total OAI contrihutiona or primary worker 
benefita at a coat equal to 50 percent of her apouae*a PXA» Recall 
according to tiM dual-entitlement provision, a person entitled to two 
benefits aimultaneoualy will receive the larger of the two benefita, but 
muat forego the other benefita to which aha ia entitled. A aimilar 
partiality towards married couplea ia exposed when single persons are 
compered to married peraona claiming dependenta' benefita with the ame 
prior wntrikitiona. The aingle person receivea a lower rate of return 
on her (his) initial QAI contributions relatiw to a married peraon 
colleetii^  dependents* benefits with the same OAl contributions, aince a 
married person ia eligible for dependenta* benefits not similarly 
extended to a single person without dependents. Airkhauaer (1979), uaing 
data from the 1973 Exact Hatch File, found that one-earner married 
couples fare better than either two-earner married couplea or aingle 
individuals because one-earner households receive spousal benefits at no 
additional charge, and aingle persona are forced to participate in a 
retirement aystea designed for married persona. 
The second factor pertains to the longer life expectancy of married 
persona. Mortality atudiea conclusively show that married persona of 
each race and sex have longer life expectancies than nonmarried, 
divorced, or widowed counterparts (Gove, 1973; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; 
*7be primary ineurance amount i# the amount payable to a retired 
worker who begins to receive retirement benefits at age 65, 
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Httropollean Llf«, 1975). Xt it Inetraaelng to not# that eha diffarancaa 
battfaan marriad and unmarriad ataeuaaa ara much graaear for man Chan for 
woman. For inaeanca. %4iiea, aingla malaa aga 65 and ovar axparianead 
mortality 44 parcant graatar than tha laval of whita, married malaa 
comparably agad. Similarly, whita, aingla famalaa aga 65 and ovar hava 
mortality 1avala nina parcant higher than comparably agad white, married 
femalea. A aingla perion haa a shorter life expectancy, on average, 
relative to a married pareon of roughly tha aam# age, everything elae 
equal. Both of thaae factora taken together exert upward praaaura on the 
rate of return on OAl contributiona for tha traditional family atructura 
relative to tha nontraditional family atructura, although married 
paraona, ona-eamar or two-earner, fare batter than aingla paraona. 
Iha data-of-retiremant factor raflacta tha relative maturity or 
immaturity of tha retirement program.* Iha firat generation of OAl 
ratireea received exorbitant rataa of return on thair prior 041 contribu­
tiona owing to tha fact that they had few yeara of coverage in the 
program and a relatively long period of benefit collection. Subiiequent 
generatiotta hava banafitted from tha ralativa innaturity of tha program, 
which made poaaibla axtramaly low tm rataa and frequant incraaaaa in 
benefit lavala. Aa tha syaten maturea, meaning tha contribution period 
eclipaaa the entire work history, tha sise of the intargenerational 
tranafer and subsequent rates of return on prior 0A81 contributions will 
diminish. Parsons and Munro (1977) contend that within the next 50 years 
takes apprœtimately 40 years for a retirement program to reach 
full maturity. 
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tha lne«rgM«rafcional tranafar will diaappaar eomplacaly; hanca, each 
raelrataant cohort will diatrlbuta amongat ita naobara tha amount of mmnay 
thay Initially paid into tha program. Fraidan at al. (1976) atudiad tha 
ratiramant cohort# from 1967 through 1970 focuaing on workar-only 
banaficiariaa. Although all coafficianta wara amall, thay found that tha 
1968 ratiraaa* rata# of ratum wara 2.27 parcant highar than tha 1967 
ratiraaa*, vharaaa tha 1969 ratiraaa* rataa of ratum wara 1.76 parcant 
lowar than tha 1967 ratiraaa*. Ihara waa no aignificant diffaranca found 
batuaan tha rataa of ratum for tha 1970 and 1967 ratiraaa. Burkhauaar 
and Varlick (1981) found a ganaral daelina in tha parcantaga of 
radiatribtttion ovar time. By dividing tha 1972 cohort into thraa aga 
cohortai 66-67, 72-75, 81-85, thay found that tha oldaat aga cohort 
racaivad tha largaat intarganarational tranafar# and that tha youngaat 
aga cohort racaivad tha cmallaat. 
Income ia m important factor in determining the overall prograa-
aivity of the OAl program. The program, by deaign, favor# low-income 
houaeholda through the retirement benefit formula UMd to determine the 
worker*# PXA from Iwr (hi#) average mnthly eaminga (ANC).^  The 
retirement benefit formula i# structured to pay higher marginal and 
average benefit ratea aa the benefit baae (AME) decreasea. Therefore, 
the replacement rate (the ratio of retirement benefits to preretirement 
earnings) is higher for low-income units relative to hi^ -income units, 
T^he average monthly earnings is a summary measure of the worker's 
earnings history calculated hy summing the total taxable earnings in the 
computation years divided by the nmiber of months in the computation 
period. The PIA is a function of the worker's AME. 
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although high-lncoaa unita raeelva mora caah banallta par month In 
abaoluta dollara. Moat atudiaa hava found tha OAI program to ba prograa-
aiva. Fraldan at al. (1976) aatimatad tha alaatieity of tiM internal 
rata of return with reapect to lifetime income for OAI benefita of -.278. 
Other atudiaa uaing a broader definition of benefita and more 
diaaggragated mortality ratea have ahotm laaa prograaaivity than the 
Freiden et al. atudy (Okonkwo, 1976s Aaron, 1974). 
The age-at-ratirement factor influaneea tha aiia of the return 
becauae of the early-retirement and delayed-retirement featurea of the 
program. Paraona vho chooae to remain employed between the agea of 65-72 
receive additional retirement benefita according to the number of 
incremental montha employed during thia age period. The PIA ia increaaed 
by 1/12 of one percent for each month retirement ia delayed after age 65 
with a naxinua a^ fuatment of aeven percent if the worker should remain 
employed until age 72. The accretion to the PIA* however» imderatatea 
the ahorter life expectancy of the worker who delaya retirement. 
Alternatively, the actuarial reduction in the PIA for early retirement 
(retirement age of 62 to 64) ia exceaaive. Freiden et al* (1976) found 
that the optiwm age at retirement, in terma of maximizing the internal 
rate of return, ia 65. 
The laat factor to influence the rate of return or extent of 
rediatributton ia differential mortality ratea. The Kitagawa and Hauser 
atudy (1973) on differential mortality ratea in the United Statea 
indicates that socioeconomic factors, especially sex, race, occupation, 
income, eduction, and marital status, influence the individual's 
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probability of dying at (surviving to) a apacific lifa aga. Tha affaet 
of marital statua on survival waa mantionad aarliar and, hanca, will not 
ba diseusaad furthar. Mortality ratas vara found to ba nagativaly 
ralatad to ineoma and adueation, which alicit tha oppoaita affaet of tha 
prograssiva banafit formula on rataa of raturn. Mortality ratas «ara 
also found to ba highar for man ralativa to woman ami nonwhitas ralativa 
to lAtitas. Kanea, woman, on avaraga, can axpaet to raeaiva a highar 
raturn on thair OAX contribution# vis-l-vis mala countarparts givan that, 
cataria paribus, woman hava, on avaraga, longar lifa axpactaneiaa than 
man. Fraidan at al. (1976) found that woman can axpaet ratas of raturn 
on thair OAI contributions that ara approximately 8.8 parcant highar than 
man, avarything alsa aqual, and that nonwhitas c«ti axpaet ratas of raturn 
approximately 1.9 parcant lower than whitea. 
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IV. THE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL 
To «valuato the redistribution of tht OAl program, the program vaa 
b« divided into two flow# of money—an inflow of contribution# and an 
outflow of benefit#. During the worker'# earning year# #he pay# in a 
flow of contribution#, in the form of a flat rate payroll tax, earmarked 
for the OAl program in exchange for a promiae of a #te«ty #tream of real 
income in the latter phaae of her life cycle. The accumulated value of 
the worker*# contribution, TCj,, paid in over the work hiatory i# deter­
mined ueing a traditional compounding acheme and a nontraditional roll­
over compounding acharne. 
The traditional compounding scheme calculate# the total OAl 
contribution#, TC^ , credited to the covered worker'# account on the date 
of retirement by 
, RE RE 
TCt • I T . 11 (1+r,) (4.1) 
yB j-y J 
where T^  » OAl contribution# in year y for individuel i, 
rj « annuel yield on U.S. government bond# in year j, 
RE » year of retirement, and 
B " first year in covered employment. 
The nontraditional roll-over scheme calculate# the total OAl 
contributions, TC?, by the generalised form of 
Cy. - (W,)* (4.2) 
where » compounded value of individual i's contributions paid in 
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yaar y in th« rttircmant year» 
appropriate U.S. 
w, *, % " bond maturitiea. 
r^ , 't* " bond rate#, and 
2 
The value of total OA! contributions, TC^ , is calculated by adding 
together the compounded annual contributions, or 
9 4 
Tcf - I C .. (4.3) 
* y-B ** 
Annual contributions are carried through time according to a bond 
roll-over scheme. That ia, it ia assumed that the government invests the 
full amount of the twrker's yearly OAl contributions, credited to her 
account as of the end of the year in queation, into a government bond 
iHth the longest maturity that doea not exceed the number of years from 
the date of investment to retirement. The coupon and principal are 
rolled over immediately upon maturity into the next longest bond that has 
a maturity period no longer than the difference between the roll-over 
date and the expected date of retirement. The superscripts w, s, and x 
reflect different bond maturities and sum to the number of year# from 
year B to the retirement date. 
The value of QAl contribution#, in equation# (4.1) and (4.2) 
depends on the year the income i# earned, y, the amount of income earned, 
relative to the maximwa taxable earnings base, M^ , and the relevant 
OAl tax rate, t^ . The individual'# taxable earnings for the years 1937-
1950 «8# determined by 
V * SV "**" V - "y *'• 
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for Ch« years 19)1-1954, taxable earnings were determined in three 
different ways depending on the type of income earned and the relation­
ship between income earned and the maximvn taxable earnings base. In the 
first case, total earnings are equal to the sua of wages, plus self-
employment income, but are less than the maximum taxable earnings 
base (Eyi • * 1^  ^< H^ ). In this case, taxable earnings are deter­
mined by 
C) Tyl » tyWy£ • tyglyl 
where t^  ^• the self-employment OAI tax rate. Case two pertains to the 
case where total earnings exceed the maximum taxable earnings base, but 
total wages do not > My, but < My); then, 
"" V " * 'yCy - V'-
The final case is identical to the pre-1951 formula when taxable 
earnings, are equal to, less than, or greater than the maximum 
taxable earnings base. For the years after 1955, total wages are defined 
as the sum of agricultural and nonagricultural wages and taxable 
earnings, are calculated using the 1951-1954 formulas. 
The revenue stream marked "contributions" qualifies the worker for 
primary and spousal benefits provided she satisfies the eligibility 
criteria established by the social security laws effective in the year of 
retirement. The discounted present value of the expected OAI benefit 
streaa for a single person on the date of retirement is 
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j, .1. ' « '*•" 
and eh« diicounetd pr«t«ne value of a couple's OAl benefit strean Is^  
 ^ 99-R 12 b.(l+C)* Z 
' Jo X (.>"> ' ' 
pM . 
where Z • R(12) * K(12) + t*^ R(12) R(12) + K(12} 
-r pW 
• e^ R(l2) - 0.5{R(I2) • K(12) • t^ R(l2) • R(12) 
pF 
• *(12) • t^ (12)) 
e • number of benefit payment perioda per year, 
99-R * number of years in the retirement period, 
R • the retirement age of the worker and spouse, 
pM 
R(12) * K(12) * t R(12) " the probability of the male retiree surviving 
to life age R(12) * K(12) *• t given he is 
already life age R(12) (expressed in months), 
pf 
R(12) * K(12) * t R(12) • the probability of the female retiree surviving 
to life age R(12) * K(12) * t given she is 
already life age R(12) (expressed in mnths), 
b » the initial OAl benefit level received at the 
o 
end of the first month of retirement. 
F^or expository convenience, it is assumed in equation (4.4) that 
the husbmd and wife are the same age and retire at the same age. In 
Chapter V of this dissertation, this assumption is dropped. 
The Z term captures the joint probability of the household surviving 
each successive month in the retirement period. 
35 
C • the expected growth In prices in subsequent 
yesrs, and 
1 " the discount rete. 
The life-cycle model of contributions and benefits represented by 
equations (4.1) through (4.5) captures the salient features of the OAI 
program. That ia» workers pay in a atream of income during their earning 
years and receive a stream of income in their retirement yeara, where the 
right to the benefit stream depends on their paat participation on the 
"contribution" aide of the exiating program. Thia ia not to imply, 
however, that the contribution and benefit stresms have any tangible 
relationship except that prior contributiona qualify the worker for 
future benefits. The two revenue strews ere not worker specific and 
need not be comparable in value. The value of the contribution atream 
depends on the number of earning yeara, the placement of the earning 
years in the work history, the worker's taxable earnings in those years, 
the OAI contribution rate and base, end the interest rate. The value of 
the benefit stream depends on the discount rate, the growth in future 
prices, the retiree's life expectancy, and the initial benefit payment. 
The value of the initial benefit payment, in turn, depends on the 
worker's average monthly earnings, the progressive benefit formula, age 
at retirement, familial characteristics, and post-retirement earnings 
level. 
Redistribution, within the intertemporal framework, is determined by 
the relationship between the total value of the accunulated contributions 
(4.1, 4.3), and the present discounted value of the expected OAI benefit 
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(4.4, 4.3). If th« following condition holds for an individual, 
> "i'®» (4.6) 
then the individual is expected, on average, to receive retirement 
benefits that are greater than (less thsn) the accumulated value of her 
OAl contributions. In this case, the OAX program affects the lifetime 
income stream for the individual (couple) within the retirement cohort. 
Similarly, redistribution across cohorts occurs if 
Î Tc!'* ) 1 (4.7) 
i-l * ' l"l 1 
An actuarially fair retirement Mould satisfy the following two 
conditions: 
Tc['* • bJ'®, and (4.8) 
I » I BV®. (4.9) 
i-l  ^ i"l  ^
For instance, if each individual purchases an actuarially fair life 
annuity with her accumulated contributions, then she can expect, on 
average, to receive a benefit streme exactly equal to her original lump 
sum premium (condition 4.8). An annuity ^ rchased with her total OAl 
contributions at the point of retirement insures the individual against 
economic risk over an uncertain life span by redistributing income from 
her relatively high earning years to her low earning years. The value of 
the monthly annuity payment depends on the value of the lump sum premium. 
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the annuitant's aga at ratlramant* tha discount rata, tha survivorship 
tabla, snd tha inflation rata (saa Chaptar V, saction P). 
Civsn tha abova modal and dafinitions of an actuarially fair 
ratiramant program, tha banaficiary's banafit laval can ba divldad along 
functional Unas. Tha actuarial componant of tha individual's OA! 
banafit paymant is tha annuity paymant which satisfias condition (4.8). 
Tha diffaranca batvaan tha ratiraa's 1972 banafit laval (b^ ) and tha 
annuity banafit (b^ ) would randar tha amount of radistribution from tha 
program. Tha radistribution componant for individual 1 is, tharafora, 
daflnad as follows 
"®i " *»ol ' *'al' (4.10) 
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V. METHODOLOGY 
A lift-eyel« model of the OAI program 1# taployad to praaarv# the 
link battraan prior OAI eoneribueiona paid into tha program ovar tha 
worker'a eaminga hiatory and OAX benefita received by the beneficiary 
during retirement. The contributory ayatam modeling of tocial aecurity 
ia conaiatant with the individual equity analyaia undertaken in thia 
atudy. However, it ia not meant to imply that the contribution and 
benefit atreama have ênf tangible relationahip except that prior contri-
butiona "qualify" the worker for future benefita. 
The model diacuaaed in the previoua aaction waa eatimated to examine 
the impact of differential mortality ratea, age at retirement, aex, 
marital atatua, income, poat-retirament eaminga, and price indexing on 
the OAI radiatribution component. In thia aaction, the aaaumptiona of 
the model, the data aet and aorting technique, computational formulae, 
annuity-type counterfactuala, and radiatribution eatimatea will be 
briefly diacuaaed. 
A. Faimeaa Standard 
The OAI progr» can be, and frequently ia, evaluated on the baaia of 
two conflicting atandarda of faimeaa. If faimeaa, for inatance, is 
defined as giving more to those persons with a greater relative need, 
then the social adequacy goal of the program ia the main focal point of 
analysis. The relative need standard of fairness evaluates the progrès's 
performance in terms of whether or not greater income protection is 
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extended to thoee eged pereone with greater relative needa, independent 
of previoua OAI contributiona. However, if fairneaa meana actuarially 
fair or, in other worda, giving more to thoae peraona with a larger 
initial inveatment, then the individual equity goal of the progm ia 
eaphaaised. The relative inveatment atandard of fairneaa evaluatea the 
performance of the program in terma of actuarially fair ratea of return 
on total OAl contributiona. Thia latter definition of fairneaa ia moat 
frequently uaed to anawer whether or not an individual beneficiary ia 
receiving her (hia) "money*a worth" from the government program. 
Xn thia atudy, an actuarial atandard of fairneaa ia employed to 
determine what a covered worker would have received from an actuarially 
fair retirement program. 
B. Study Sample 
Data on the •ocioeconomic characteriatica, 1972 QAl benefit level, 
and OAl benefit and claim atatua information for peraona repreaented in 
the atudy tample were obtained from the 1973 Current Population Survey-
Adminiatrative Record Exact Hatch File, The 1973 Exact Match File unitea 
aurvey recorda for peraona included in the March, 1973 Current Population 
Survey to their correaponding benefit and eaminge information in the 
adminiatrative recorda of the Social Security Adminiatration and to 
specific Itema from their 1972 IRS individual Income tax returns (Aziz, 
Kilaa, and Scheuren, 1978; KUaa and Scheuren, 1978; Scheuren and Tyler, 
1975). Additional earnings information was obtained from the longitudi­
nal Social Security Exact Match File, 1937-1976. Thia file Includes 
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longitudinal «arnings data on adules rapraaancad in cha 1973 Exact Match 
Fila. Tha atudy aaapla included 353 aingla paraona agad 62 and oldar and 
2,771 couplas «hara at laaat ona naabar tna aga 62 or oldar (tha data lat 
ia daacribad in datail in Appendix B). 
A record from the 1973 Exact Hatch File waa included in the atudy 
aample if;* 
1. the individual vaa 62 or older, 
2. retired between 1962 and 1972, 
2 3. repreaented a "good match," 
4. the claim code in 1972 indicated retired, special age-72 or 
tranaitional claim type, and 
5. the beneficiary code in 1972 indicated worker only or wife. 
This study investigstes the OAI program exclusively; hence, reported 
benefits inclwie primary worker, spousal, tranaitional, and special age-
3 
72 benefits. Ihe level of primary worker benefits received by the 
*It MBS sufficient to have one record in a married couple satisfy 
the above criteria to get both records included in the sample. Annuity 
calculations for married persons require the preservation of the family 
unit. 
o^ be considered a "good outch," all members of a stats unit mist 
have matched Summary Earnings Record, Internal Revenue Service and Master 
Beneficiary Record data present on the file, and a certain level of 
agreement between demographic information. 
S^pecial age-72 benefits are monthly benefits payable to a person 
aged 72 (before 1972 for male and 1970 for female) or over without 
sufficient quarters of coverage to qualify for a retired-worker benefit 
under either the full or transitional insured-status provisions. 
Tranaitional benefits are monthly benefits payable to a person age 
72 (before 1969) who has at least one quarter of coverage for every year 
after 1950 up to the year he/she reached age 65 (male) or 62 (female) 
with at least three quarters accumulated. 
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vorkar beneficiary la a function of the worker'a average monthly 
earninga, age at retirement, ami level of poat-retirement earninga. 
Spouaal benefita are SO percent of the retired worker'a primary inaurance 
amount adjuated for the apouae'a retirement age and poat-retirement earn­
inga. All of the aforementioned benefit levela are automatically indexed 
to the conaumer price index beginning in 1975. 
OA! beneficiariea are diatinguiahed by the following socioeconomic 
characteriaticat 
Sex (male, female). 
Race (white, nonwhite), 
Education (0-7, 8, 9-11, 12, 13+), 
Age (62-64, 65, 66-72, 73+), and 
Marital atatua (married, nonmarried). 
The aex, race, education, and marital atatua definitiona and diviaiona 
are conaiatent with the Kitagawa and Rauaer (1973) definitiona and 
diviaiona. The age diviaiona are aelected to monitor apecific featurea 
of the social security program. 
C. Hiatorical Contribution Base and Tax Ratea 
Covered workera and their reapective asployera are aasessed a 
proportional payroll tax on earnings up to the annual maximum taxable 
limit. In 1937, a combined employee-employer two percent payroll tax was 
assessed on the first $3,000. Both the contribution base and payroll tax 
rate have been periodically increased since 1937. By 1972, the coabined 
tax rate was 9.2 percent applied to the first $9,000. The contribution 
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b##e and tâx rate ara baaad on tha hlatocleal aarlaa located In 
Appandlx C, Tabla 13.3. Tha Initial Impact of tha OAI payroll tax rate 
la aharad equally by anployeaa and eaployera; however. It la aaaumed that 
the final burden of the tax la borne by labor, I.e., that there la 100 
percent backward ahlftlng.* 
The hlatorlcal tax rate aerlea employed in thla atudy ia baaad on 
the OAI tax rate aerlea conatructad by Lalmer (1976). lelner uaed a 
hlatorlcal-net-expendlture-decompoaltlon technique to divide peat OASDl 
contrlbutlona along functional llnea according to net expendlturea on 
three aeparate and dlatinct aoclal aecurlty program#* old-age, aurvivor, 
and dlaablllty. The OAI tax rate aerlea waa derived by allocating a 
ahare of the OASDl tax rate according to the proportion of total program 
expendlturea accounted for by the OAI portion in every year. Expendi­
ture# <m old-age Inaurance différa from aurvivor and dlaablllty inaurance 
'The ahlfting aaaumption la controveraial (Brlttaln, 1971 and 
1972a; Feldateln 1972 and 1974; Rammarmaah, 1979; KacRae and MacRae, 
1976; Kunnall, 1974; Vroman, 1974) but conventional in moat atudiea of 
individual equity (Aaron, 1974; Brlttaln 1972b; Burkhauaar and Warlick, 
1981; Freiden, lalmer, and Roffman, 1976; ieimer, 1978; Ownkwo, 1976; 
Osaim, 1974). There are a few computer aimulation atudiea, baaed on 
repreaentative individual equity meaaurea, that have attempted to iaolate 
the effect of the ahlfting aaaumption in individual equity meaaurea. For 
instance, Chen and Chu (1974) found that internal rates of return are 
negatively related and contribution-benefit ratios positively related to 
the degree of backward shifting, ceteris paribua. 
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in that OAl r#pr#«#nt# saving for retirement, whereaa SI and 01 provide 
tern insurance prior to retirement.* 
D, Interest Rates 
K low rate of return was selected in determining the compounded 
value of total OAl contributions. The annual yield on U.S. government 
bonds from 1937 to 1972 wss used in the traditional compounding schenw 
(see Appendix C, Table 13.1). For the roll-over scheme, the market yield 
on U.S. government securities at conatant maturity from 1937 to 1972 waa 
employed (see Appendix A, Table 11.1). A low rate of return was selected 
for both compounding schemes because of the riskless nature of the 
retirement investment. The "absence of risk" is assumed since the 
government essentially guarantees the worker full repayment of QAI 
contributions upon retirement. 
To further replicate the program's design, the roll-over scheme wss 
introduced into the analysis. The financing design of the social 
security program is as follows: 1) the government compels covered 
workers (and their employers) to pay social security taxes; and 
MPhe decomposition of OASDl rates is especially important when 
benefit comparisons are made across women with different labor-homemaker 
decisions. A working woman covered Iqr social security is eligible for 
disability benefits and her family is eligible for survivors' benefits, 
on the basis of her OASDl contributions in the event she should become 
disabled or die prior to retirement. The nonworking woman and her family 
are not offered these benefits if the nonworking woman should become 
disabled or die. The nonworking woman is eligible for disability or 
survivorship benefits if the disability or death contingency occurs to 
her husband, Hence, the survivor and disability insurance coverages 
extended to the working woman prior to retirement are not duplicated by 
her husbands OASDl contribution. 
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2) workers do noe have access to this money until retirement at which 
time it ia repaid in monthly stipends for life. The QAI contributions 
are easentially "tied-up" indefinitely. Aa mentioned earlier, the 
guaranteed repayment feature impliea a riskless investment. The "tied-
up" feature suggests a long-term inveatment, or an investment period 
equal to the difference between the year of retirement and the year in 
which the contribution-inveatment ia made. Both the certainty and timing 
features of the QAl program are reflected in the roll-over schem. 
The roll-over scheme aaaumes the government invests the worker's 
contribution into a government bond with the longest maturity that does 
not exceed the number of years from the date of investment to retirement. 
Upon maturity, the coupon and principal are immediately rolled over into 
the next longest bond that has a "correct" maturity period. While it is 
technically true that the worker could "caah out" of a bond with an 
"incorrect" maturity period offering a higher yield on the date of 
retirement, it ia assumed that the funds are "tied up" in riskless 
investments with minimal portfolio manageMnt. The difference between 
the traditional and roll-over total contribution measures are shown in 
Appendix D, Table 14.1. 
B. Survivor Probabilities 
Three tables of survivor probabilities were used to calculate 
annuity counterfactuals. Survivor probabilities describe the statistical 
probability of a person life %e x (say, 65) surviving to life age x + I 
(say, 66). The age-specific (gender-merged) and age-race-sex-speclfic 
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tablet arc baaed on Social Security Adoiniatration (SSA) survivor 
probabilitiea for persona 62 and older and Vital Statiatica Life Tablea 
for persons younger than 62 (aee Appendix C, Tablea 13.4 and 13.5). The 
SSA probabilitiea were eatimated uaing 1968-1969 Medicare data for 
persons who were either covered by Hospital Xnaurance or Supplemental 
Medical Inaurance and at least 62 years old (Bayo» 1972; Myera and Bayo, 
1965). 
In addition, a table of survivor probabilitiea differentiated by 
age, race, sex, marital atatua, education, and income waa uaed. The 
socioeconomic adjusted survival probability table ia based on tablea 
conatructed by Kitagawa and Rauaer (1973) and modified by Leimer (1978). 
r. Computational Formulae 
Burkhauaer and Usrlick (1981) estimated a "tranafer** component (1972 
0A81 benefit level less the actuarially fair benefit level) from a life-
cycle model uaing the 1973 Exact Match File. The actuarially fair 
counterfactual was m imwdiate whole life annuity payable on an annual 
basis* This dissertation extends their wrk to account for the monthly 
disbursement of benefits and indexing. The annuity ia assumed to be 
purchased on the date of retirement with the retirement candidate's total 
OAI contributions. The first benefit payment from the actuarially fair 
retirement insurance is received at the end of the first month of the 
retirement period. 
*A f^ iole life annuity immediate pays the first paysent one payment 
interval after the date of purchase aW is purchased with a single 
premium. See Jordan (1975) for mnuity formula derivations. 
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Tha vaciabl«s U8«d to calculate the foraulaa diieuaaed In this 
aeetion are aa follow: 
g 
PV • preaent value of a one dollar unindexed whole life annuity 
payable monthly, 
PV • preaent value of a one dollar unindexed jolnt-and-two-thlrda 
whole life annuity payable monthly, 
PV^  • preaent value of a one dollar price-indexed whole life annuity 
payable monthly, 
PV^  • preaent value of a one dollar price-indexed joint-and-two-
thirda whole life annuity payable monthly, 
R " male'a age at retirement, 
1 • female'a age at retirement, 
R+t*R » the probability of the annuitant aurviving to life age R+t 
given ahe ia already life age R, 
101-R * number of yeara in the retirement period, 
i • diacount rate (0.05 percent), 
J • vife'a age at huaband'a retirement, 
Z « huaband'a age at wife'a retirenwnt, 
a • deferment period |K - Q|, 
Q * retirement age difference between huaband and wife (R - R), 
K » age difference between the huaband and wife, 
c • expected growth in future price#,* 
i' » indexed diacount rate (0.02189 percent), and 
*Expected growth in future price aaaumption ia baaed on Truatees 
intermediate II-B projection on inflation for 1972 of 0.027$. 
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X " «g« of the old«»c member of the couple at the end of the 
deferment period. 
The retireiMnt candidate purchaaea an actuarially fair life annuity 
1 2 
with her total OAI contributiona (TC^ * ) on the date of retirement (RE). 
The preient value of a one dollar nonindexed life annuity payable 12 
times a year purchaeed by a ain*le person ia 
PV* " (* i  ^ g în®Rl • #. (5.1) 
t-l (1+i): 
The present value of a one dollar nonindexed joint-and-two-thirda 
annuity payable 12 tiaea a year purchaaed by each nearer of a couple on 
the date of retirement ia^  
(a) 
(b) (c) 
- 4( J+a®J »*s®R{( I - %*tH • Z*th) * 
•* (1+i)* fl (1+1):  ^
(d) (a) 
joint-and-two-thirda ia comparable to purchasing a single annuity 
on each member's life and a joint-and-aurvivor annuity on both lives. 
The joint-and-two-thirda replicatea the OAI program. The joint-and-two-
thirda annuity has an up^ r bound of one if both mesAers survive, pays 
2/3 if there is one survivor, aW has a lower bound of aero if there are 
no survivors in the group. 
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T«ra (a) in equation (5.2) ia a rcacaeanenc of equation (5.1) and 
atatea thet the person purchasing the annuity will receive 2/3 of one if 
he lives. The second term atatea that the spouse «fill receive 2/3 of one 
when she is eligible for retirement (in the case where the husband is 
purchaaing the annuity). Term (b) ia the discount and survivorship 
factor capturing the deferment period for spousal benefits in the ease 
where the spouse ia younger than the huaband and not of retirement age 
The age difference between the husband and wife ia equal to K yeara, the 
difference in their retirement agea, R - *, equala Q, where R ia the 
huaband'a age at retirement and R ia the apouae's retirement age. The 
length of deferment period equala a, where a • |K-Q|. If K • 0 and 
e 
Q " 0, then a » 0 and terma (b) and (c) collapae to 2/3PV —the annuity 
formula for a aingle person multiplied by 2/3. 
Term (e) in equation (5.2) ia a joint-life annuity and it defines 
group failure when the first member of the group diea or faila to qualify 
for benefit paysenta. Failure to qualify in thia caae mana one of the 
membera doea not meet the OAl eligibility criteria. The joint-life 
annuity pays only if both persona are alive and retired and provides 
paysenta for the duration of the shorter surviving status. Tern (d) 
accounts for the time value of mmey and the compound probability of both 
membera aurviving the deferment period (a). 
The price-indexed annuity formula guarantees payment of a real 
stream of income over the mnuitant'a retirement period. The nonindexed 
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formula# discuaacd above are modified by a CPX expected growth factor and 
an adjuated intereat rate.* 
The present value of a one dollar price-indexed life annuity payable 
12 time# a year purchaaed by a aingle person is 
».3) 
The present value of a one dollar price-indexed joint-and-two-thirda 
life annuity payable 12 times per year purchased by each member of a 
couple is 
•  t f t t n î î T  \ 1 , * " * * 1  *  
• z+t®z) • 
The price index formulas state that the retirement caiWidate purchases a 
one dollar life annuity and a series of staggered deferred life annuities 
paying increments of (1 + c). The nominal accretions in income each year 
will maintain the real purchasing power of one dollar over the 
T^he effective interest rate used to calculate an annuity that pays 
geometrically increasing payments is i' * |  ^ where i is the unindexed 
interest rate and c is the future growth in prices. 
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individual's r«tiren«ne period, atsuning that th« actual inflation rate 
equals the expected rate. 
G. Annuity-Type Counterfactuals 
There are 12 annuity-type counterfactuals estimated in this study. 
The counterfactuals are described in Table 5.1. Annuity-type 
counterfactuals mimic the features of the OAX progrm and differ in terms 
of the survivor probability tables used, the compounding scheme employed, 
and vhether benefits are indexed or nonindexed. The value of the monthly 
annuity benefit is dependent on the accumulated value of OAl contribu­
tions, the extent of insurance protection, and the degree to which the 
insurer can "tailor" benefits to reflect differentials in survivorship. 
H. Earnings Test 
The annuity benefits were adjusted for the earnings test. The 
modeling of the earnings test reflects the legislated earnings test in 
1972. 
A beneficiary's annuity benefit was adjusted by a reduction factor, 
RED., if earnings in 1972 exceeded $1,680. The reduction factor is 
calculated by 
RED. • l/2(REP72^  - 1,680) (5.5) 
if REP72. < 2,880; or 
51 
Ta We 5,1. DcacripCion of annuity eounterfaetuals 
Annuity 
eountarfaetual Cliaraetariatiea 
Type 1 Traditional compounding achem#, nonindoxtd formula, 
and gandar-oargad aurvivorahip taUaa 
Typa 2 Traditional compounding acharna, nonindaxad formula, 
and aax-raca-diatinet aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 3 Traditional compounding acharna, nonindaxad formula, 
and aocioaconomic aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 4 Traditional compounding acharna, Indaxad formula, and 
gandar-margad aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 5 Traditional expounding acharna, indaxad formula, and 
Mx-raca-dlatinct aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 6 Traditional compounding acharna, indaxad formula, and 
aocioaconomic aurvivorahip taUaa 
Tyjw 7 Roll-ovar cmipoundit^  acharna, nonindaxad formula, and 
gandar-margad aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 8 Roll-ovar compounding acharna, nonindaxad formula, and 
aax-raca-diatinct aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 9 Roll-ovar compounding achama, nonindaxad formula, and 
aocioaconomic aurvivorahip tablaa 
Typa 10 Roll-ovar compoundii^  achama, indexed formula, and 
gender-merged aurvivorahip tablea 
Type 11 Roll-over compoundii^  acheme, indexed formula, and 
aex-race-diatinct aurvivorahip tablea 
Type 12 Roll-over compounding acheme, indexed formula, and 
socioeconomic survivorship tables 
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RBD^  - 600 + (RSP72j^  - 2,880) (5.6) 
If REP72^  > 2,880 
vh«r« REP72^  • beneficiary i's 1972 reported earning#. 
I. Rediatribution Component# 
The eounterfaetual# deeeribed above were uaed to calculate the 
rediatribution component#, RC^ . The redi#tribution component# determine 
the portion of the beneficiary'# 1972 aocial lecurity benefita which she 
did not pay for, but which repreaent# an intergenerational tranafer from 
the current working population. 
For aingle beneficiariea, the rediatribution component# were 
calculated by the following: 
RCj^ j " b^ j - bj^ j for j » 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9; and (5.7) 
" **01 ' % j " 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 (5.8) 
where and RC|j * beneficiary i'a rediatribution component for 
annuity-type j, 
b^ l • 1972 OAI benefit level for beneficiary i, 
b|j • nonindexed annuity-type j benefit level for 
beneficiary i, and 
btj • indexed annuity-type j benefit level for 
beneficiary i. 
The redistribution component calculations for married persons are 
similar to the components calculated for single persons but require the 
inclusion of both the husband and wife's annuity-type benefit. Family 
53 
annuity banafita fron tha joint-and-tvo**thirda annuity vara aaatmad to be 
equally owned by the husband and wife. The "equally-owned** aaaumption 
haa important implication# in tenia of the relative thara of redistribu­
tion received by men and women in different houaahold typea. 
If the husbaiHl and wife are retired, then the redistribution 
components for each member of the couple are calculated by 
RCjj - b^ j - .5(by • _b^ j) for j - 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9; (5.9) 
-_b^ j - .5(bij • for j " 1, 2, 3, 7. 8. 9; (5.10) 
' .Kb^ j • J»|j) for j " 4, 5, 6. 10, 11, 12; (5.11) 
-*Ctj " J>oi -  ^ j " 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 (5.12) 
where b^ | " fmale's 1972 OAl benefit, 
_b^  • male's 1972 OM benefit, 
b|j * female i's nonindexed annuity-type j benefit level, 
Jb|j * male i'a nonindexed annuity-type j benefit, 
b|j • female i's indexed annuity-type j benefit level, and 
_b^ j * male i's indexed annuity-type j benefit level. 
If only one mnber of the couple ia retired, then the redistribution 
calculations are identical to those calculated for single persons. 
J. Behavioral Responses 
the removal of the worker-finance retirement insurance was accour 
plished by estimating a series of worker-specific actuarially fair 
eouoterfactuals assuming no behavioral responses. That is, it was 
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••auBMd that workar parcieipanta would noe raapond by alearing their 
labor or aavlng daelalona whan ratlramant banaflta wara ealculatad ualng 
atrletly-lnauranca banaflt foroulaa aa compared to tha OAl ratlramant 
banaflt formula. An actuarially fair ratlramant ayatam waa uaad only aa 
a countarfactual to datarmlna tha ratlramant banaflta tha worker' 
beneficiary actually paid for through OAl contrlbutlona after contrlbu-
tlona were already paid Into the ayatam. Thla annuity-type counter-
factual waa then uaad to laolate the alie of the beneflta the beneficiary 
received from the "modal adequacy" function of the govenuMnt'e retire­
ment program. The benefit dlaentanglement waa undertaken tilth the aole 
Intention of aaaeaalng the benefit Incidence of the tranafera received 
by the 1972 retirement cohort from the current tforking population. The 
incidence wa# examined to laolate the effecta of socioeconomic character-
iatica on the direction and aise of the tranafera and to enaure that the 
Intent of the law vaa conaiatent with the overall effect of the program. 
The ex poet annuity calculationa and comparifona uaad in thia atudy 
are confined to the narrow dlaentanglement interpretation diacuaaed 
above. They cannot be accurately interpreted to reflect the effect of a 
program switch from the current OAl program to an actuarially fair 
retirement ayatem. Empirical reaulta. to date, ehow that the social 
security program doea effect labor supply and savings decisiona (Boskin, 
1977; Burkhauaer, 1980; Burkhauaer and Qulnn, 1981; Feldatein, 1974; 
Pellechio, 1978). In addition, research by Browning (1975) and 
Burkhauaer and Turner (1978) indicatea that an actuarially fair 
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retirement system would have significant labor supply implications across 
the life cycle. 
In light of misting empirical research on the economic effects of 
the social security program, a study on the privitiiation of the social 
security program would necessitate ex ante modeling of an actuarially 
fair retirement system which would fully incorporate behavioral responses 
by worker participants. At best, this study only approximates the 
effects of a privitiiation of the social security program. 
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VI. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Xn ehii chapter, Che tingle and married modela eaeimated Co iaolaee 
Che effect of worker eharacteriatica on the percentage of rediatribution 
are preaented. Section A ineludea a deacription of the generaliiad 
quadratic modela for aingle and married houaeholda and the model 
variablea. Model variablea, independent and dependent, are diacuaaad in 
detail in Section B. 
A. functional fora 
1. Single model 
The following generalised quadratic model waa eatimated to iaolate 
the partial effect of worker-apecific characteriatica on the percentage 
of rediatribution (X):* 
% " 0Q + 0^ LTEAR * g^ LTEAM * S^ SEX * S^ RACE * d^ SERUtf 
+ g^ SERLENZ * e^ RAGERl + i R^ACERZ * g^ RACER) 
+ Sj^ RCORORTl • 0^ RCOiIORT2 • g^ E^DUl • 0^ E^DU2 
+ 6j^ ro03 • 6^ gED# (6.1) 
where the dependent and independent variablea are defined in Tablet 6.1 
and 6.2, reapectively, and explained in Section VI.B. Four permutations 
L^oglinear and linear forms were also estimated; however, the 
quadratic form provided the best fit of the data. 
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Xibla 6.1. Definition# of the dependent variables uaed in the single 
regression equations 
variable Description 
RRC|4 The nonindexed, noneamings-a^ j usted redistribution 
component for individual j as a percentage of individual 
J'a 1972 OAl benefit level» where i equals type-1* type-2, 
or type-3 annuity counterfactual. 
SRC|t The indexed, noneamings-a4j ustsd redistribution component 
for individual j as a percentage of individual j*a 1972 QAl 
benefit level, where i equals type-4, type-5, or type-6 
snnuity counterfsctusl. 
ERRCjj The nonindexed, eamings-s4Justed redistribution component 
for individual j aa a percentage of individual j'a 1972 QAX 
benefit level, where i equals type-1, type-2, or type-3 
snnuity counterfactual a^ usted by the earnings test. 
ERRCI^  The indexed, earnings-adjusted redistribution component for 
individual j as a percentage of individual J's 1972 OAl 
benefit level, where i equals type-4, type-), or typ#-6 
snnuity counterfsctusl a^ usted by the earnings test. 
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Table 6.2. Definiciona of eht indépendant variablea uaed in aingle 
regreaaion equationa 
Variable Deacription 
LTEAR Accumulated value of lifetime earning# (in hundreda of 
thouaanda) 
LTEAR2 LTEAR aquared 
SEX Dummy variable for aex: 0 for male, 1 for female 
RACE Dummy variable for race: 0 for white, 1 for nonwhite 
SERLEN Service length in covered employment 
SBRLEN2 SERLEN aquared 
RACERl Dummy variable for retirement age: 1 for age 62-64, 
0 otherwiae 
RAGER2 Dummy variable for retirement age: 1 for age 66-71, 
0 otherwiae 
RA6ER3 Dumpy variable for retirement age: 1 for age 72 and older, 
0 otherwiae 
RCOHORTl Dum^ f variable for retirement cohort: 1 for year 1962-1965, 
0 otherwiae 
RC0fK}RT2 Dummy variable for retirement cohort: 1 for year 1966-1968, 
0 otherwiae 
EDOl Dumoqr variable for year# of education completed: 1 for 
year# 0-7, 0 otherwice 
EDU2 Dummy variable for year# of education completed: 1 for 
yeara 9-11, 0 otherwiae 
ED03 Duumy variable for years of education completed: I for year 
12, 0 otherwiae 
EDD4 Dumnqr variable for year# of education completed: I for 
year# 13 or more, 0 otherwi#e 
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of the gansralitcd singlt smdal vara ascimacad, uhara tha owdala diffarad 
by apacification of tha dapandant variabla only. Tha purpoaaa of 
eonatructing thaaa four diffarant modala wara» first, to saa if variablas 
significant in axplaining tha parcantaga of radistribution changad undar 
various countarfactual dafinitions, and, secondly, to datarmina if thara 
wara any unaxpactad sign ravarsals in tha paramatar astimatas. Sinca 
this study attampta to account for tha affact of uorkar charactaristics 
and program faaturas on tha siia of tha radistribution component, 12 
measures of redistribution wara used as dependent variablea; each measure 
was calculated identically, in a technical sense, but different annuity 
counterfactuals ware employed in each maaaura to net out tha "worker-
purchased" insurance component. For future reference, tha estimation of 
modal 6.1 with dependent variable EMC^  ^and ERRC|j will be 
referred to as models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Each model is 
estimated using three different mortality rate assumptions. 
2. Harried model 
To isolât* the partial effect of family-specific characteristics on 
the percentage of redistribution for a husband-and-wife family unit (Y), 
1 2 the following generalized quadratic model was estimated: * 
O^nly household units where both the husband and wife were retired 
in 1972 were included in the data set used to estimate model 6.2, 
L^oglinear and linear models were also estimated, but the reported 
model resulted in the best fit of the data. 
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Y " 0Q + ÔjPLTEAR • B^FLTEARZ • 0^RACE + 0^SERLEN 
+ S^ SBRLEN * 8^ SBRLEH2 * g^ SERLBM + B^ RAGERl 
• 0^RAGER2 • 0jqRACEB3 • 0^_RAGER1 • 0jj_RACBR2 
• 0^gRCOHORTl • 0j^RCOHORT2 • 0^^RCOHORT1 
• 0j^ RC0H0RT2 + 0j^EOUl • 0jgBDO2 • 0jçEDO3 
• 0gQEDU4 • 0g^ _EDUl • 0g^ BDU2 • 0g^ EDU3 
• 0g^ EDU4 (6.2) 
vhsrc th« d«p«iMl«ne «nd independent variable# are defined in Table# 6.3 
and 6.4, reepeetively, and explained in Section VI.B. 
Again, 12 veraion# of model 6.2 w#re eatimated, differing by 
dependent variable only. The dependent variable# are labelled 
FAM^ j, EFAM^ j, and EfAM^ j. The eatimation of model 6.2 uaing FAMj^ j, 
FAM^ j, EFAMj^ ., and EFAM^  ^will be #ub#equently referred to a# modela 5, 
6, 7, and 8, respectively. Each model i# estimated ucing three different 
mortality rate assumptions. 
B. Regression Variables 
1. Dependent variables 
Twelve annuity eounterfactuals were constructed for each household 
type, differing by progras features or life contingency assumption. 
Annuity counterfactuals distinguish one dependent variable fro# another. 
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Table 6.3. Definition# of the dependent variable# used in the married 
regression equations 
Variable Description 
PAMjj The nonindexed, noneamings-adjusted redistribution 
component for fsaily J as a percentage of family J *s 1972 
QAl benefit level, vhere i equals type-1, type-2, or type-3 
annuity counterfsetual. 
The indexed, nonearnings-adjusted redistribution component 
for family j aa a percentage of family J'a 1972 OKI benefit 
level, where i equala type-4, type-5, or type-6 annuity 
counterfactual. 
EFAM|j The nonindexed, eamings-siQusted redistribution component 
for family j aa a percentage of family J's 1972 QAZ benefit 
level, where i equals type-1, type-2, or type-3 annuity 
counterfactual a^ Juated *9 tiM earnings test. 
EFAMlf The indexed, earnlngs-a4justed redistribution component for 
family j as a percentage of family j's 1972 CAI benefit 
level, where i equals type-4, type-5, or type-6 annuity 
counterfactual a4ju#ted by the earnings test. 
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Tabic 6.4 Definitions of independent variables used in married 
regression equations 
Variables 
PLTEAR 
F1TEAR2 
RACE 
SERUM (_SERUIt) 
8BRLE1I2 (.8ERLE1I2) 
RAGEM (JkAGERl) 
RACE» (_RA6ER2) 
RA6ER3 
RGORORtl (_RC0W)RT1) 
RC0H0RT2 (_RCOHORn) 
EOOl (_ED01) 
BD02 (_EDU2) 
EW3 (JH>U3) 
ED04 ( EDU4) 
Description 
AectBBulated value of fmsily lifetime earnings 
(in hundreds of thousands) 
PLTEAR squared 
Dummy variable for race: 0 for white, 1 for 
nonwhite 
Service length in covered employment for wife 
(husband) 
SERLEN (JSERLEM) squared 
Dumoqf variable for wife's (husband's) retirement 
age: 1 for age 62-64, 0 otherwise 
Xhmwy variable for wife's (husband's) retirement 
age: 1 for age 66-71, 0 othendse 
Dummy variable for wife's retirement age: 1 for 
age 72 and older, 0 otherwise 
D«mqp variable for wife's (husband's) retirement 
cohort : 1 for year 1962-1965, 0 otherwise 
Duany variable for wife's (husband's) retirement 
cohort; 1 for year 1966-1968, 0 otherwise 
Dumgqy variable for years of education completed 
by wife (husband): I for years 0-7, 
0 otherwise 
Dum^ r variable for years of education completed 
by wife (husband): I for years 9-11, 
0 otherwise 
DmmqF variable for years of education completed 
by wife (husband): 1 for year 12, 0 otherwise 
Dumaqf variable for years of education completed 
by wife (husband): I for years 13 or more, 
0 otherwise 
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R«e«ll, annuity eountarfacCuala vara conaeruetad to diaantangla tha 
antitlad inauranca paymant of tha OAl banafit from tha intarganarational 
radiatribution paymant. Countarfactuala ranga from traditional Ufa 
annuitiaa baaad on highly aggregated aurvivorahip aaaumptiona to indaxad, 
aaminga adjuatad lifa annuitiaa reflecting highly diaaggregated 
aurvivorahip aaaumptiona. Tha aingle and married generalised modela are 
eatimated uaing alightly different dependent variablea to iaolate how 
apaeifie aurvivorahip aaaumptiona or program featurea influence the 
radiatributional incidence of tha QAl program. Thia aubaaction will 
deacriba how each dependent variable waa calculated for each houaehold 
type. 
a. Percentage of radiatribution for the aingle model (RRC|,, RRC^ , 
each aingle houaehold. Each generic meaaura ia diatinguiahed by a 
program feature (with or without indexing; with or without aaminga 
adjuatmanta), md, within each meaaura, three aurvivorahip probabilitiaa 
aaaumptiona were impoaed (gender-merged, ae%-raca-diatinct, 
aocioeconomic-adjuated). The calculationa uaed to determine the 
percentage of radiatribution under varioua aaaumptiona for aingle 
houaeholda are aa followa: 
There are four generic meaaurea of radiatribution for 
* 88*72. 
BEII72, - TB.. 
 ^% 100 
for i • type-l, type-2, type-3 (6.3) 
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BBN72. - TB#. 
" B^ ij ^  * 100 
for i • typ#-4, type-5, eyp«-6, (6.4) 
BBII72. -ATB-. 
for 1 • typ#-l, type-2, eyiw>3, (6.5) 
B®f72. - ATB4. 
 ^* 10® 
for 1 • typ#-4, eyp«-5, typ€-6, (6.6) 
whore TBj^  » nonindexed, none«mlnge-ed)ueted cy^ -i annuity benefit for 
individual j, 
• indexed, noneaminga-a<Duated type"! mnuity benefit for 
individual j, 
ATB^  • nonindexed, eaminga-e^ j uated type-! annuity benefit for 
individual j, and 
ATB^  • indexed, eaming#-a4)uated type-i annuity benefit for 
individual j• 
b, Percentage of radiatribution for the married model (FAM^ j. 
FAI^ j, BFAM^ j , BFAI^  ) The four generic neaaurea of radiatribution 
for each married houaehold are; 
FBElf72. -TB„ - TB„ 
famjj 
for i • type-l, typ«-2, typa-3, (6,7) 
FBEM72. - TB}. - TBJ. 
FAj^ j 1 ^ 
for i - Cype-4, typa-5, type-6, (6.8) 
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PBBN72. -ATB.. - ATB.. 
«'«"y  ^ ~ 
for 1 • cyp#-l, cyp#-2, typ«-3, <6.9) 
FBBtf72. - ATM. - ATB}. 
"n 'rtJj -
for 1 • typ«-4, typ«-5» typ#-6, (6.10) 
«hart FBBN72 • ch# sua of the wlfo and husband's 1972 QAl banafic 
amounts, 
TB^  jj ) " nonlndaxad, nonaamlnga-adj ustad typa-1 annuity 
banafit for tha wifa (huaband) in houaahold j, 
TB|j(jni^ ) " indaxad, nonaamings-a4) uatad typa-i annuity banafit 
for tha wifa (husband) in houaahold j, 
ATBjj(^ TBjj) " nonindaxad, aamings-aiUustad typa-i annuity banafit 
for tha wifa (husband) in houaahold j, and 
ATB^ (_ATB^ ) • indaxad, aamings-ad)uatad typa-i annuity banafit for 
the wife (huaband) in houaahold j• 
2. Independent variablaa 
a. Accumulated value of lifetime earnings (LTEAE. LTEAR2, FLTEAR. 
FLTEAR2) The lifetime earnings variablaa (ITEAR, UEAR2; FITEAR, 
FlTEAIt2) are two of four quantitative variables included in the 
generalized polynominal model. LTEAR reflects tlw individual's lifetime 
earnings stream on the date of retirement by a single number. FLTEAR is 
the SUB of the husband and wife's lifetime earnings streams. LTEAR and 
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FLTEAR mf «cpececd co b#ve n«gaeiv« coefficient#, «hereae 1.TEAR2 and 
PLTBAR2 were expected to have positive coefficiente. The summary measure 
of lifetime earnings was calculated assuming: 
(1) annual reported twable earnings (REPj^ ) were received at the 
beginning of each year; and 
(2) the earnings stren was truncated on the date of retirement 
(YBEGXlta). 
Accordingly, the present value of the worker's lifetime real tmable 
earnings on the date of retirement is: 
YBEGIRZ REP{ ,¥110X112 
LTEAR - £ I » (1 + r.)] (6.11) 
i-EYEAR ®i j-i  ^
where YBEGIN2 " year of retirement, 
EYEAR • year of entry into covered employment, 
REP^  " annual reported earnings in year i, 
• consumer price index in year i, and 
rj • annual real interest rate in year j. 
Ihe percentage distribution of IXEAR for single households only appears 
in Table 6.5. Table 6.6 displays the percentage distribution of FLTEAR 
for married households. 
The summary measure of lifetime earnings differs from the simple sum 
of annual reported earnings by the weighting of annual reported earnings 
by the mnual real interest rate in each year. This weighting scheme was 
introduced to approximate the individual's lifetime income status on the 
date of retirement. The compounding rate was a simple historical average 
of the yield on O.S. government securities (low yield) and the annual 
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T«bl« 6.5. Percentage dietribution of LTEAR, tingle population only* 
LTEAR^  Total Men Women 
0 - 19.5 13.0 10.9 14.4 
19.6 - 41.8 12.7 17.4 9.8 
41.9 - 65.2 8.5 7.2 9.3 
65.3 - 86.2 5.9 8.7 4.2 
86.3 - 106.9 7.4 5.8 8.4 
107.0 - 129.5 6.8 6.5 7.0 
129.6 - 150.4 5.1 2.9 6.5 
150.5 - 168.8 2.5 0.7 3.7 
168.9 - 195.5 4.8 2.9 6.0 
195.6 - 217.3 6.8 8.0 6.0 
217.4 - 238.8 5.4 5.1 5.6 
238.9 - 260.7 2.5 0.7 3.7 
260.8 - 281.6 4.2 5.1 3.7 
281.7 - 302.8 3.1 3.6 2.8 
302.9 - 325.1 3.7 5.8 2.3 
325.2 - 345.6 2.0 1.4 2.3 
345.7 - 361.7 1.7 2.2 1.4 
361.8 - 388.3 2.0 2.9 1.4 
388.4 - 401.9 0.1 0.7 0.5 
401.9+ 1.1 1.4 0.9 
"Totals nay not add to 100 because of rounding. 
R^eported in thousands. 
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Tabla 6.6. Pareantaga diatribution of FLTEAR by household type* 
Ona Two 
PIJEAR** Total Eamar Eamar 
0 - 40.0 9.2 14.0 3.1 
40.1 - 80.3 10.4 14.6 5.0 
80.4 - 119.8 8.9 10.8 6.5 
119.9 - 160.4 7.7 7.9 7.5 
160.5 - 200.0 7.2 6.3 8.5 
200.1 - 241.1 8.2 7.8 8.6 
241.2 - 281.4 7.4 7.6 7.2 
281.5 - 321.9 7.2 5.8 9.0 
322.0 - 362.2 8.5 8.3 8.6 
362.3 - 402.4 8.5 9.1 7.7 
402.5 - 442.1 7.6 5.4 10.4 
442.2 - 482.3 3.2 1.4 5.4 
482.4 - 522.5 2.1 0.1 3.7 
522.6 - 562.3 2.1 0.0 4.6 
562.4 - 596.8 0.7 0.0 1.5 
596.9 - 637.9 0.4 0.0 1.0 
638.0 - 677.5 0.4 0.0 1.0 
677.6 - 712.8 0.3 0.0 1.0 
712.9 - 730.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 
730.4 - 805.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
"Total# may not add eo 100 beeausa of rounding, 
htaported in thousand#• 
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yield on corporate paper plus the rate of increase of average stock 
prices (high yield). The historical average series tras converted to real 
terma aince the annual reported earnings were deflated by the consimer 
price index (see Appendix C, Table 13.1). 
There are obvioua problema tfith the LTEAR measure of lifetime 
income. First, the selection of an appropriate compounding rate or 
compounding series is somewhat arbitrary. (The sensitivity of the 
regression results to the compounding series should be investigated in 
the future.) Second, LTBAR ia based on annual reported earnings to 
social security only; hence, it systematically excludea nonlabor earnings 
and labor earnings above the taxable earnings ceiling. The third problem 
with the LTBAR meaaure involvea the actual aise of the annual tmable 
eaminga reported in the file. The size of the annual taxable earnings 
depends on the tax baae and typea of occupâtiona covered under the law. 
These policy variables depend on policy decisions and, as a result, 
policy decisions influence the size of the calculated lifetime earnings 
meaaure. The last problem is technical in nature. Annual reported 
earnings for 1937 to 1950 were not reported annually; rather, the 
Longitudinal Exact Hatch File reported a lA-year summary earnings figure. 
However, the file reports estimated annual quarters of coverage by year 
for the 1937 to 1950 time period. The year-specific estimated annual 
quarters of coverage were used to disaggregate the 1937-1950 summary 
taxable earnings measure. The disaggregation procedure is described in 
Appendix F. 
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In fpita of th« aforcaontioned problem# with the LTHAR maaaure of 
llfaelna aaminga. It ia, in cha raaaarchar'a opinion, tha baat maaaura 
available given the information on the tiorker*a aaminga hie tory obtained 
from the Longitwlinal Baminga Match File, In the context of thia atudy, 
the meat larioua ahortcoming of the LTEAR meaaure ia the ayatamatic 
axcluaion of nonlabor aaminga and aaminga above the taxable maximini* 
The gravity of the problem ia challenged, however, by the percentege 
diatribution of the UEAR ahovn in Tablea 6.5 and 6.6, But, aa a 
aafeguard, a graduated education level variable waa included in the 
regreaaion analyaia, since, generally apeaking, there ia a poaitive, 
although not perfect, correlation between income and education levela. 
b. Socioeconomic variablea (SEX. RACE. EDO) The SEX, RACE, and 
EDU dum^ p variablea repreaent the expected value of the abeolute 
difference in the dependent variable for each beneficiary characteriatic, 
ceteris paribus. 
The SEX variable was included to monitor the effect, if any, of sex 
differentials, be it longevity or employment differences, on the extent 
of redistribution. The dunqr variable takes on a value of one when 
identifying a female. When the annuity counterfactuals reflect 
survivorship differentials by sex, the coefficient on SEX was expected to 
be positive. 
The RACE variable reflects the race of the family unit, and it was 
included to determine if race influenced the size of the redistribution 
component. RACE equals one for nonwhites and zero for whites. RACE was 
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•xp«eted to havo a negative coefficient when mortality differantiats by 
race were accounted for in the annuity counterfactual. 
The EDU variable waa included to aupplamnt the earning# meaaure 
(LTBARf FITEAR) aa di#cu##cd earlier, and to account for the independent 
a##oeiationa of education level on survivorihip# Four education 
claaaification# were used; EDUl for person# with 0-7 year# of education: 
E0U2 for peraon# with 9-11 year# of education; ED03 for high achool 
graduatea; and EDU4 for peraon# with any college education. The 
coefficienta on the EDU variablea meaaure the differential impact of the 
indicate# category and the category of peraona with eight yeara of 
achooling (the median yeara of achooling for thi# age cohort). The 
coefficient on EDM wa# expected to be poaitive without adjuating for 
education differential# in #urvivor#hip, but negative if education 
differential# were introduced into the annuity counterfactual. 
Coefficient# on ZDU3 and EDU4 were expected to have a negative sign 
without adjuatii^  for education differential# in •urvivor#hip and may be 
poaitive after adjuating for education differentiala in survivorahip. 
The «ign of the coefficient for E1NI2 may be poaitive or negative. The 
sign reversal for the EDU3 and EDU4 was expected because education level 
i# inversely related to mortality; hence, the annuity benefit received 
by person# with high education levela were lower (therefore, their 
rediatribution component# larger), ceteri# paribus, when aurvivorship 
differentials by education level were uaed to calculate annuity benefits. 
Education mortality differential# counteract the progree#ive feature# of 
the benefit formula. 
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c. Proar«a-votlt<r variable# (SEHLBH. SSRLBH2. RACERl, RACE82. 
RA0ER3, RCOHORTl. RCOHOm) SBRLBN, a eontinuoua variabl#, ia a 
aingl# nuBbar r#pr###nting eh# nu=A#r of yaara of noniero reported 
eaminga. The aummary meaaure traa conacrueead by counting the number of 
years from the year of entry into the labor force and the year of retire­
ment when annual reported earninga were noniero. Since worker# with 
longer earning# hiatory pay in more taxe#, SERLEH w## expected to have a 
negative coefficient. The coefficient on SBRLZN2 tfea not predicted. 
the RAGtR| and RCOHORTj duony variable# repreaent the expected value 
of the absolute difference in the dependent variable for each program-
worker characteriatic, ceteris paribua. 
RAGKRl, RA6ER2, and RACER3 isolate the importance of retirement age 
of the beneficiary on the aiie of the intergenerational tranafar. The 
retir«Mnt age variable did not appear on the file, but with the uae of 
variable# on the file, it wa# po##ible to conetruct it, aa follow#: 
RACE • LACE - (72-WECIM2) (6.12) 
where tAGC i# the beneficiary'# age in 1972, and YBE6XM2 i# the year the 
beneficiary retiré. If RACE equalled 62-64, then a code of one wa# 
aasigned to RACERl; if RACE equalled 66-71, then a code of one wa# 
assigned to RACgR2; RACE greater than 72 was coded as one for RACER3. 
The comparison group for this àmmy series was persons with a RACE equal 
to 65; that is, beneficiaries $*o began receiving benefits at age 65. 
Previous empirical evidence #*%gest# that RACERl, RACER2, and RACER3 
would have negative coefficients. 
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The retirement cohort dumaqf verleblee RCORORTl end RC0H0RT2 meeaure 
the elgnlfleence of the year of retirement In explaining the variation In 
the elae of the tranafer component. Peraona retiring between 1962 and 
1964 were In ttM earlleat cohort labelled RCORORTl. Peraona retiring 
between 1965 end 1968 were In the middle cohort labelled RC0H0RT2. The 
retirement cohorte dated after 1968 were uaed aa the control group. A 
poaltlve algn wia expected on coefflclenta for RCOKORTl and RC0H0RT2. A 
poaltlve elgn wee expected becauae earlier cohorte benefited from the 
relative Immaturity of the program, which made poaalble extremely low tex 
retea end frequent Increaaea In benefit levele. 
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VII. RESULTS 
A. Oatcrlpeiv* Staclaeles 
!• benefit Incidence of the 1972 old-#g# inaurance program, all 
houaeholda 
Table 7.1 diaplaya the eatimated benefit incidence of the OAX 
progras in 1972 for the 1962-1972 retirement cohorte baaed on type-6 
annuity coonterfactual. In the aggregate, 7,09 million dollara in OAI 
benefita were peid to retired benefieieriee in thia aubample; approxi­
mately 89 percent of the benefita received were tranafera from the 
current working generation. The $6.3 million in intergenerational 
tranafera were not, however, evenly diatriboted acroaa the income groupa. 
Contrary to the "aocial adequacy" objective, the low-income groupa (90-
3,000) repreaented 15 percent of the ample and they received ten percent 
of the intergenerational tranafera, whereaa the middle-income groupa 
($3,001-8,(MO) received 57 percent of the tranafera but repreaented 
53 percent of the aample. The high-incrae groupa (98,001 plua) received 
33 percent of the tranafera, but included 32 percent of the aample (aee 
Appendix E, Table 15.1 for the aggregate figure# aaaociated with 
Table 7.1). In abaolute term#, the middle-income groups received the 
large#t share of the intergenerational tranefer#. 
The extent of the intracohort redistribution may be inferred from 
the absolute and relative size of the redistributim component acro«s 
family income classes. Column 3 in Table 7.1 indicates that all income 
groups have received more than their "money's worth" from the social 
Table 7.1. Benefit incidence of the 1972 old-age insurance program 
(1) (2) Redistribution component 
OAl Type-6 
(3) (4) benefit actuarially Household 
Total family level in fair benefit. Absolute Percentage population 
income in 1972 earnings adjusted difference distribution 
1972* (mean) (mean)** (l)-(2) (I) * *** (in percents) 
$ 0-1,000 698 17 681 97.6 1 
1,001- 1,500 1,065 76 989 92.9 1 
1,501- 2,000 1,369 119 1,250 91.3 3 
2,001- 2,500 1,618 141 1,477 91.3 5 
2,501- 3,000 1,847 173 1,674 90.6 5 
3,001- 3,500 2,071 220 1.851 89.4 6 
3,501- 4,000 2,275 258 2,017 88.7 8 
4,001- 5,000 2,499 287 2,212 88.5 13 
5,001- 6,000 2,571 312 2,259 87.9 11 
6,001- 8,000 2,517 312 2,205 87.6 15 
8,001-10,000 2,381 281 2,100 88.2 9 
10,001-20,000 2,271 240 2,031 89.4 18 
20,001+ 2,425 260 2,165 89.3 5 
Total $7.09® $ 796= $6.294® 88.8 3,106 
Mean 92,283 $256 $2,027 88.8 
*Total family income includes OKI benefits in 1972. 
A^nnuity counterfactual based on the traditional compounding scheme, an indexed annuity 
formula and socioeconomic survivorship tables. 
I^n millions of dollars. 
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Mcuricy program, since for each Income class, the mean OAI benefit level 
(column 1) is larger than the actuarially fair benefit level (column 2). 
However, the largest relative gains were realised by low-income families. 
On average, the lowest income fsmily group received $698 annually from 
OAI, of which $681, or 97.6 percent, was a result of the "social 
adequacy" feature of the program. Column 4 shows that the redistribution 
component, aa a percentage of the mean OAI benefit level in 1972, 
generally decreased as the family income level in 1972 increased. This 
general pattern would seem to suggest that the progressive benefit 
formula and minimum benefit provisions effectively redistributed income 
in favor of lower income households; that is, the program in 1972 was 
progressive. 
There ere seversl approaches that could be used to assess the 
oversU progressivity of the OAI program. One approach is based on end-
point comparisons. That is, the percentage of redistribution for the 
lowest income group is compared to the comparable measure for the highest 
income group. The relatively mall low-to-high differential, 97.6 to 
89.3 in column 4, suggests that the redistribution formula in 1972 was 
"mildly" progressive. Another approach evaluates progressivity in terms 
of a steadily falling percentage of redistribution as the income level 
increases. It is interesting to note that the redistribution measure in 
column 4 of Table 7.1 falls steadily as income rises (with the exception 
of $2,001-2,500) until the $8,001-10,000 income group, after (*ieh the 
percentage of redistribution generally increases. The faHii% pattern 
for nine out of 13 income groups would, again, suggest that the program 
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vat "generally" progreaalve* An alternative approach is to evaluate the 
program's overall progressivity by comparing the highest income group's 
percentage of redistribution to the percentage of redistribution for all 
other family income categories. A "truly" progressive program would have 
a stesdily falling, positive différentiel as inconw increases, wherees a 
"truly" regressive program would have a steadily falling, negative 
differential as income increases. This type of comparison for the 
results presented in coluom 4 is displayed in Figure 7.1, curve 1. 
dearly, the OAI program demonatrated "truly" progressive features at 
income levels less than $3,S01, but it displayed regressive, although not 
"truly" regressive, features at income levels greater than 93,500 but 
less than $10,001. 
The different approaches used to sssess progressivity can lead to 
different program assessments from the same descriptive statistics. The 
"end-point" approach indicates that the OAI program in 1972 was "mildly" 
progressive, whereas the "patterned" approach shows it to be "generally" 
progressive throughout the income classifications. However, the "high-
Income-group-comperison" approach shows that the program exhibited 
classic progressive features for low-income groups only, and it exhibited 
stroi% regressive features for all other income groups except the 
penultimate income group. The different approaches when taken separately 
can result in misleading and "over-optimistic" program performance 
assessment, but, i*en taken together, the different approaches render a 
complete depiction of the program's overall performance. That is, the 
OAI program in 1972 was "mildly" and "generally" progressive across 
Percencage point 
redistribution 
component 
differential 
-Type-6, Indexed without earnings test (2) 
Typo-3, nonlndexed with earnings test (3) 
"I^ fpe-6, Indexed with earnings test (1) 
"f I I " ' I I I ' I I I 1 I 1 r 
0- 1,001- 1.501- 2,001- 2,501- 3,001- 3,501- 4,001- 5,001- 6,001- 8,001- 10,001- 20,001+ 
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 5,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20,000 
(Income in 1972) 
Figure 7,1. Progressivity of the OAl program using socioeconomic-adjusted 
annuity benefits controlling for earnings test and indexing 
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incosM group*» but it alio axhibitad strong ragraasiva faaturaa, 
raaultlng in lovar ralativa raturna to middla-incom banaficiariaa. 
Tharafora» tha intraeohort tranafar machanira oparatad to pay tha highaat 
ralativa ratum to tha loir-incoma banaficiariaa and tha lowaat ralativa 
raturna to niddla-ineoma banaficiariaa» which» in apita of baing "mildly" 
and "ganarally** prograaaiva, ia inconaiatant with tha program's ovarall 
objaetiva. 
Whila tha banafit formula and tha minimum banafit proviaiona 
atrongly influancad tha pattarn of tha radiatribution componanta» thara 
ara othar confounding program faaturaa that axart an influanca on tha 
radiatribution daaign, auch aa tha aaminga teat» coat-of-living 
adjuatmanta, and lifa continganciaa. Tabla 7.2 iaolataa tha affacta of 
tha aaminga taat and coat-of-living faaturaa on tha parcantaga of 
radiatribution acroaa incoma groupa. Tha lifa contingancy influanca is 
axaminad in Tabla 7.3. 
Tha aaminga-taat affact is praaantad in column 3 of Tabla 7.2.* 
Column 3 maaauras the change in the percentage of radiatribution when the 
earning* teat ia introduced into the program's design. Kote that the 
earnings test does not affect the three lowaat income groupa, but it 
becomes an increasingly important influence on the estimated percentage 
of redistribution as family income level increases. The earnings-test 
effect has its greatest impact on high-income families ($6,000+), which 
*The earnings test operates to reduce the beneficiary's annuity 
benefit by 50 cents for every dollar of post-retirement earnings greater 
than $1,680 but less than $2,280 and by $1.00 for every dollar of 
earnings over $2,280 providing the beneficiary is younger than 72. 
Table 7.2. Effect of the oaminge test and cost-of-living iodexiog on the distribution of 
redistribution (expressed in percentage terms) for socioecooomic-adj osted 
annuity benefits* 
Percentage of redistribution^  
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total family Indexed Indexed Change in Nonindexed Change in 
incmte ia and earnings without earnings redistribution and earnings redistribution 
1972® adjusted adjustment (l)-(2) adjusted (l)-(4) 
9 0- 1,000 97.6 97.6 0.0 97.3 0.3 
1,001- 1,500 92.9 92.9 0.0 92.5 0.4 
1,501- 2,000 91.3 91.3 0.0 90.4 0.9 
2,001- 2,500 91.3 91.1 0.2 90.4 0.9 
2,501- 3,000 90.6 90.3 0.3 89.5 1.1 
3,001- 3,500 89.4 89.1 0.3 88.2 1.2 
3,501- 4,000 88.7 88.4 0.3 87.4 1.3 
4,001- 5,000 88.5 88.2 0.3 87.0 1.5 
5,001- 6,000 87.9 87.5 0.4 86.3 1.6 
6,001- 8,000 87.6 86.8 0.8 85.8 1.8 
8,001-10,000 88.2 87.1 1.1 86.3 1.9 
10,001-20,000 89.4 87.6 1.8 87.8 1.6 
20,001+ 89.3 87.7 1.6 87.6 1.7 
Mean 88.8 88.0 0.8 87.2 1.6 
*All annuity benefits were calculated using socioeconomic-a4)usted survivorship 
probabilities, 
P^ercentage of redistribution was calculated by taking the difference between the mean OAl 
benefit level in 1972 and the mean actuarially fair benefit level for an income class divided by the 
mean OAl benefit level in 1972. 
o^tal family income includes OAl benefits received in 1972. 
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Tabla 7.3, Giangaa in tha parcantaga of radiatribution undar diffarant 
aurvlvorahip probability aaauaptiona 
Eaminga caat adjuatad 
Annuity-eypa, indaxad (4) (5) 
Total family ' " Changa in parcantaga 
income in 
1972 
(1) . 
iy^ -4* 
(2) 
Typa-5* Ty^ L* 
of redistribution 
(2M1) (3)-(l) 
$ 0- 1,000 97.7 97.8 97.6 0.1 -0.1 
1,001- 1,500 93.9 94.1 92.9 0.2 -1.0 
1,501- 2,000 91.8 92.0 91.3 0.2 -0.5 
2,001- 2,500 91.3 91.6 91.3 0.3 0.0 
2,501- 3,000 90.6 91.0 90.6 0.4 0.0 
3,001- 3,500 89.4 89.7 89.4 0.3 0.0 
3,501- 4,000 88.6 88.9 88.7 0.3 0.1 
4,001- 5,000 88.2 88.6 88.5 0.4 0.3 
5,001- 6,000 87.5 87.9 87.9 0.4 0.4 
6,001- 8,000 87.1 87.5 87.6 0.4 0.5 
8,001-10,000 87.7 88.1 88.2 0.4 0.5 
10,001-20,000 88.9 89.3 89.4 0.4 0.5 
20,001+ 88.6 88.9 89.3 0.3 0.7 
Mean 88.5 88.8 88.8 0.3 0.3 
R^aw data uaad to calculate the percentage of distribution for 
each family income classification is available upon request. 
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place# upward praaaure on their auomary redlaerlbutlon meaaurea becauae 
their annuity baneflta are reduced hf the eamlnga teat formula. The 
eamlnga-teat effect on the "hlgh-lncome-group-comparlaon" approach to 
progreaalvlty aaaeaament can be aeen Iqr comparing curve 2 to curve 1 In 
Figure 7.1. In the abaence of th# eamlnga teat, the program exhibited 
"claaalc" progreaalve featurea at Income levela laaa than $5,001 and 
"claaalc" regreaalve featurea at Income level# In excea# of $3,000. In 
conclualon. It ha# been ahotm that the Introduction of the eamlnga teat 
ahlfta the performance curve downward. Intercalating additional 
regreaalve feature# Into the program*a modu# operandi. 
Column 5 In Table 7.2 laolatea the change In the redlaerlbutlon 
meaaure a# a reault of Introducing price Indexli^  Into the programma 
dealgn. It 1# Interesting to note that th# abaolute alae of the 
redlatrlbutlon meaaure la Increaaed for all Income groupa trtwn Inflation 
protection 1# Included In the annuity counterfactual, ceterl# parlbua. 
Thl# reault 1# expected, at leaat Initially, alnce the Indexed annuity 
benefit 1# mailer than an unlndexed annuity benefit.* This Is because 
the annuitant is insured againat the risk of economic insecurity and 
inflation over an uncertain retirement period. 
Although all Income groups realised extra rediatributlon per dollar 
of OAI benefit when indexing was included in the program, the greatest 
relative gains were realized by higher income groups because of their 
longer life expectanciea on average. Price indexing, when taken alone, 
*Tha magnitude of the program-type annuity benefit differential 
will diminieb and its sign will eventually reverse wer time because 
annui^  benefits received from an indexed program are ai^ nented by 
(1+c)^  and unlndexed benefits remain fixed in nominal terms. 
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did not alter the progresaivity coneluaiona» but it did generally reduce 
the level of progreaaivity at income levela leea than $3,501 and alightly 
inereaaed regreeaivity at income levela between $3,500 and $5,(M)0 (tee 
Figure 7.1, curvea 3 and 1)« 
The eenaitivity of the progreaaivity concluaiona to the eurvivorthip 
probability atauaption ia examined in Table 7.3. The benefit incidence 
for type-4, type-5, and type-6 counterfactuala are presented in 
coluama 1,2, and 3, reapectively. Colum 4 shova the change in the 
percentage of rediatribwtion if the program adopted e eex-race-ege 
diacriminating policy aa oppoaed to atrictly a^  diacriminating policy. 
The adoption of a ee%-race-age diacriminating policy reawlted in an 
average gain of 0.3 centa of rediatribution per dollar of OAX benefit. 
However, the adoption of a #e%-race-age-edwcation-income-marltal atatua 
diacriminatii« policy in place of an age-only policy (column 5) reawlted 
in a marginal accretion in rediatribution for houaeholda with income 
levela in exceaa of $3,500, Wxere the marginal gain generally inereaaed 
aa family income inereaaed. The loweat income group# ($0-2,000), on the 
other hand, realized a net loaa in redistribution per dollar of OAl 
benefit. The marginal gain-loas observation ia explained by the effect 
of income and education level# on longevity. That is, annuity benefits 
are higher (lower) for low (high) income earners, ceteris paribus. 
because the probability of survival is positively related to income and 
education. Contrary to Aaron'a study (1974), the effect of socioeconomic 
differential# in eurvivor#hip does not reverse the direction of redistri­
bution, but, rather, "dampens" the «(tent of redistribution at the low 
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•nd of the incono #e#le and "alavacaa" tha axcane of radiatribucion at 
tha high and of tha incoma aeala. Iha prograa'a ovarall prograaaivity 
tiaa virtually invariant to tha uaa of gandar-margad or aax-raca-diatinet 
aurvivorahip rataa (laa curvaa 2 and 3 in Figura 7.2). Bowavar, tha uaa 
of iocioaconomie-adjuatad aurvivorahip probabilitiaa did augnant tha 
ragraaaiva faaturaa and attantuata tha prograaaiva faaturaa ralativa to 
tha "laaa" diacrininating probabilitiaa, 
Baaie aumary atatiatiea for eountarfaetuala ona through ai* ara 
praaantad in Tablaa 7.4 and 7.5* Tha total and naan mnuity banafit 
raeaivW in 1972 and tha Man pareantaga of radiatribution, controlling 
for aurvivorahip aaaunption, indaxing, and aaminga taat, ara praaantad 
in Tabla 7.4. Tha "and-point" amary atatiatiea for all eountarfaetuala 
ara ahotm in Tabla 7.5. It ia intaraating to nota that tha largaat 
prograaaivity gap (12.2) raaultad from a program eharactariiad by aga-
only diaerimination without an aaminga panalty taat or inflation 
protaetion. Tha maallaat prograaaivity gap (8.3) raaultad from a program 
that provided inflation protaetion, gamiahad a fraction of banafita for 
axcaaaiva poat-ratirmant aaminga, and tapared banafita to reflect 
aocioaconomie differantiala in mortality. 
2. The effect of differential life axpactanciaa of malea and femalea on 
the benefit incidence for fullytnaured beneficiariaa 
a. Single beneficiariea Tablea 7.6 and 7.7 ahow the effect of 
differential life expectanciea of femalea and malea on the benefit 
incidence for fullyinaured aingle beneficiariea. Type-4 annuity 
benefita were calculated employing gender-merged survivorship rates. 
Percentage point 
rftdistrlbutlon 
conponont 
differential 
-I • 
—6 
0- 1,001- 1,501- 2,001- 2,501- 3,001- 3,501- 4,001- 5,001- 6,001- 8,001- 10,001- 20,001+ 
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 5,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20,000 
(Income In 1972) 
Figure 7.2. ProgressIvlty of the 041 program using different survival 
probahlllty assumptions 
Table 7.4. To cal annuity benefit received In 1972 controlling for survivorship assumption, indexing, 
and earnings test 
Without earnings test With earnings test 
Annuity type 
Total 
annuity 
benefits 
Mean annuity 
benefit 
level 
Mean* 
percentage of 
redistribution 
Total 
annuity 
benefits 
Mean annuity 
benefit 
level 
Mean® 
percentage of 
redistribution 
Unlndexed 
$992,000 319.00 86.0 $925,000 298.00 87.0 
Type-2® 971,000 313.00 86.3 905,000 291.00 87.3 
Type-3** 972,000 313.00 86.3 906,000 292.00 87.2 
Indexed 
877,000 282.00 87.6 820,000 264.00 88.5 
T^ -5® 850,000 274.00 88.0 794,000 256.00 88.8 
T^ -6^  852,000 274.00 88.0 796,000 256.00 88.8 
'Total benefits nlnus total annuity benefits divided by total benefits. 
C^alculations based on gender-verged survivor iwobabllltles. 
C^alculations based on sex--r«ce-distinct survivor probabilities. 
C^alculations based on socioeconomic-adjusted survivor furobabllltles. 
Table 7.5. Percentage point gap between poorest and richest income groups 
Without esmings test With earnings test 
Itoindexed Indexed Ihiindexed Indexed 
Second Second Second Second 
Survivor Poorest poorest Poorest poorest Poorest poorest Poorest poorest 
probability to to to to to to to to 
assumption richest richest richest richest richest richest richest richest 
Cender-merged 12.2 7.9 10.7 6.9 10.3 6.0 9.1 5.3 
Sex-r#ce-distinct 12.1 7.9 10.4 6.7 10.2 6.0 8.9 5.2 
Socioeconomic 11.6 6.8 9.9 5.2 9.7 4.9 8.3 3.6 
Table 7.6. Effect of differential life expectancies of females on benefit Incidence for single 
workers controlling for total OAI contributions* 
(I) . C2) (3) (4) (5) j (6) (7) 
Total OAI® 
Type-4® Ty^ -5® Type-5 Ty^ -6® Overall 
actu­ actu­ Benefit actu­ actu­ Benefit benefit 
contributions arially arially differ­ arially arially differ­ differ­
In 1972 fair fair ential fair fair ential ential 
dollars benefit benefit (2)-(l) benefit benefit (5)-(4) (SMI) Population 
$ S00< 22 19 -3 19 21 2 -1 17 
501-1,000 62 54 -a 54 62 8 0 15 
1,001-1,500 94 81 -13 81 87 6 -7 13 
1,501-2,000 142 122 -20 122 130 8 -12 12 
2,001-2,500 183 158 -25 158 173 15 -10 15 
2,501-3,000 211 182 -29 182 198 16 -13 15 
3,001-3,500 229 197 -32 197 216 19 -13 12 
3,501-4,000 293 252 -41 252 277 25 -16 13 
4,001-4,500 350 301 -49 301 320 19 -30 17 
4,501-5,000 402 346 -56 346 378 32 -24 7 
5,001-6,000 410 351 ••99 351 364 13 -46 36 
6,001-7,000 492 421 -71 421 456 35 -36 12 
7,001-8,000 544 466 —78 466 506 40 -38 9 
8,001-9,000 767 660 -107 660 697 37 —70 6 
9,001+ 626 537 -89 537 562 25 -64 8 
Total $59.764 551.355 -$8.409 $51.355 $54.853 $3.498 -$4.911 207 
'Female beneficiaries are defined as single female retirees Mho are fully Insured and 
collecting primary benefits In 1972. 
**Type-4 annuity estimates are based on gender-merged survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
T^ype-5 annuity estimates are based on sexf ace-distinct survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
T^ype-6 annuity estimâtes are based on socioeconomic adUusted survivor probabilities, 
unadjusted. 
%^e 1972 dollar value of O&l contributions paid by the worker over her work history. The OAl 
contributions were accumulated assuming that tliere was 100 percent backward shifting of the OAI tax 
rate and compounded at U.S. government bowl Interest rates. 
Table 7.7. Effect; of differencial life mpeccanciea of male# on benefit incidence for allele 
workers controlling for total OKI contributions* 
( U  h (2) (3) (4) (5) j (6) (7) 
Total OAI* 
Tj^ -4" type-5® iype-5 Overall 
actu­ actu­ Benefit actu­ actu­ Benefit benefit 
contributions arially arially differ­ arially arially differ­ differ­
in 1972 fair fair ential fair fair ential ential 
dollars benefit benefit (2)-(l) benefit benefit (5)-(4) (5)-(l) Population 
$ 500< 23 2$ 2 25 29 4 6 10 
501-1,000 61 66 5 66 78 12 17 10 
1,001-1,500 91 99 8 99 119 20 28 17 
1,501-2,000 82 88 6 88 104 16 22 4 
2,001-2,500 172 187 15 187 240 53 68 6 
2,501-3,000 215 233 18 233 287 54 72 7 
3,001-3,500 263 284 21 284 347 63 84 11 
3,501-4,000 302 326 24 326 389 63 87 5 
4,001-4,500 313 337 24 337 401 64 88 7 
4,501-5,000 369 399 30 399 484 85 lis 7 
5,001-6,000 426 461 35 461 556 95 130 11 
6,001-7,000 469 505 36 505 595 90 126 10 
7,001-8,000 521 561 40 561 664 103 143 11 
8,001-9,000 677 731 54 731 857 126 180 4 
9,001+ 827 899 72 899 1,100 201 273 6 
Total $37.157 $40.131 $2.974 $40.131 $48.207 $8.076 $11.050 126 
*Nale beneficiaries are defined as single «ale retirees who are fully insured and collecting 
primary benefits in 1972. 
**%^ pe-4 annuity estimates are based on gender-#erged survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
y^pe-5 annuity estimates are based on sex-race-distinct survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
*^ iype-6 annuity estimates are based on socioeconomic adjusted survivor probabilities, 
unadjusted. 
T^he 1972 dollar value of O&I contributions paid by the worker over his work history, the OAI 
contributions were accumulated assuming that there was 100 percent backward shifting of the OAI tax 
rate and compounded at U.S. government bond interest rates. 
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where## Kype-5 benefit# were calculated ueing #e%-race-di#tinct rate#. 
All contribution ela##e#, independent of #ex and annuity type, received 
poaitive tranafer# from the OAI program, i.e., the mean OAI benefit level 
exceeded the annuity-type benefit level. However, the abaolute #iie of 
the tr#n#fer depemi# on sex and annuity type. Male beneficierie# 
received imaller annuity benefit# when gender-merged rate# were employed 
relative to a program uaing sex-diatinct ratea, ceteris paribua. The 
observed relationship is expected becauae sex-distinct ratea adjuat 
benefit levels upward for the relatively ahorter life expectancies of 
men, aa a group, vis-drvis woman, as a group. Contrariwise, female 
bsneficiaries received largar annuity banefite (hence, smaller 
redistribution components) when gender-merged rates were used relative to 
sex-distinct rates. Again, thia ia an expected reeult since sex-distinct 
rates adjuat benefit level# downward for the relatively longer life 
expectancie# of women, as a group. 
Ihe annuity benefit differentials for female and male beneficiariea 
are ahown in coltam 3 in Tablea 7.6 md 7.7, respectively. The negative 
differentials for female beneficiaries and the positive differentials for 
male beneficiaries indicate that single women, aa a group, are made 
differentially better off in a retirement program that does not sex 
discriminate benefit levels to account for the women's longer life 
expectancies relative to men's, as a group. Single female beneficiaries, 
as a group, received annuity benefits that were approximately 16 percent 
higher in a gender-merged retirement system relative to a sex-race 
discriminating system, lAereas male counterparts, as a group, received 
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benefits that were approximately aeven percent lower. Hence, in a sex-
neutral retirement program, single male beneficiariea received lower 
benefit levela relative to a sex discriminating program, which 
ccmpenaated for the slightly higher benefit levels paid to single female 
beneficiariea. 
A aimilar comparison can be made between type-) and type-6 annuity 
counterfactuala. Column 6 in Tablea 7.6 and 7.7 ahows that aingle 
persona, in general, received marginal accretiona in their annuity 
benefita when the effect of marital atatua, education, and income levels 
are incorporated into their life contingenciea. Theae "other" socio­
economic variablea affecting longevity tend to offaet the effect of the 
aex variable for aingle women and reinforce the effect of the aex 
variable for aingle men. The overall benefit differential resulting from 
the incorporation of sex, race, marital statua, education, and income 
variablea into annuity benefit calculations ia preaented in column 7 on 
Tables 7.6 md 7.7. Single female beneficiariea received annuity 
benefits that were approximately eight percent lower in a socioeconomic-
discriminating program relative to an age-only discriminating program^ , 
whereaa aingle male beneficiariea received annuity benefits that were 
approximately 30 percent higher. 
b. Married beneficiariea Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the effect of 
differential life expectancies of f«sales and males on the benefit 
incidence for fully-inaured married beneficiaries. Ihe cross-
subsidization by sex found in the case for single beneficiariea was not 
observed «ben the annuity benefit comparisons were made acroas married 
Table 7.8. Effect of differential life expectancies of fesmles on benefit incidence for married 
workers controlling for total OUI contributions, females only 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Type-4 Type-5 Type-5 Type-6 Overall 
Total OM actu­ actu­ Benefit actu­ actu­ Benefit benefit 
contributions arially arially differ­ arially arially differ­ differ­
in 1972 . 
dollars** 
fair fair ential fair fair ential ential 
benefit^  benefit* (2)-(l) benefit benefit* (5)-(4) (5)-(l) Population 
$ S00< 21 20 -I 20 20 0 —I 132 
501-1,000 50 48 -2 48 48 0 -2 130 
1,001-1,500 83 80 -3 80 80 0 -3 97 
1,501-2,000 llO 107 -3 107 105 -2 -5 89 
2,001-2,500 145 141 -4 141 140 -1 -5 82 
2,501-3,000 172 166 -6 166 165 -1 -7 59 
3,001-3,500 204 198 -6 198 194 -4 -10 51 
3,501-4,000 242 234 -8 234 231 -3 -11 45 
4,001-4,500 275 268 -7 268 263 -5 -12 41 
4,501-5,000 341 329 -12 329 324 -5 -17 23 
5,001-6,000 358 346 -12 346 341 -5 -17 40 
6,001-7,000 360 348 -12 348 338 -10 -22 26 
7,001-8,000 452 441 -11 441 435 -6 -17 17 
8,001-9,000 449 436 -13 436 426 -10 -23 10 
9,001+ 479 458 -21 458 441 -17 -38 5 
Total $127.919 *123.835 -$4.084 $123.835 $122.094 -$1.741 -$5.825 847 
*Female beneficiaries are defined as married female retirees who are fully insured and 
collecting primary benefits in 1972. 
I^he 1972 dollar value of OAI contributions paid by the worker over her work history. The OAl 
contributions were accumulated assuming that there was 100 percent backward shifting of the OAI tax 
rate and compounded at U.S. government bmid intereat rates. 
y^pe-4 annuity estimates are based on gender-merged survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
T^ype-S annuity estimates are based on sex-race-distinct survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
®Type-6 annuity estimates are based on socioeconomic adjusted survivor probabilities, 
unadjusted. 
Table 7.9. Effect: of differential life expectancies of males on benefit incidence for married 
worker# controlling for total OUI contributions, males only 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Type-4 Type-5 iype-5 type-6 Overall 
Total OAI actu­ actu­ Benefit actu­ actu­ Benefit benefit 
contributions arially arially differ­ arially arially differ­ differ­
in 1972 . fair fair ential fair fair ential ential 
dollars*• benefit^  benefit (2)-(l) benefit benefit* (5)-(4) (5)-(l) Population 
$ 500< it 14 -I 18 -I -2 104 
501-1.000 46 45 -I 45 45 0 -1 156 
1,001-1,500 78 75 -3 75 75 0 -3 134 
1,501-2,000 109 106 -3 106 105 -1 —4 133 
2,001-2,500 130 126 -4 126 125 -I -5 129 
2,501-3,000 173 168 -5 168 166 -2 -7 138 
3,001-3,500 209 203 —6 203 200 -3 -9 125 
3,501-4,000 234 227 -7 227 226 -I -8 143 
A,001-4,500 264 256 -8 256 254 -2 -10 133 
4,501-5,000 289 280 -9 280 277 -3 -12 131 
5,001-6,000 330 321 -9 321 318 -3 -12 229 
6,001-7,000 406 395 -11 395 389 —6 -17 214 
7,001-8,000 433 421 -12 421 416 5 -17 171 
8,001-9,000 478 465 -13 465 460 -5 -18 176 
9,001+ 483 469 -14 469 462 -7 -21 247 
Total $647.180 $629.418 -$17.762 $629.418 $621.542 -$7.876 -$25.638 2.363 
a^le beneficiaries are defined as married male retirees who are fully insured and collecting 
primary benefits in 1972. 
T^he 1972 dollar value of OAl contributions paid by the worker over his work history. The OAl 
contributions were accumulated assuming that there was 100 percent backward shifting of the OAl tax 
rate and compounded at U.S. government bond interest rates. 
T^ype-4 annuity estimates are based on gender-merged survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
l^ype-S annuity estimates are based on sex-race-distinct survivor probabilities, unadjusted. 
*Type-6 annuity estimates are based on socioeconomic adjusted survivor probabilities, 
unadjusted. 
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persons. Actuarially fair banafit lavala for married parions were 
approximately three percent higher, Independent of the sex of the primary 
annuitant, in a retirement aystem that did not sex discriminate relative 
to a sex discriminating program (see column 3 of Tablaa 7.8 and 7.9). 
First, it is interesting to note that both the male and female received 
annuity benefits that were three percent higher in a sex-neutral retire­
ment progm. Within a married household, the effects of sex differan-
tlala are neutralised because the joint-and-two-thlrds annuity insuraa 
the male and female membera of the couple, the absolute sise of the 
annuity benefit received is invariant to the sex of tha annuitant who 
actually purchases the annuity in either program type. Second, the sex-
neutral bias in favor of married persons, aa a group. Is a result of the 
Joint-and-two-thlrds mnulty, which insuraa the life of the ahortar-llved 
(on average) mala, the longer-lived female, and the longeat-llved 
survivor, who la typically the female, The surviving wife will, in a 
sex-neutral aystem, receive artificially high benefit levels for tW 
duration of widowhood. The relatively higher benefit levels for married 
households in a sex-neutral actuarially fair retirement program are 
financed primarily by single, male beneficiaries who receive smaller 
annuity benefits because of the assumption of identical life contingen­
cies for males and females. 
The effect of incorporating "other" socioeconomic variables can be 
seen in column 6 of Tables 7.8 and 7.9. Education, Income, and marital 
status effects tend to further reduce the size of the annuity benefit 
received by married persons. Specifically, annuity benefits are 
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approximately 1.3 percent lower in a socioeconomic discriminating program 
relative to a sex-race discriminating program. Again» this is expected 
since married persons tend to have a longer life expectancy relative to 
nofunarried counterparts. The overall benefit differential is represented 
in column 7 on Tables 7.8 and 7.9. Generally speaking, married persons, 
independent of sex, received benefits that were approximately four 
percent lower in a socioeconomic discriminating program relative to an 
age-only discriminating program. 
3. The effect of retirement year on the benefit incidence of single 
workers only 
The effect of retirement year on the percentage of redistribution is 
shown in Table 7.10. The retirement year is divided into three 
categories: 1962-1965, 1966-1969, and 1970-1972. The results are shown 
for type-3 and typ*-6 annuity counterfactuals, and displayed by total 
family income claaaifications. Except in a few eases (notably %*en the 
cell sise i# small), the percentage of redistribution falls as the 
retirement year increases, holding family income constant. Also, the 
percentage of redistribution ia quite stable for the lowst income group, 
which is consistent with the minimua benefit provision. The generally 
observed inverse relationship between the percentage of redistribution 
and the date of retirement supports the findings of Parson* and Munro 
(1977), Freiden et al. (1976), and Burkhauser and Warlick (1981). The 
general decline in the redistribution measure reflects the maturing of 
the progrm*. 
Tabl« 7.10. Effect of retlrMont year on benefit ineidmee for aiagle worker* 
Total family 
income in 
1972 
Type-3, inindexed* type-6 , indexed* 
Population Redistribution component^  Redistribution component 
1962-
1965 
1966-
1969 
1970-
1972 
1962-
1965 
1966-
1969 
1970-
1972 
1962-
1965 
1966-
1969 
1970-
1972 
$ 500- 1,000 97 98 95 97 98 96 1 3 1 
1,001- 1,500 97 93 76 97 93 83 7 8 6 
1,501- 2,000 89 84 78 88 85 79 6 9 5 
2,001- 2,500 88 84 75 87 85 79 18 15 7 
2,501- 3,000 89 82 79 89 83 82 13 10 9 
3,001- 3,500 87 81 72 85 82 75 7 13 6 
3,501- 4,000 87 80 71 87 82 75 12 9 10 
4,001- 5,000 89 82 73 89 83 76 12 13 12 
5,001- 6,000 90 79 66 90 80 71 5 12 6 
6,001- 8,000 91 82 67 90 83 73 6 15 13 
8,001-10,000 87 86 73 86 87 77 5 13 5 
10,001-20,000 94 84 74 94 85 78 16 19 18 
20,001+ 88 64 75 88 67 79 4 1 3 
Overall 90 83 75 90 84 79 112 140 101 
A^nnuity benefit# employed to calculate the redistribution component* were adjusted for 
earnings in excess of the 1972 earnings limit. 
f^tedistrilHition compwents were calculated by subtracting the mean annuity benefit level from 
the mean 1972 O&l benefit level reported as a percentage of the mean 1972 OAl benefit level. Raw 
data used to calculate tW reported results are available upon re^ iuest. 
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4. The baneftt incidanct of th# 1972 old-#*# inmurmmc* program: 
Married, both ratirad hou##holda only 
a. The effect of the wife'# work #t#tu# on th# b#n#git ineid#nc# 
Th#r# are 1,394 household# included in thi# sample: 614 two-earner 
hou##hold# #nd 780 on#-#arn#r hou##hold#. S«# T#bl# 7.11 for # 
description of the married, both retired, data set The effect of the 
wife*# work #t#tu# on the dietributional impact of the OAX program i# 
#%#min#d in Table# 7.12 and 7.13. Female beneficiarie# w#r# cl##sifi«d 
by their work atatua, where work atatu# waa determined by OAl beneficiary 
eligibility criteria, and hou##hold income in 1972. T«bl# 7.12 i# 
aimilar to Table 7.1 except that only married hou##hold# where both the 
hu#b#nd md wife ere retired in 1972 tfere included in the data #et. 
Similar to the reault# in Table 7.1, all female beneficiaries, 
independent of work statu# and family income level, received poaitive 
income tran#f#r# from the OAI program in 1972 (that ia, the r#di#tribu-
tion component# in column# 4a and 8a in Table 7.12 are poaitive). The 
rediatribution component e%pre##ed a* a percentage of the female'# OAl 
benefit level i#, on average, negatively related to family income, 
indicative of the program'a progresaivity. 
Table 7.13 compare# the difference# in OAl benefit level (column 1), 
yearly annuity benefit in a type-6 actuarially fair retirement system 
based on the actual contributions made by the female (column 2) and the 
male (column 3), and rediatribution component in percentage terms 
(column 4) for working and nonworking women acroa# family income 
categories. The working woman who qualifies for benefits on her own 
account received, on average, retirement benefits that were approximately 
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Tmble 7.11. Population distribucion for married, both racirad houaaholda 
by family incom in 1977 and family typa 
Two-aamar* Ona-aarnar^  
Family income 
in 1972 
Population 
aita 
Percentage 
diatribution 
Population 
aiia 
Parcantaga 
diatribution 
$ 0- 2,GOO 3 .5 29 4.0 
2,001- 2,500 13 2.0 33 4.0 
2,501- 3,000 13 2.0 46 6.0 
3,001- 3,500 31 5.0 55 7.0 
3,501- 4,000 46 7.5 72 9.0 
4,001- 5,000 107 17.5 113 15.0 
5,001- 6,000 91 15.0 98 13.0 
6,001- 8,000 122 20.0 111 14.0 
8,001-10,000 70 11.5 66 8.0 
10,001-20,000 86 14.0 124 16.0 
20,001+ 32 5.0 33 4.0 
Total 614 100.0 780 100.0 
*Ruaband and wifa ara aligibl* for primary-workar banafiea on chair 
own aeeomica* 
'^iWahaw* ia eligible for primary-worker benefice <m bia own account 
and the wife ia eligible for dependent apouae'a benefits only. 
Table 7.12. Effect; of the «rife*s %#ork mtaCu# on trife-ooly benefit incidence holding family income 
constant (type-ft* earnings adjusted) 
TVo-eamer household* One-earner household^  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Actu­ Actu­ 8adistry>u- Actu­ Actu­ Redistribu­
arially arially tion arially arially tion 
Female fair fair coiqKwent Female fair fair component 
OAl benefit benefit OAI benefit benefit 
Total family^  benefit from from (a) (b) benefit from from (a) (b) 
income in level wife's husband's 1-2-3 
1 
level wife's husband's 5-6-7 
5 1972 (mean) annuity annuity 1-2-3 (mean) annuity annuity 5-6-7 
0- 2,000 506 29 26 451 89 418 0 35 383 92 
2,001- 2,500 752 18 60 674 90 542 1 42 499 92 
2,501- 3,000 1,023 38 70 915 89 702 1 89 612 87 
3,001- 3,500 1,193 58 105 1,030 86 754 1 102 651 86 
3,501- 4,000 1,210 62 140 1,008 83 912 1 143 768 84 
4,001- 5,000 1,255 65 157 1,033 82 918 1 138 779 85 
5,001- 6,000 1,316 61 182 1,073 82 929 1 172 756 81 
6,001- 8,000 1,413 80 171 1,162 82 955 1 162 792 83 
8,001-10,000 1,412 88 148 1,176 83 896 2 159 735 82 
10,001-20,000 1,508 80 129 1,299 86 933 1 144 788 84 
20,001+ 1,596 87 159 1,350 85 942 2 134 806 86 
H^usband and wife are eligible for primary-worker benefits on their own account. 
H^usband is eligible for primary-worker benefits on his own account and the wife is eligible 
for dependent spouse's benefits mily. 
T^otal family income includes O&l benefits in 1972. 
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Table 7,13. Coapariaon of OAl and ty|M-6, «arnlnga «Ijuatad annuity 
banaflta for marritd traoan vieh différant labor-homemaker 
ehoieaa holding family income eonatant 
(1) (2) (3) _ (4) 
Difference" 
Difference^  between 
Difference^  between actuarially Difference in** 
between actuarially fair benefita redistribution 
Total family* female OAI fair benefita from components aa 
income in benefit from wife'a huaband'a a percentage 
1972 levels annuity annuity of OAI 
$ 0- 2,000 88 29 -9 -3 
2,001- 2,300 210 17 18 -2 
2,301- 3,000 321 37 -19 +2 
3,001- 3,300 439 57 3 0 
3,301- 4,000 298 61 -3 -1 
4,001- 5,000 337 64 19 -3 
5,001- 6,000 387 60 10 +1 
6,001- 8,000 458 79 9 -1 
8,001-10,000 516 86 -11 •1 
10,001-20,000 575 79 -15 +2 
20,001+ 654 85 25 -1 
'Fifty percent of the two-earner woman*a abare of her huaband'a 
yearly annuity benefit leaa 50 percent of the one-earner wman's ehare of 
her twaband'a yearly annuity benefit. 
i^fty percent of the two-earner woman*a yearly annuity benefit 
minus 50 percent of the one-earner woman's yearly annuity benefit. 
e^ mean level of OAl benefits received by a woman in a tw>-
earner houaehold less the mean level of benefita received Iqr a woman in a 
one-earner household. 
*%he difference between redistribution components of women in two* 
earner and one-earner households. 
o^tal family income includes OAI benefits in 1972, 
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50 pcrccne larger thtn the auxiliary benefita received by the nonworking 
woman. The benefit differential rangea from 21 percent for the loweat 
income category to 69 percent for the higheat income category.^  
Generally apeaking, entitled female workera received retirement 
benefita that ware larger than dependent apouae benefita. One reaaon for 
the obaerved OAl benefit differential ia that the nonworking woman'a 
benefit ia baaed on 50 percent of her huaband'a primary inaurance mount, 
whereaa the entitled female worker'a benefit ia baaed on her primary 
inaurance amount if her PIA exceeda SO percent of her apouae'a MA. 
Working women received higher annuity benefita from an actuarially 
fair retirement ayatem baaed on their actual contributiona than 
nonworking women (column 2, Table 7.13). Column 3 preaenta the 
difference between mnuity benefita received by working and nonworking 
women baaed on actual contributiona made by their huabanda. The negative 
valuea in column 3 indicate that the working woman received a mailer 
axmuity benefit from her huaband'a joint-and-two-thirda annuity than the 
nonworking woman. On net, working women received higher annuity benefita 
baaed on the houaehoW# OAl contribution#, and, b#cau## of her pact 
contributiona, ahe w#a afforded higher OAI benefita. 
The difference in percentage of rediatribution per dollar of OAl 
benefita for working wd nonworking women ia ahown in column 4 of 
Table 7.13. Working women received a higher percentage of rediatribution 
in the following income categoriea; $2,501-3,000, $5,001-6,000, 
S^ocial Security Bulletin data ahow that the average benefit for 
women worker# to be about 60 percent higher than the wife's auxiliary 
benefit for this time period. 
102 
$8,001-10,000, and $10,001-20,000. Bue, nonworking women received en 
equal or higher percentage of rediatribution per dollar of OAl benefita 
in all other income categoriea. It appeara that there waa alightly more 
rediatribution to nonworking women via-<-via working women. In abeolute 
terma, however, working women paid in more dollara in the form of OA! 
eontributiona, and, in exchange, they received higher OAX benefit levela. 
The relatively narrow differential in rediatribution componenta auggeata 
that women, independent of work atatua, were treated almoat equally in 
terma of rediatribution. 
b. The effect of the wife*a work atatua on huaband-only benefit 
incidence The finding of equal treatment acroaa women with different 
labor-homemaker choicea doea not apply to men married to women with 
different labor-homemaker choicea. Tablea 7.14 and 7.15 repreaent the 
male veraiona of Tablea 7.12 and 7.13. It ia intereating to note that 
the male rediatribution componenta aa a percentile of OAl benefita 
(columna 4b and 8b) are generally higher for malea in one-earner 
houaeholda relative to their male counterparta in two-earner houaeholda. 
The percentage of rediatribution meaaurea follow the generally obaerved 
pattern—falling aa family income riaea. However, the variance in the 
pattern ia alightly mailer for malea in a one-earner houaehold (97 to 92 
percent). Thia impliea that malea in one-earner houaeholda with family 
income of $0-2,000 received 97 centa of rediatribution for every dollar 
of OAl benefit. Similarly, malea in the $5,001-10,000 income claaaea 
received 92 centa of rediatribution per dollar of QAl benefit. 
Table 7.14. Effect of the «rife'a work atatua oo hiM*and-ooly benefit incidence holding family income 
constant (type-6, eaniinga adjuated) 
Two-earner bouadiold* One-earner houaehold^  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Actu­ Actu­ Kediatribu- Actu­ Actu­ Redistribu­
arially arially tion arially arially tion 
Male fair fair component Male fair fair component 
OAI benefit benefit OAI benefit benefit 
Total family^  benefit from from (a) (b) benefit from from (a) (b) 
income in 
1972 
level 
(mean) 
wife"a 
annuity 
huaband'a 
annuity 1-2-3 1-2-3 1 
level 
(mean) 
wife'a 
annuity 
husband's 
annuity 5-6-7 5-6-7 5 
0- 2,000 906 29 26 851 94 1,026 0 35 991 97 
2,001- 2,500 1,349 18 60 1,271 94 1,309 I 42 1.266 97 
2,501- 3,000 1,521 38 70 1,413 93 1,604 1 89 1,514 94 
3,001- 3,500 1,598 58 105 1,435 90 1,727 1 102 1,624 94 
3,501- 4,000 1,961 62 140 1,759 90 1,995 1 143 1,851 93 
4,001- 5,000 1,986 65 157 1,764 89 2,103 1 138 1,964 93 
5,001- 6,000 2,150 61 182 1,907 89 2,092 I 172 1,919 92 
6,001- 8,000 2,056 80 171 1,805 88 2,091 I 162 1,928 92 
8,001-10,000 1,947 88 148 1,711 88 2,086 2 159 1,925 92 
10,001-20,000 1,907 80 129 1,698 89 2,062 1 144 1,917 93 
20,001+ 2,197 87 159 1,951 89 2,110 2 134 1,974 94 
H^usband and wife are eligible for primary-%#orker benefita on their own account. 
H^usband is eligible for primary-worker benefita on hia own account and the wife is eligible 
for dependent spouse's benefits only. 
o^tal family income includes Ohl benefits in 1972. 
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Table 7.15. Caapariaon of OAI and eypa-6, adjuaead annuity banafita for 
aarriad man in ona-aarnar and twaamar houaaholda holding 
family income conatant 
(1) (2) (3)  ^ (4) 
Difference* 
Difference^  between 
Difference^  between actuarially Difference in** 1 1 between actuarially fair benefita radiatribution 1 1 male OAI fair benefita from components aa income in benefit from wife'a husband's a percentage 
1972 lavala annuity annuity of OAI 
$ 0- 2.000 -120 29 -9 -3 
2,001- 2,300 40 17 18 -3 
2,501- 3,000 -83 37 -19 -1 
3,001- 3,500 -129 57 3 -4 
3,501- 4,000 -34 61 -3 -3 
4,001- 5,000 -117 64 19 -4 
5,001- 6,000 58 60 10 -3 
6,001- 8,000 -35 79 9 -4 
8,001-10,000 -139 86 -11 -4 
10,001-20,000 -155 79 -15 -4 
20,001+ 87 85 25 -5 
"fifty percent of the two-earner man'a yearly annuity benefit 
minus 50 percent of the one-earner man's yearly annuity benefit. 
*Yifty percent of the two-earner oum's share of hie wife'a yearly 
annuity benefit less 50 percent of the one-earner man'a share of his 
wife's yearly annuity benefit. 
T^he mean level of OAI benefita received by a man in a two-earner 
household less the mean level of benefits received by a man in a one-
earner houaelwld. 
T^he difference between redistribution components of men in two-
earner and one-earner households, 
o^tal family income includes OAI benefits in 1972. 
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G#n#f#lly, mal## in t%K)-«arn«r household* received «nailer QAX 
benefit# (column 1, Table 7.15), although male* in two-earner familie* 
received higher combined annuity benefit* baaed on the actual OA! 
contributiona of both earner* in the household*. The difference in 
combined annuity benefit* (column* 2 plu* 3 in Table 7.15) acroa* hou*a-
hold type i*, in large part, a reault of the annuity benefit* received 
from the wife'* joint-and-two-thirda annuity baaed on her actual 0A% 
contribution*. Column 4 in Table 7.15 shorn that the male in a one-
earner houaehold con*i*tently received a larger percentage of rediatribu-
tion from the OAI program than the male in a t«o-earner houaehold. 
c. The effect of the tdfe'* work *tatu* on family benefit incidence 
Table 7.16 repreaenta the benefit incidence acroa* one-earner and two-
earner houaehold*, holding conatant family income in 1972. Column 7 
indicate* that, except for the lowe*t income category, family CM benefit 
level* were higher for two-earner houaehold* vi*-l-vi* one-earner house­
hold*. In addition, two-earner houaeholda received higher family 
benefit* from an actuarially fair retirement *y*tem (column 8). All 
family imita, independent of household type*, received poeitive income 
tranafer* from the OAZ program (columns 3 and 6). Furthermore, the one-
earner houaehold received a larger percentage of rediatribution relative 
to the two-earner houaehold for all income categoric* (column 9). 
d. The importance of the houaehold type in explaining the benefit 
incidence The tabular reault* regarding the percentage of redistribu­
tion by sex and household type across family income classes (columns 4b 
Table 7.16. Effect of the wife's work status on family benefit incidence holding total family 
income constant 
-earner household One-earner household Comparison 
(1) <2) (3) 
Redistri­
bution 
CMiMMient 
(4) <5) (6) 
Redistri­
bution 
component 
(7) 
Differ­
(8) 
Mffer-
(9) 
Differ­
as a per­ aa a per­ ence in ence In ence in 
Family centage of family centage of family family redistri­
Total family OKI Pamily family 041 041 Family family 041 041 annuity bution 
income In benefit annuity 
bmefit" 
benefits benefit annuity 
benefit" 
benefits benefits benefit « 
} 1972 level* (l)-(2) level* C4)-<5) (l)-(4) (2)-<5) (3)-(6) 
$ 0- 2,000 1,411 111 92 1,433 71 95 -22 40 -3 
2,001- 2,500 2,101 156 93 1,851 87 95 250 69 -2 
2,501- 3,000 2,544 217 91 2,306 181 92 238 36 -1 
3,001- 3,500 2,791 328 88 2,481 208 92 310 120 -4 
3,501- 4,000 3,171 404 87 2,907 289 90 264 115 -3 
4,001- 5,000 3,242 443 86 3,021 279 91 221 164 -5 
5,001- 6,000 3,466 487 86 3,021 346 89 445 141 -3 
6,001- 8,000 3,470 502 86 3,046 326 89 424 176 -3 
8,001-10,000 3,359 472 86 2,983 322 89 376 150 -3 
10,001-20,000 3,414 417 88 2,995 289 90 419 128 -2 
20,001+ 3,793 493 87 3,051 271 91 742 222 -4 
C^ombined OKI benefit received by the husband and wife in 1972. 
C^ombined annuity benefit received Iqr the husband and wife. 
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and 8b, Tabla* 7.12 and 7.14 arc sumnariaad in Figura 7.3. Xc ia 
intaraaeing to noea that tha parcantaga of radiatribution raeaivad by 
trataan, indapandant of work atatua» ia ganarally lower than the comparable 
meaaure for men. The obaerved mele-to-female differential in 
radiatribution ia conaiatent Mroaa all income cetegoriea. But, looking 
at the radiatribution curve# for women by household type# in Figure 7.3, 
it eppear# that the aiie and pattern of the radiatribution meaaure for 
women in one-earner and two-eemer houaeholda are very aimilar. The 
observed similarity auggeet# that, although women with different work 
etetu### paid in different amouata of OAX contributiona, they were 
treated equally in terme of the percentage of OAX benefita repreaenting 
radiatribution from the current working generation. 
The redietribution pettem for male# in one-earner and two-earner 
houaehold# are #imil#r; however, the •b#olute eiae of tlw redietribution 
me##ure varie# #ignifie#ntly by houcehold type. It ie deer from 
Figure 7.3 thet the percentege of redietribution for male# in one-eerner 
houcehold# i# #ub#t#ntially larger than the comparable meaaure for male* 
in two-eanwr houaehold# #cro## all incog* categoric#. One reason for 
the obviou# #ise disparity acroea all income categoriee i# the very small 
(or sero) ennuity benefit# received from the nonworking wife # joint-and-
two-third# annuity. Because hi# wife'# yearly annuity value is generally 
equal to zero, his redietribution component is larger. 
Although male# in one-earner households received preferential 
treatment from the OAl program vi#-a-vi# male# in two-earner households 
Redistribution 
component m a 
percentage of 
0\I benefits 
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Male, one-earner 
Male, two-earner 
/»* / Female, one-earner 
 ^ Female, two-earner 
'••• I ' I 'I I ' " ' I ' I I I I I » 
$0- 2,001- 2,501- 3,001- 3,501- 4,001- 5,001- 6,001- 8,001- 10,001- 20,001+ Income In 
2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 5,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20,000 1972 
Figure 7.3, Graphical comparison of redistribution components, expressed In 
percentage terms, by sex and household type 
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and faoalsa, working vooicn, aa a group, received a aignificancly soaller 
percentage of rediatribution when compared to tforking malea. There are 
aeveral reaaona for the aaaller rediatribution componenta received by 
working women. Pirat, entitled women frequently claim reduced benefit#. 
In 1967, 67 percent of the married female retired workera aged 65 and 
older received reduced benefit#. By 1971, the proportion had increased 
to 76 percent. The proportion of beneficiary women with reduced benefit# 
put# downward pre##ure on mean OAI benefit levela uaed to calculate the 
rediatribution componenta. Second, working wown have smaller primary 
inaurance amounta relative to workii^  men becaua# of their lower eaminga 
and intermittent labor force participation. In 1971, a aignificane 
proportion of retired women workera, eapecially the dually entitled, were 
entitled to the minimum PIA. Rail of the dually entitled women worker#, 
in 1971, were entitled to the minimum PIA compared to aeven percent of 
male worker#. Differencea in PIA diatribution# for male and female 
worker# reflect difference# in work hl#torie#. Men generally work for 
longer period# of time at higher earning#, reeulting in higher PIA#. The 
laat reason concerna the annuity benefit received by working wmen from 
their husband*# peat QAl contribution#. Since the male worker pay# into 
the #y#tem longer and, in addition, receives higher earning#, he ha# a 
larger accumulated tax contribution to purchase a j oint-and-two-third# at 
retirement. Assuming a community property approach to the actuarially 
fair benefit, the wife receives half of the yearly annuity benefit in an 
actuarially fair system based on OAI contributions of her husband. The 
wife's redistribution cotqKment is determined by subtracting her OAI 
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b«Mfie level fron her there of the yearly fully annuity benefit baaed 
on her OAI contribution and her huaband'a OA! eontributiona. The value 
of her rediatribution component la relatively email, therefore, becauae 
her OAI benefit level ia generally email becauee of her fmaller PXA 
relative to male workera combined with her Inereaaed tendency to accept 
reduced benefita and the relatively large annuity benefit received from 
her huaband'a joint-and-two-thirda combined with the annuity benefit 
baaed on her own OAI eontributiona. 
Figure 7.4 aummariaea the tabular reaulta in columna 3 and 6 in 
Table 7.16, The diitribution of rediatribution componenta by houaehold 
type illuatrated in Figure 7.4 showa that one-earner familiea, on 
average, received preferential treatment from the OAI program. Again, 
the preferential atatua of one-earner fmiliea ia explained by the 
nominal eontributiona made by the nonworking apouae in the one-earner 
family. 
e. The progreaaivity of the OAI program by houaehold type The 
''end-point" approach to determining progreaaivicy auggeata that the 
program ia "weakl]^ * progreaaive: the varianeea for women and men in two-
earner fmiliea are 90-82 and 94-88, reapectively, and the varianeea for 
women and men in one-earner familiea are 92-81 and 97-92, reapectively. 
Progreaaivity aaaeasment baaed on the "patterned" approach ahowa the 
program to be "generally" progreaaive given the generally obaerved 
inverse relationabip between the percentage of rediatribution and total 
family income. Bowver, the "higbeat-income-group-compariaon" approach 
expoaea atr<wg regreaaive featurea for women in both houaehold typea. 
Redistribution 
component m « 
percentage of 
Oàl benefits 
One-earner 
bousebold 
TWo-eamer 
household 
*#####*##################*### 
j  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  i  •  ! •  
$0- 2,001- 2,501- 3,001- 3,501- 4,001- 5,001- 6,001- 8.001- 10,001- 20,001+ Income In 
2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 5,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20,000 1972 
Figure 7.4. Distribution of redistribution compmients in percentage terms by 
hous^ old type 
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mild f#gf###iv# faacurtt tot nan in ona-aarnar houaaholda, and strong 
progtasaiva faafcuraa tor man in two-aamar houaaholda. 
Figura 7.5 appliaa to famalaa only and ihowa tha program to ba 
prograaaiva at income levels less than $3,300, but atrongly regreaaive at 
ineoKM levels greater than $3,500. Middle-income femalea, especially, 
are made worse-off relative to the highest income group of females, 
independent of household type. The program does not appear to be as 
regreaaive when focusing on males only (Figure 7.6). The program 
demonstrated "claaaic" prograaaiva featurea for malaa in two-earner 
households for income levels of $5,000 or less, and it demonatrated only 
"slight** regreaaive featurea for the $6,001 to $20,000 range. The 
program haa a narrow progressive area ($0 to $3,000) for males in one-
earner households and somewhat "claaaic" regreaaive featurea for income 
levels in exceaa of $3,000. Figure 7.7 is based on the household unit 
sorted by tousehold type. Again, the program had "claaaic" prograaaiva 
features at low income levela ($0-3,500), but had regreaaive featurea at 
higher income levels. The program is more progressive and less 
regressive for two-earner relative to one-earner households. 
(Summary findings on annuity types I, 2, 3, 4, and 5, male-to-female 
comparisons by annuity type, household-type comparisons by annuity type, 
and indexed to nonindexed comparisons by annuity type can be found in 
Appendix E, Tables 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, and 15.7.) 
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Figure 7.5. Progressivity of the OAI program by household type, females only 
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Figure 7.6, Progressivity of the OAI program Iqr household type, males only 
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Figure 7.7. Progreasivity of the OKI program by household type 
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5. Th# effect of •ocial Mcurlcy paynMintt on ch# dlatributlon of incoaw. 
both retired houieholde only 
The effect of toclel mecurlty benefit# on the dletrlbutlon of Income 
eoong #ld#rly houcohold# «## #x#aln#d by dividing #11 a#rrl«d coupl## 
wh#r# both member# were collecting OAl benefit# between 1962 and 1972 
Into ({ttlntlle group#. Table 7.17 pre#«nt# the dl#trlbutlon of income 
before and after paymnt of #ocl#l ««curlty benefit#. The dletributlon 
of personal Income, «cluelve of aociel security benefit#, wa# highly 
#k«wed{ the pooreet 60 percent of the elderly population had lea# th#n 20 
percent of personal income compared to the 60 percent of personal income 
held by the richest 20 percent of the elderly population. The addition 
of the husband's QAl benefits did reduce the skewedness in the distribu­
tion of income. Column 2 displays the distribution of personal income 
inclusive of the husband's OAI benefits, but exclusive of the wife's OAI 
benefits. Row, the poorest 60 percent received 30 percent of personal 
income, whereas the richest 20 percent received just under SO percent of 
personal income. Column 3 displays the distribution of personal incoM 
after all family 041 benefit# were apportioned. The di#tribution of 
personal income was, in spite of the social security progrme, skewed in 
favor of the richest quintile, but the program did increaae the relative 
share of personal income received by the poorest 60 percent of the 
elderly. After receipt of all family OAI benefits, the poorest 60 
percent had 34 percent of personal income compared to 45 percent of 
personal inwwe received by the richest <*uintile. Also, the husband's 
share of OAI benefits had the greatest redistributional impact. This is 
expected since the absolute size of the male's OAI benefit generally 
Tablet 7.17, Dletrlbutlon of lACoae for both retired population, before and after payment of social 
security benefits 
(2) (3) Mean personal income 
(I) Distribution Distribution 
Distribution of personal of personal With 
of personal income after income after Without husband With 
income before husband's Oàl faW^ ly OAX social benefit family OAI 
social security benefits benefits security only benefits 
Poorest qulntile 1.0% 6.0% 8.0% $210 $2,142 53,141 
Second qulntile 6.0 10.0 11.0 1,305 3,255 4,331 
ntird qulntile 11.0 14.0 15.0 2,535 4,557 5,635 
Fourth qulntile 21.0 21.0 21.0 4,913 6,877 7,973 
Richest qulntile 61.0 49.0 45.0 14,337 16,270 17,400 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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exceeded the femle'e CAI benefit because of the male*s higher average 
earnings and atronger labor force attachment, and becauie feoalea 
typically collect auxiliary beneflta which are 50 percent of the male's 
PIA. 
Table 7.18 looks at the distribution of modal Mcurlty benefits by 
percentage share. Married couples In the sample received approximately 
94.2 million In Wkl beneflta In 1972, of which 6S percent were paid to 
male beneficiaries and 35 percent were paid to female beneficiaries. 
Oversll, foclsl security benefits were proportionally distributed to 
households, msle beneflclarlea, and female beneflclarlea. Nevertheleaa, 
the roughly proportional distribution of OAI benefits significantly 
Improved the level of personal Income for the poorest 60 percent of the 
elderly population. Ihe poorest «{ulntlle received 19.3 percent of all 
soclsl security benefits paid to both retired, married couples in 1972, 
which increaaed its level of personal income by 1,394 percent. 
conclusion, column 1 of Table 7.17 indicates that the distribu­
tion of personal income before codai security tas sharply akewed in 
favor of the richeat income quintile. The single-period analysis of OAI 
transfers showed that, although the distribution of personal income after 
the addition of sodal security benefits was not distributed particularly 
evenly, there had been a relatively small change toward increasing inc<me 
equality as a result of the program's intergenerational transfer 
Table 7.18. Distribution of social security benefits to both retired population by percentage share 
Percentage gain in personal income 
Hale resale ' 
All OM bmeficiaries* beneficiaries' Male female 
Quintile group benefits OUI benefits OAl benefits Household beneficiary beneficiary 
Total 4,231,935 2,732,532 1,499,403 
Percentage 100.0 64.50 35.43 
Poorest quintile 19.3% 19.7% 18.6% 1,394 919 475 
Second quintile 19.9 19.9 20.0 232 149 83 
Third quintile 20.4 20.6 20.1 122 80 42 
Fourth quintile 20.2 20.1 20.3 62 40 22 
Richest quintile 20.1 19.7 21.0 21 13 8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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mechamiam and Ineosw-iooothing faacura.* A closer look ac the 
dlsbursaoant of OAI banafits (Tabla 7.18) showed that benefits were, at 
best, proportionally distributed across quintile groups, but the largest 
relative gains in the level of personsl income, before and after social 
security benefits, were realised by the poorest 60 percent of the elderly 
population. 
The uae of single-period analysis to assess the distributional 
impact of social security is insightful, but it can be very mialeading 
aince it fails to distinguish between the intergenerational tranafer and 
income-smoothing features of the program. Because benefits are 
contingent on past OAI contributions, they are a mixture of the return on 
past contributions, redistribution within a retirement cohort, and 
redistribution across generations. The following tables in this section 
focus on the distributional impact of the intergenerational transfer 
mechanism only; that is, the income-smoothing feature has been stripped 
awgqr by use of type-6 annuity counterfactuals. Table 7.19 presents the 
distribution of redistribution components by quintile group, controlling 
for family type and sex. The distribution of income before and after 
apportioning the redistribution component is displayed in Table 7.20. 
Similar to the distribution pattern of social security benefits, the 
redistribution components were distributed roughly equally across 
R^ecall, the social*seeurity*program has two primary features; 
I) an income-smoothing feature whereby workers transfer a fraction of 
their labor earnings to their retirement years by participating in the 
program during their earning years, and 2) an intergenerational transfer 
feature whereby income is transferred from the current working generation 
to the currently retired population. 
Table 7.19. Dlstribuclon of irodlstrlbutloii ooapooeats by qulntile group oootrolling for family type 
end sex 
Two-eerner One-eemer 
<1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female's Male's Household's Bopula- Pemale'a Male's Household's Popula-
share of share of share of tlon dxare of share of share of tlon 
redistri­ redistri­ redistri­ distri- redistri­ redistri­ redistri­ distri-
bution* bution* bution* tion bution* bution* bution* tlon 
Poorest qulntile 16.7% 18.1% 17.5% 18% 20.8% 21.1% 21.0% 22% 
Second qulntile 20.1 20.5 20.4 20 19.7 19.4 19.4 20 
Third qulntile 20.3 22.0 21.3 22 18.9 19.4 19.3 19 
fourth qulntile 21.0 20.4 20.6 21 19.6 19.6 19.6 20 
Richest qulntile 21.9 18.9 20.1 20 21.0 20.5 20.6 20 
Total 674,798 1,075,773 1,767,702 614 560,920 1,416,564 1,989,561 780 
'Rediscribucion oonponent: calculecioas are baaed on type-6, earnlnga-adjuated counterfactual. 
Table 7«20. fiiacrlbucion of inomie for mrrled, both retired population before and after 
apportioning the redistribution component 
AU bCNMlnldB Ho-eraier household Out qaiiiei hwwclwld 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DLstributloa 
of penxmal Ptotribucion Distribution Dtotxihution Mgtri burton DtotrUutioo 
Inocae b^ ons of pBtsonal of peeannal of pwanal of personal of (sraonal 
social Inoaas itftnr inocae teCace after Ite InooK teCore Income after Ifet 
Quint He group saoutity H? K? K? ef&et m? Mf effect 
Raorast qulntlle IJK 7.7% OJK 7.1% 46w4 un 8J% •ff.l 
Sacood qulntUe 6.0 10.9 56 11.2 45.6 5.6 10.6 45.0 
Third qulntlle IIJO 11J6 15.2 43.6 10w4 13.5 43.1 
Fburth qulntlle 21.0 2DJ 21.1 20.9 -0.2 21.1 20.6 -0.5 
Rlchast qulntlle 61J0 46.4 6OJ0 45.6 -14.4 61.8 47.1 -14.7 
'Redistribution component calculations are basW on type-6, earnings-adjusted counterfactuals. 
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quinclia groupa» Indapandanc of family type and aax (Table 7•19). It is 
interesting to note that 22 percent of the pooreat one-earner households 
received approximately 21 percent of all intergenerational tranafara to 
males and females in one-earner households. Column 4 in Table 7.19 
indicates that apousal beneflta were, at beat, proportionally distributed 
to dependent spouses of male vorkera and, therefore, were not diatributed 
principally to needy dependent apousea aa intended by the apousal benefit 
provision. 
Table 7.20 diaplays the distribution for married, both retired 
population before and after apportioning the rediatribution componenta. 
Comparing wlumn 2 of Table 7.20 and colum 3 of Table 7.17, it is clear 
that single-^ riod analysis tends to overstate the true distributional 
impact of the OAI program. The intergenerational transfer mechanism did 
increase income equality but not to the extent that aingle-period 
analysis alleges or the "social adequacy" objective would seem to 
dictate. 
B. Regression Results 
The regression results reported in this section are based on the 
eight models described in Chapter VI. There are four permutations of the 
generalized single model labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. Recall that the 
specified models have Identical independent variables but different 
dependent variables measuring the extent of redistribution. Similarly, 
there are four versions of the married model each having Identical 
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indapcndcnt varlabl##, but, again, different meaaurea of rediatribution 
were uaed aa dependent variablea. 
In Chapter VI, the independent and dependent variablea were defined 
and explained. The regreaaion résulta presented in this section are 
organised aa folIowa: 1) fimlings for the single model; 2) findings for 
the married model; and 3) aunmary of finding*. 
1. Single modela 
Ihe expected eigne of the coefficienta were diacuaaed in Chapter VI 
and are aunmariied in Table 7.21. Linear and loglinear modela were 
eatimated, in addition to the quadratic model, but the quadratic 
variables LTCARS and SER1ZN2 were found to be jointly aignificant in all 
perautationa of the generalised aingle model, althou^  the quadratic 
terma, «hen taken separately, were not always found to be statistically 
aignificant. Summary statistics for the independent variablea employed 
in the aingle model appear in Table 7.22. Aa might be expected, there 
was evidence of correlation between the labor force experience variables 
(LTgAH and SHQjm), The estimated correlation coefficient was 0,91 and 
it is statiatically significant at the one percent level. In spite of 
the strong correlation between the two labor force variables, the 
estimated coefficients on LTEAR and SBRLZN were significantly different 
fro# zero at a one percent level for all permutations of the single 
model. At present, there is no obvious solution to this multicollin-
earity problem without introducing a new statistical problem, specifi­
cally, a specification error. However, the construction of a larger. 
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TabI* 7.21. Slngla ragraaalon modal varlablaa and expaetad eoaffielant 
aigna for aodala 1, 2, 3, and 4 by aorvivorahlp aaaumption 
Indapandane 
variable 
Dependent variablea in modela 1, 2, 3, and 4 
(bnder-merged 
Sex-raee-
diatinet 
Socioeconomic-
a«Q uated 
LTIAR 
LTE&R2 
SBX 
RACE 
SBRLEN 
8BXLQf2 
RAGCRl 
RAGER2 
RA6ER3 
RCOWffiTl 
RCOROm 
BDUl 
E0U2 
E003 
ED04 
Negative 
Poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Poaitive 
Negative 
Negetive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Poaitive 
Poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
Negative or 
poaitive 
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T)ibl« 7.22. Suamary ttatiatics for indapandant variables employed in the 
tingle regrettion modelt 
Standard 
Variable Htan deviation Minima Maximum 
LTEAR 142,211 112,408 0 
SEX 0.61 0.49 0 
RACE 0.06 0.24 0 
SBRLEN 19.08 9.64 0 
RAGERl 0.30 0.30 0 
RAGER2 0.24 0.42 0 
RAGER3 0.11 0.31 0 
RCOBORTl 0.32 0.47 0 
RC080IIT2 0.31 0.46 0 
ESUl 0.21 0.41 0 
E0U2 0.10 0.31 0 
E0U3 0.29 0.46 0 
mm 0.20 0.40 0 
434,835 
36 
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mor# diver## data sec ia likely to nininiie the collinearity preaent 
between the labor force variablea in thia small, relatively homogenoua 
single data set 
a. Eatimation of the model uaina the annuity couaterfactuala for a 
nonindexed. no earnings test adtuated inaurance program Aa mentioned 
in Chapter VI, thia permutation of the single model waa estimated to 
isolate the partial effect of worker-apeeific charaeteriatica on the 
percentage of rediatribution in the absence of cost-of-living and 
eaminga test adjustments. This narrow definition of the program allowa 
for the iaolation of the initial effect of the progressive benefit 
formula and the minimoa benefit proviaion. The reaulta for model 1 under 
different survivorship assumptions are reported in Table 7.23. 
Looking first at the regression results for the model based on the 
gender-merged survivorship aasumption (column I in Table 7.23), it la 
worth noting that all the coefficienta for the independent variablea have 
the predicted aign (for those independent variables with predicted 
signs). The coefficients on the quantitative variables LTEAR and SERLEU 
are significantly different from zero at a one percent level; however, 
the coefficients for the quadratic terms LTIAR2 and 8ERLE92 were not 
significantly different from zero at a five percent level, although they 
were jointly significant at a one percent level. The coefficients on the 
control variables, RACERS, RC080RT1, RC0K0RT2, and EDU4, were 
significantly different from zero at the one percent level. The 
coefficients on SEX, RACE, and EDU2 (variables with unpredicted 
coefficient signs) were not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 7.23. Single regression results: Model 1 under different 
survivorship sssumptions*'* 
Survivorship probability assumption 
Sex-race- Socioeconomic 
variable Gender-merged distinct sdjusted 
LTEAR -4.426* -4.166* -4.288* 
(4.02). (3.68) (3.34) 
LTEAR2 0.219® 0.173 0.176 
(0.91) (0.70) (0.62) 
SEX -0.013 3.063* 4.745* 
(0.03) (6.55) (8.94) 
RACE 0.971 0.129 -0.111 
(1.06) (0.14)_ (0.10) 
SBRLEN -0.636* -0.626* -0.664* 
(5.17). (4.95)„ (4.63) 
SIRLEN2 0.006^  0.006® 0.006 
(1.71). (1.59) (1.27) 
RACERl -0.300» -0.354 -0.354 
(0.90). (0.62) (0.55) 
RA6ER2 -0.600* -0.405 -0.323 
(0.98) (0.65) (0.46) 
RAGER3 -2.126* -2.315* -2.834* 
(2.78) (2.95) (3.W 
RCORORTl 9.240* 8.975P 9.634* 
(16.45) (15.54)_ (14.70) 
RC0H0RT2 6.116* 5.980* 6.495* 
(11.37) (10.81) (10.35) 
EODl 0.006 -0.092 -0.394 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.51) 
E1>U2 -0.800 -0.625 -0.482 
(1.0) . (0.76). (0.52) 
E0U3 -0.540» -0.619* -0.573 
(0.86) (0.96) (0.78)^  
EDD4 -2.754* -3.050* -2.535* 
(3.89) (4.18) (3.07) 
INTERCEPT 95.48* 93.92* 92.45* 
(88.19) (84.38) (73.21) 
R2 
.871 .863 .855 
N 353 353 353 
*c-ratios in parentheses. 
S^ignificance levels (uppercase for 2-tail tests, lowercase for 1-
tail tests): A, a-1%; B, b-535, C, c-lOZ, D, d-20%. 
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Column 2 In Table 7.23 preaenta regreaaion raaulca when aex and race 
aurvivorahlp dlfferentiala are accounted tor In the annuity 
counterfactuala. All the coefficienta, excluding thoae on RACE and BDUl, 
have the expected algn. The coefficient on SEX la poaitive and 
aignificantly different from aero et a one percent level. Ceteria 
paribua. women can expect a rediatribution component 3.06 percentage 
pointa larger than men becauae of their relatively longer life 
expectanciea, on average. Contrary to expected reaulta, nonwhitea, after 
accounting for their ahorter life expectanciea, can expect a 
rediatribution component 0.129 percentage pointa larger than whitea, 
ceteria paribaa. 
Regreaaion reaulta for model 1 adyuating for aocioeconomic 
differential* in aurvivorahip are preaented in coliam 3 in Table 7.23. 
After accounting for aex, race, marital atatua, education, and income 
differentiala in aurvivorahip, the OAI program vaa atill found to be 
progreaaive; that ia, the coefficient on LTEAR ia negative and 
aignificantly different from aero at a one percent level, and, although 
all coefficienta m the education variablea are negative, only EDU4 ia 
aignificantly different from zero at a one percent level. Alao, the 
coefficient on RACE ia negative, but not atatietically aignificant. 
The overall effect of accounting for differential life expectanciea, 
in moat caaea, ia alight, dearly, from the aize of the coefficient on 
SEX, women receive a aignificantly larger rediatribution component when 
their relatively longer life expectancy ia accounted for in their 
actuarially fair retirement inaurance payment. 
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b. Estimation of tht model uaina the annuity counfrfactual for mm 
indexed, no eaminga ft adiuatad insurance program The dependent 
variable employed in this version of the single model is the 
redistribution residual, in percentage terme, assuming the retiree 
purchaaed an indexed, no earnings test snnuity with her accumulated OAI 
contributiona on the date of retirement. The variation in the residual 
ia once again explained by the quadratic model with 12 independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients for model 2 by survivorship 
aasumption appear in Table 7.24. 
In column I, coefficienta on LTEAR, SERLEM, and SERLEN2 have the 
correct sign (those with predict#* signs) and are aignificantly different 
from sero at a one percent level. And the coefficient on LTEAR2 has the 
correct sign and ia aignificantly different frcm aero at a five percent 
level. All the control variablea have the correct aign, and coefficients 
on RA6ER3, RCOWRTl, RC0H0R72, and EDB4 are significantly different from 
sero at a one percent level. 
Regression results for model 2 accounting for sex and race 
differentiala in survivorship are shown in column 2 of Table 7.24. The 
coefficients have the expected sign (those with predicted signs) except 
for RACBM and EDOl. Incorporating indexing and survivorship 
differentials by race and sex into the measure of redistribution results 
in coefficients on the age of retirement variables that are mixed in sign 
but small in size for RA6E1U and RA6ER2. The positive coefficient on 
RA6E1U suggests that persons will maximize the percentage of 
redistribution by retiring at %es 62 to 64 *en lifetime contributions 
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Tmble 7.24. Slngl* regression results: Model 2, under different 
survivorship assumptions** ° 
Survivorship probability aasumption 
Sex-race- Socioeconomic 
variable Gender-oerged distinct adjuated 
LTEAR -4.871* -4.523* -4.884* 
<5.48). (4.99)^  (4.31). 
LTEAR2 0.334* 0.276® 0.366* 
(1.72) (1.39). (1.48) 
SEX -0.072 3.101* 5.192* 
(0.19) (8.29) (11.12). 
RACE 0.711 -0.117 -3.487* 
(0.96) (0.16) (3.71) 
SERLEN -0.662* -0.630* -0.676* 
(6.68). (6.22). (5.35). 
SEELER2 0.009* 0.009* 0.007® 
(3.14) (2.90) (1.95) 
RACERl -0.054 0.105 0.182 
(0.12). (0.23) (0.32) 
RA6ER2 -0.467* -0.274 -0.116 
(0.95), (0.55) (0.19). 
RAGER3 -2.415* -2.50* -3.012* 
(3.92) (3.97) (3.84) 
RGOHOiai 6.252* 5.90* 6.529* 
(13.82) (12.76) (11.32) 
RCOHORta 4.066* 3.876* 4.391* 
(9.37) (8.75) (7.95) 
EOUl 0.087 -0.055 -0.303 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.44) 
E002 -0.546 -0.400 -0.309 
(0.85). (0.61). (0.38) 
E003 -0.467* -0.522* -0.535 
(0.92 (1.01) (0.83). 
E004 -2.189* -2.41* -2.069* 
(3.83) (4.13) (2.84) 
XmrERCEPT 97.55* 95.92* 94.395* 
(111.74) (107.68) (84.90) 
R2 
.881 .870 .853 
N 353 353 353 
*t"ratios in parentheses. 
S^ignificance levels (uppercase for 2-taH tests, lowercase for l-
tail tests): A, a-JZ; B, b-5%, C, c-lW, 0, d-20%. 
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arc uaad to purchaaa inflation and income inauranca, Thia raault may be 
more reflective of the way annuity benefita were indexed after retirement 
and the population diatribution of the aingle data aet than of the actual 
atrueture of the QAl program. Thia will be diacuaaed further in 
aubaaction 3. 
Similar raaulta are obtained from the uae of aoeioeconomic-adjuatad 
aurvivorahip probabilitiaa, except the coefficienta for SEX and RACE were 
found to be mora atatiatically aignificant. 
c. latimation of the aingle model uaing the annuity countarfactual 
for a nonindexed. earning# teat adiuatad inauranca program The 
nominal annuity benefit employed to calculate the dependent variable waa 
adjuatad by the OAl earning teat formula for poat-ratiremant aaminga in 
axcaaa of 91,680. The quadratic model had leaa explanatory power, aa 
2 
reflected by the aignificantly amaller R , becauae 65 percent of peraona 
with poat-retiramant aaminga in axcaaa of 91,680 would have received 
saro annuity banafita for 1972, raaulting in rediatribution componenta 
equal to 100 percent. 
Tha eatimatad coefficienta in column 1 of Table 7,25 have Ihe 
predicted aign with exception of EOOl; however, only the coefficienta for 
LTBUt, SERUM, RCOHORTl, and RC0H0RT2 are aignificantly different from 
zero at a one percent level and the coefficient for RA6ER3 ia 
eigoifieantly different from zero at a five percent level, Non^ iltea and 
peraona with 0-7 year# of education received allghtly leaa rediatribution 
from the OAI program relative to wbltea and peraona with eight yeara of 
education, reapectlvely. 
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Table 7.25. Single regression results: Model 3 under different 
survivorship aeaumptlona*'* 
Survivorship probability assumption 
Sex-race- Socioeconomic 
variable Gender-merged dlstlnet a4Juated 
LTEAR -6.586* -6.208* -6.460* 
(3.55). (3.34). (3.18) 
LTEAR2 0.516* 0.411*' 0.451 
(1.27) (1.01). (1.01) 
SEX 0.393 3.206* 4.789* 
(0.51) (4.18) (5.72) 
RACE -0.048 -0.852 -1.201 
(0.03) (0.55). (0.71) 
SERLEN -0.625* -0.605* -0.619* 
(3.02) (2.91). (2.731 
SERLEN2 0.012® o.oir 0.01® 
(1.89) (1.79) (1.46) 
RAGERl -0.513 -0.301 -0.291 
(0.55) (0.32) (0.28) 
RACER2 -0.317 -0.211 -0.144 
(0.31). (0.21). (0.13). 
RAGEX3 -2.839» -2.918® -3.431* 
(2.21) (2.26) (2.44) 
RCORORri 6.50* 6.26* 6.753* 
(6.87) (6.61) (6.53) 
RCOROm 3.109* 2.993* 3.343* , 
(3.44) (3.30) (3.37) 
EDUl -0.295 -0.482 -0.824 
(0.26) (0.43) (0.67) 
EIHI2 -0.072 -0.069 0.233 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.16) 
E0U3 -0.785 -0.802 -0.736 
(0.74)^  (0.75). (0.63)* 
ED@4 -1.783® -2.133" -1.689° 
(1.50) (1.78) (1.29) 
lirrERCEPT 97.93* 96.42* 95.11* 
(53.78) (52.81) (47,69) 
R2 
.628 .629 .637 
N 353 353 353 
-ratios In parentheses, 
S^lgnifleance levels (uppercase for 2-tall tests, lowercase for l-
tall tests): A, a-lX; B» b-5X, C, c-lOZ, D, d-20%. 
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Again, the Introduction of differentials In survivorship, be Ic sex-
race or socioeconomic. Increases the site and algnlflcance of the 
coefficients for RACE end SEX, With the earnings test adj uatment of 
annuity benefits, the level of education verlables follow a curloua path 
when mortality differentials ere Introduced, First, Including mortality 
differentials 1^  sex and race In the annuity counterfactual tends to 
Increase the negative redistributional differential between persons with 
less than eight or more than 11 years of education relative to persons 
with eight years of education. But, there Is a slight narrowing of the 
redistributional differential between persona with 9-11 year# of 
education relative to persons with only eight years of schooling when sex 
and race differential# are reflected in mortality ratea. Further 
disaggregation of mortality rate# by marital atatua, income, and 
education level# tend# to etrengthen the tendency of the sex and race 
adjustment# for EDUl only. For all other education catégorie#, the 
rediatributional differential 1# narrowed, and, for EDU2, the 
differential sign 1# poeitive, This suggest# that the earning# test 
slightly weaken# the program*# progre##ivity, which 1# con#i#tent with 
the smaller coefficient# for UEAft in column# 2 and 3 relative to 
column 1, 
d, Batimation of the «ingle model ualng the annuity counterfactual 
for an indexed, earning# te#t adguated Inawrance program Similar 
re#ulte are obtained with tbi# final permutation of the generalized 
single model, where the dependent variable 1# based on an annuity 
counterfactual promising to pay a real stream of benefits for the life of 
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the annuitant and aone or all benefits are forfeited If post-retlrenent 
earnings exceed $1,680. (The fraction forfeited depends on the slie of 
the annuity benefit and the amount of earnings over $1,680.) The 
regression results are reported in Table 7.26. 
With the notable exception of the coefficients for the education 
variables BOUl and B0U2 in colum 1, RAGBRl and BOUl in coltnm 2, and 
RA6ER1 in column 3, all the coefficients have the expected sign. In 
coltnn I, the coefficients on EDUl and EDU2 are negative and positive, 
respectively, indicating that persons with less than eight years of 
education received less, and persons with 9-11 years of education 
received more, redistribution per dollar of OA! benefit relative to 
persons with eight years of schooling. The redistributional differential 
generally increases with the incorporation of disaggregated mortality 
differentials. 
e. Comparison of models 1. 2. and 4 controlling for differential 
survivorship probeMlities In the previous subsections, the effect of 
differential mortality on the estimated coefficients across permutations 
of the generalized single model «sas examined. This suWectiom focuses on 
the effect of different program features on the size and sign of the 
estimated parameters, holding the survivorship assumption constant. The 
coefficient estimates for models I, 2, and 4 for the gender-merged and 
socloeconomic-a«y usted survivorship probability assumptions are 
reproduced in Tables 7.27 and 7.28, respectively. 
Looking first at the coefficients in Table 7.27, it is interesting 
to note that benefit indexing and earnings test a4Justments, **en 
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Tmbl* 7.26. Single regtatsion résultat Model 4, under different 
survivorship asaumptions*'* 
Survivorahip probability assumption 
Sax-race- Soeioaconomie-
variable Candar-mergad distinct a4) uatad 
LTEAR -6.589* -6.101* -6.639* 
(4.11) (3.87). (3.65)_ 
LTEAR2 0.528® 0.439* 0.532* 
(1.51) (1.17) (1.34). 
SEX 0.284 3.164* 5.156* 
(0.43) (4.87) (6.87) 
RACE -0.103 -0.943 -4.362* 
(0.08) (0.72). (2.89). 
SERLBN -0.661* -0.628* -0.649* 
(3.70). (3.57). (3.20). 
SERLEN2 0.014* 0.014* 0.012® 
(2.67) (2.62) (1.95) 
RACERl -0.129 0.063 0.149 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.16) 
RAGER2 -0.283 -0.227 -0.074 
(0.32). (0.26) (0,07). 
RACER3 -3.051* -3.044* -3.576* 
(2.75)_ (2.79) (2,83) 
RCOROim 3.851* 3.598* 3,989* 
(4.72). (4,48). (4,30). 
RC0ii0RT2 1.435* 1.331* 1,598* 
(1.84) (1.73) (1,80) 
EDUl -0.136 -0.392 -0,701 
(0.14) (0.41) (0.64) 
E002 0.115 0.138 0,293 
(0.10) (0.12) (0,22) 
EDO) -0.685 -0.701 -0,711 
(0.75)^  (0,72). (0,68) 
ED04 -1.417® -1.723* -1,441* 
(1.38) (1.70) (1,23). 
INTERCEPT 99.747* 98.229* 96,934* 
(63.42) (63.51) (54.26) 
R2 
.624 ,624 .636 
N 353 353 353 
*t-Tacioe in psrenelicsea, 
Significance levels (uppercase for 2-eail tests* lowercase for 1-
tail tests): A, a-lZ; B, IH5Z, C, c-10%, D, d-20%. 
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T«bl« 7.27. Single regr«##ion raaulttt Coopariaon of nodala 1, 2, and 4 
uaing gandar-oargad aurvivorahip probabilifclaa 
Variable Modal 1 Nodal 2 Modal 4 
LTEAR -4.426 -4.871 -6.589 
LTEAR2 0.219 0.334 0.528 
SEX -0.013 -0.072 0.284 
RACE 0.971 0.711 -0.103 
SBRLEtf -0.636 -0.662 -0.661 
SBRLEN2 0.006 0.009 0.014 
RAGERl -0.300 -0.034 -0.129 
RAGER2 -0.600 -0.467 -0.283 
RACER3 -2.126 -2.415 -3.051 
RCOROItn 9.240 6.252 3.851 
RC0H0RT2 6.116 4.066 1.435 
EOUl 0.006 0.087 -0.136 
eD02 -0.800 -0.546 0.115 
EXMB -0.540 -0.467 -0.685 
EDD4 -2,754 -2.189 
-1.417 
Inearcape 95.48 97.55 99.747 
R2 
.871 .881 .628 
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Table 7.28. Single regression results: Comparison of models 1, 2, and 
4 using socioeconomic-adjusted survivorship probabilities 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 
LTEAR -4.288 -4.884 -6.639 
LTEAR2 0.176 0.366 0.532 
SEX 4.745 5.192 5.156 
RACE -0.111 -3.487 -4.362 
SBRUN -0.664 -0.676 -0.649 
SBRLm 0.006 0.007 0.012 
RAGEM -0.354 0.182 0.149 
RAGER2 -0.323 -0.116 -0.074 
RACER3 -2.834 -3.012 -3.576 
RC080RT1 9.634 6.529 3.989 
RCOHOinZ 6.495 4.391 1.598 
BOUl -0.394 -0.303 -0.701 
BDU2 -0.482 -0.309 0.293 
ESU3 -0.573 -0.535 -0.711 
ED# -2.535 -2.069 -1.441 
Intercept 92.45 94.395 96.934 
R2 
.855 .853 .636 
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«ecountcd for In eh« annuity countarfactual, do have an affect on the 
relationahip between the independent and dependent veriablea aa reflected 
in the eatimated coeffieienta. For inatance, the coefficient on the 
lifetime eaminga anaaure increaaea in abaolute aise with the 
introduction of indexing and earning test ad)uatments into the annuity 
coimterfactual. At firat bluah, thia evidence would tend to auggest that 
the program becomea more progreaalve aa the annuity counterfactual more 
closely approximatee the GAl program. However, thia ganerallaation may 
be too atrong in light of the observed pattern on the coefficients for 
LTEMI2 and the education variables. The coefficient for LTEAR2 enters 
with a positive sign in colum 1 and increaaea acroaa the model, 
offaettlng the strength of the negative coefficient on UTEMt. Ukewlie, 
the coeffieienta oo the education variable ahow a weakening of 
progresslvlty across the models. The coefficient estlMtes for EDUl 
across the models ahow a withering away of the rediatrlbutlonal gains for 
persons with 0-7 years of education relative to persons with eight years 
of schooling. The redistributional losses associated with education 
levels of 13 or more years of education are reduced, and for education 
levels 9-11 the loss not only diminishes but becomes a gain when the 
earning test Is added to the annulqr counterfactual. 
A few additional patterns across models are worth mentioning. The 
sign change on the estimated coefficient for SB% with the accounting for 
the earnings test suggests that women were more likely to continue 
working after retirement and, as a result, wmen tended to have slightly 
larger redistribution components. The pattern on the coefficient for 
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RACE, on the other hand» suggeats that the rediatributional gaina of 
nomihitea are reduced under indexing and, with the addition of an 
eaminga teat, nonwhitea receive alightly leaa rediatribution when 
compared to their white counterparta. The laat, and perhapa the moat 
dramatic, pattern to be mentioned concerna the eatimated coefficienta on 
the retirement cohort variablea, RCOHORTl and RC0H0RÎ2. The 
rediatribution gaina for peraona retiring in 1962-1965 and 1966-1968 
relative to the 1969-1972 retirement cohort conaiatently diminish acroaa 
modela. 
Similar reaulta are obaerved uaing aocioeconomic-adjuated 
probabilitiea (aee Table 7.28). It ia intereating to note that femalea 
received alightly more rediatribution from an indexed ayatem relative to 
mmlea, again, becauae of their longer life expectaneiea. Alternatively, 
nonwbitea are made aignificantly worae off, in terma of the reduced ahare 
of rediatribution from an Indexed ayatem, relative to whitea becauae of ' 
race differentials in aurvivorahip (compare columna 2 and 3). 
2. Married modela 
Reported regreaaion reaulta are baaed on the eatimation of four 
pennitations of the generalized married quadratic model. Linear and 
loglinear models were eatimated, but the quadratic variablea FLTEAR2, 
SBRLEN2, and JSERlJPf2 were found to be jointly, although only n»TEAR2 was 
found to be aeparately, significant in all permutations of the 
generalised model. The expected signs for all 24 independent variables 
are summarized in Table 7.29, and summary statistics for each independent 
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Tmble 7.29, Married ragreaaion model variablea and expected coefficient 
aigna for modela 5, 6, 7, and 8 by aurvivorahip aaauaption 
Dependent variablea in modela 5, 6 ,  7 ,  and 8  
Independent Sex-race- Socioeconomlc-
variable Cender-merged diatinct e«Q usted 
FUIAR Negative Negative Itogative or 
poeitlve 
P1TÏAR2 Positive Ptaitive Negative or 
poeitlve 
RACE Negative or Negative Negative 
poaitive 
SBRLEN Negative Negative Negative 
SERLEN Negative Negative Negative 
%RUtt2 Negative or Negative or Negative or 
positive positive positive 
jsERuna Negative or Negative or Negative or 
positive positive pwaltlve 
RAGERl Negative Negative Negative 
RAGZR2 Negative Negative Negative 
RAcno Negative or Negative or Negative or 
positive positive positive 
RAGEKl Negative Negative Negative 
'RACm Negative Negative Negative 
ICOHORn Positive Positive Poeitlve 
RC0R0RT2 Positive Positive Positive 
RCORORn Positive Positive Pbaltlve 
"rcorortz Positive Positive Poeitlve 
'boi Positive Positive Ne^ tlve or 
positive 
E002 Negative or Negstlve or Negative or 
positive positive positive 
ED03 Negative Negative Negative or 
positive 
nm Negative Negative Negative or 
poeitlve 
Positive Positive Negative or 
positive 
_EDU2 Negative or Negative or Negative or 
positive positive positive 
JSDW3 Negative Negative Negative or 
positive 
JBD# Negative Negative Negative or 
positive 
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varimbl# #pp##r in Table 7.30. There wm# evidence of correlation between 
the aervice length variablaa within a houaahold, but eollinaarity waa not 
a problem between the lifetime earninga aeaaure (FLTBAR) and lervice 
length variablaa (SCRUN, SERLER). The correlation coefficient on the 
service length variablaa SERLEN and JSERLEN waa relatively email * 0.33, 
but aignificantly different from aero at the five percent level. 
a. totimation of the model uaing the annuity counterfactual for a 
nonindexed. no earninga teat adiuated inaurance program Aa discussed 
in Chapter VI, the annuity counterfactual uaed to determine the 
percentage of rediatribution waa baaed on the aaaumption that the 
retirement candidate purchaaed a life «muity that promised payment of a 
nominal atream of income for life and the sise of the benefit payment waa 
invariant to poat-retirement earninga. Then, the quadratic model with 24 
independent variablaa waa eatimated to iaolata the partial effect of 
houaabold-apeeific characteriatica on the percentage of redistribution 
for the household. The results for model 5 under different survivorship 
aaaumptiona are presented in Table 7.31, 
In the regression for the gender-merged survivorship probabilities 
(column 1), all independent variablaa have the predicted sign, with the 
exception of SERLElf, RA6ER3, EWl, EDU4, JESDl, _BD*0, and _EDU4. Of 
those variables with the predicted sign, only FLTEAK, FLTEAK2, JRACEKl, 
RCQBORTl, EC0H0RT2, ^RCOHORTl, and ^ RC0H0RT2 have estimated coefficients 
that are significantly different from zero at a five percent level. And, 
of those variables with the unpredicted sign, only the coefficient for 
RA6EX3 is significantly different from zero at a one percent level. 
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Table 7.30. Sumnary itatiatica for indapandanC variablaa amployad in Cha 
married regreaaion modela 
Standard 
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum 
FLTEAR 241,996 155,621 0 805,200 
RACE 0.02 0.13 0 1.00 
SBSLEN 6.43 8.41 0 35.00 
_8BRLE1I 21.50 10.14 0 36.00 
RAfiEM 0.76 0.43 0 1 
RAGM2 0.11 0.31 0 1 
RACER3 0.10 0.31 0 1 
JIAGERl 0.42 0.49 0 1 
_RACER2 0.26 0.44 0 1 
RCOROim 0.26 0.44 0 1 
RCORORR 0.29 0.45 0 1 
_RC0H0RT1 0.36 0.48 0 1 
JtCOHORR 0.31 0.46 0 1 
EOUl 0.18 0.38 0 1 
«M» 0.17 0.38 0 1 
E9U3 0.25 0.44 0 I 
ED04 0.16 0.36 0 1 
_ED01 0.23 0.42 0 1 
jam 0.16 0.37 0 1 
JED03 0.17 0.38 0 1 
ED04 0.15 0.36 0 I 
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Table 7.31. Married regresalon reaoltat Model 5 under different 
aurvlvorahlp aaauaptlona* 
Survlvorahlp probability aaaumptlon 
Sex-race- Socioeconomic 
Variable Cender-merged dlatlnet adjuated 
FLTEAR -4.071* -3.994* -4.002* 
(26.81) (26.72) (26.73)^  
FLTEAR2 0.154* 0.152* 0.157* 
(5.80) (5.82). (6.00) 
RACE -0.305 -0.7IS* 0.977* 
(0.53) (1.27) (1.73) 
SBfOJEtl 0.007 0.008 0.008 
(0.25). (0.29) (0.29) 
_SZRLD; -0.043® -0.042® -0.042® 
(1.49) (1.51) (1.49) 
SDOJRa 0.000 O.OOO 0.000 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
_SEKLIN2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.95) (0.96) (1.01) 
RA6ER1 -0.056 0.038 -0.044 
(0.25), (0.17)^  (0.20). 
RAcm -0.429® -0.460® -0.528* 
(1.43) (1.55) (1.78) 
RAGEX3 0.774* 0.779* 0.849* 
(2.93). (3.05). (3.32). 
_RAGER1 -0.534* -0.528* -0.546* 
(3.05)^  (3.37)^  (3.16) 
_RAGE*2 -0.291® -0.273® -0.295® 
(1.50). (1.43). (1.54) 
RCOHORTl 1.874* 1.746* 1.788* 
(8.39). (7.94). (8.12) 
RCOHOItTZ 1.493* 1.421* 1.444* 
(7.51) (7.26) (7.37) 
JIC080RÎ1 5.404* 5.394* 5.359* 
(24.67) (25.01) (24.82) 
jtcoflom 3.556* 3.544* 3.536* 
(17.65) (17.87) (17.80) 
EDOl -0.126 -0.118 -0.301 
(0.52) (0.49) (1.26) 
H-raelos In parencheaes. 
S^ignificance level# (uppercase for 2-wll tests* lowercase for I-
tail tests): A, a~l%; B, b-%, C, e-10%, D, d-ZOK. 
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Table 7.31. continued 
Survivorihip probability atauaption 
Sex-race- Socioeconomic 
Variable Cender-mrged diatinct actuated 
ESU2 -0.201 -0.180 0.084 
(0.84) (0.77) (0.36) 
B0U3 -0.088 -0.070 0.091 
(0.38) (0.31) (0.40). 
BDVA 0.203 0.223 0.969* 
(0.74) (0.82) (3.58) 
jaaul -0.107 -0.095 -0.038 
(0.49) (0.44)^  (0.18)_ 
JH)02 0.332® 0.317® 0.309® 
(1.42) (1.37) (1.34) 
jn»3 0.047 0.044 0.055 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.23) 
_n)U4 0.051 0.043 0.055 
(0.19). (0.16) (0.20) 
Intercept 92.360" 92.655* 92.520* 
(208.47) (211.94) (211.35) 
*2 
.849 .848 .846 
If 1,394 1,394 1,394 
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Of the aix quantitative variables, only FLTEAR and FLTEAR2 explain a 
•ignifieant amount of the variation of tlw percentage of rediatribution 
around Ita mean. As expected, the estimated coefficients on FtTEAR and 
PLTEAR2 are negative and positive, respectively, but, wtMn taken 
together, there exists a negative association between the family measure 
of the percentage of redistribution and family lifetime earnings. The 
estimated coefficients for the education variables for the husband and 
wife are small, and they were found to be statistically insignificant, 
aeparately and jointly. However, the signs on the education variable 
coefficients, especially on EDUl, E004, JEDUl, and _EDU4, challenge the 
progressivlty conclusion based exclusively on the overall sign of the 
coefficient on the family lifetime earnings measures. 
The interpretation of the other independent variables is 
straightforward and consistent with earlier discussions for the sli^ le 
models, with the exception of RAGCX3. The coefficient for RAGEKS is 
positive and It is statistically significant. This suggests that 
households where the woman retired after age 71 received a redistribution 
component that was .774 percentage points larger than households where 
the woman retired at age 65, ceteris paribus. 
Next, looking at regression results in column 2, there are but minor 
changes in the estimated coefficients after accounting for mortality 
differentials by sex and race. The coefficient for RACE, while small and 
statistically insignificant, indicates that nonwhlte households received 
slightly less redistribution relative to white households. The 
coefficient for RACE is, however, only slightly larger after adjustments 
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are made for race differentials In survlvorahlp. Perhaps, though, the 
omst curious finding is the sign switching on the coefficient for RACERl 
after introducing sex and race differentials in survivorship. Now, 
households lAere women retired before age 65 and after age 72 received 
slightly larger redistribution components relative to households where 
the woman retired at age 65. 
The regression results for model 5 after accounting for socio­
economic differentials in survivorship are presented in column 3 of Table 
7.31. The coefficienta for the following variables are aignlficantly 
different from lero at a five percent level* fTEAR, MJEAR2, RACE, 
RAGER2, RACEX3. JlAGERl, RCOHORTl, RCOHORTZ, JWORORTl, JKOHORTZ, and 
EDD4. TW interesting results should be noted. The coefficient for RACE 
is positive and significantly different from zero at a one percent level 
after controlling for race, sex, marital status, eduMtion, and income 
differentials in survivorship. Also, the coefficient for EDM is 
positive and significantly different from zero at a one percent level. 
That is, households where the woman has some college education received a 
rediseribuelon component that was approximmtely ,97 percentage points 
larger then households where the woman had eight years of education. 
Comparisons of the results across survivorship assumptions suggest 
that for married households aggregate results do not significantly 
change, except for RACE, RACERl, and ED04, with mortality rate 
disaggregation. 
b. Estimation of the model using the annuity counterfactual for an 
indexed, no earnings test a<Wuated insurance program. The dependent 
variable employed in this version of the married model Is based on an 
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annuity countarfactual promising a real stream of benefits for the life 
of the annuitants. The variation in the dependent variable ia once again 
explained by the quadratic model with 24 independent variables. The 
estimated coefficients by survivorship assumption appear in Table 7.32. 
Regression results for model 6 based on gender-merged survivorship 
probabilities are reported in colum 1. The coefficients for PITEAR# 
FLTEAR2, RA(n«2, RACER3, _RAGBR1. JtAGER2, RCOHORTl, RC0H0RT2, JlCORORTl. 
snd _RC0H0RT2 are significantly different from lero at a five percent 
level, and they enter tiith the predicted aign. When the annuity promises 
to pay a fixed real benefit level for the life of the annuitants, the 
household received slightly more redistribution if the woman elected to 
retire prior to age 65, as reflected by the coefficient for RACERl. The 
redistribution gains are larger yet for the household when the woman 
retired after age 71, everything else equal. 
The results for the education dumaqr variables are mixed with all 
eight coefficients small. According to th« signs of the coefficients for 
EOUl, ED02, E%W3, and EDM, households received slightly less 
redistribution when the female member had less than eight or 9-12 years 
of education, whereas households received slightly more redistribution 
when the female member had some college education relative to households 
where the female member had eight years of schooling. Turning to the 
comparable coefficients for the male member, households where the male 
member had nine or more years of schooling received slightly larger 
redistribution components (althoui^  the marginal gain decreased with 
extra years of schooling), whereas the opposite was true for households 
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Tabla 7.32. Married ragraaaion raaulta; Modal 6 undar différant 
aurvivorahip aaaumpkiona'** 
Sunflvorahip probeWLllty aaeunpeion 
Sax-raca- Socioeconomic 
Variable Cander-merged diatinct adjuatad 
FLTÏAR -3.@94# -3.793* -3.791* 
(31.03) (30.79) (30.90). 
PtTBAR2 0.190* 0.185* 0.190* 
(8.62) (8.36) (8.84) 
RACE -0.197 -0.606® 1.097* 
(0,42) (1.30) (2.37) 
smut 0.006 0.007 0.007 
(0.27)^  (0.32)^  (0.32)^  
__S1RLIN -0.031® -0.031® -0.030® 
(1.30) (1.32) (1.28) 
SERU»i2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.10) 
_SnUJQI2 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.82) (0.83). (0.87) 
RAGERl 0.081 0.202* 0.117 
(0.44). (1.12). (0.65) 
RAGER2 -0.473® -0.518» -0.565* 
(1.90), (2.12), (2.32) 
RAGER3 1.113" 1.119* 1.167* 
(5.19), (5.32), (5.57), 
_RACE*1 -0.394* -0.473* -0.435* 
(2.72). (3.32). (3.08). 
_RAGER2 -0.306® -0.277® -0.297® 
(1.90), (1.75) (1.88) 
RCOHORTl 1.056* 0.877* 0,929* 
(5.72), (4.84), (5.15) 
RCORORH 0.965* 0.868* 0.891* 
(5.87), (5.38), (5.55), 
JtCORORTl 3.691* 3.764* 3.711* 
(20.39), (21.18) (20,97) 
_RC0H0RT2 2.345* 2.379* 2,357* 
(14.08) (14,56) (14,48)^  
BDOl -0.084 -0.074 -0,270» 
(0.42) (0,38) (1.37) 
®t-rati08 In parencheaea. 
S^ignificance level* (uppercaae for 2-tall (ests, loffereaae for 1-
tail ceaes): A, a-1%; B, b-5%, C, clOX, 0, d''20%. 
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Tabic 7.32. continued 
Sutvlvorihlp protMbilley «••uapeion 
Sax-raea- Soeioaeonoaic 
Variable Candar-fMrgad diaeinet actuated 
E0U2 -0.148 -0.123 0.151 
(0.75) (0.64) (0.78) 
BDU3 -0.045 -0.023 0.159 
(0.23) (0.16) (0.85), 
E0U4 0.140 0.168 1.054* 
(0.62) (0.75) (4.75) 
_BDU1 -0.138 -0.122 -0.071 
(0.76)_ (0.69)_ (0.40)_ 
_EB02 0.266® 0.249® 0.239® 
(1.37) (1.31) (1.26) 
_BB03 0.058 0.054 0.064 
(0.29) (0.27) (0.33) 
_ED04 0.020 0.006 0.009 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.04) 
Incareope 94.233" 94.302* 94.167» 
(256.81) (261.83) (262.50) 
.848 .846 .845 
W 1,394 1,394 1,394 
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where the mele member had leae then eight yeers of education when 
compered to households where the mele member had eight yeere of 
schooling, ceterie paribus. 
Introducing dissggregsted survivorship probebilitiee does change 
some of the besic findings under ttw gender^ nerged sssumption. First, 
looking St the sex-race disaggregated assumption in column 2 of 
Table 7.32, the changes ere relatively minor and confined to rece and 
sex-distinct dummy vsrisbles. The rece coefficient is slightly more 
negetive, sa are the coefficients for RACBR2 and JRA6ER1. Alternetively, 
the redistributional gsins to houssholds where the female retired prior 
to age 65 wmre slightly increased; however, the redistributionel gains to 
households where the female member retired prior to 1969 were slightly 
reduced. 
When survivorship probabilities ere further dissggregsted by marital 
status, education, and income, the coefficient estimates effected ere for 
the variables RACE, EOUl, 0)02, ED03. ESV4, JOHIl, end jom. Clearly, 
the most drmatie change pertains to the coefficient for RACE; the 
coefficient for RACE in coliam 3 is positive and significantly different 
from zero at a one percent level. Therefore, nonwhite households 
received redistribution components 1.097 percentage pointa larger than 
white households, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly speaking, the aceountix% for education differentials in 
survivorship, in addition to sex differentiala, affects the estimated 
coefficients for EDOl, EDfl2, ED03, BXW4, JESOl, and The household 
measure of redistribution was smaller if the female member had less than 
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eight years of education» but it vas larger if the female member had more 
than eight year# of education. The coefficient# on BDUl» EDU2» and EDW3 
were #mall; however, the coefficient for ED04 wa# poaieive and 
aignificantly different from lero at the one percent level. The siie of 
the rediatributional loa# for households where the male member had lea# 
than eight yeara of achooling decreased when sex and education 
differentiala in survivorship were introduced. However, the estimated 
coefficients for JEDU2 and JKDU3 were remarkably atable under different 
survivorship s##uaption#« 
c. E#timation of the married model uaing the annuity counterfactual 
for the nonindexed. earnings test adjusted insurance progrwi The 
dependent variable usa constructsd using the nominal annuity benefit 
counterfactual a^ Snsted tqr the QAl earnings test formula. The 
explanatory power of the generalised married model, as reflected by the 
2 
amaller R , is significantly weakened hf the larger deviations in the 
redistriWtion measure for observations affected by the earnings test. 
Approximately ten percent of the married households were affected by the 
eamiims test. 
All the estimated coefficients in colinm 1 of Table 7.33 have the 
predicted sign, f^ th the exception of SERUQi, EOOl, E0ff4, BDUl, 
JE0U3, and B0U4, Of the coefficients with the correct sign, the 
estimate# for FLTEAR, WhTUMZ, RACEII3, JIACKR2, RCOHORTl, ROOHORTZ, 
JMWHORTl» and JKC(WRT2 are significantly different fromi zero at the 
five percent level. Only one of the coefficients with the wrong sign is 
statistically significant, ED04. The coefficients on the service length 
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Tibl* 7.33. Harried regr###ion rtaulta; Model 7 under different 
•urvivorihip aaauapeiont**" 
Survlvorahip probability aaauaption 
Variable Gender-merged 
Sex-race-
diatinet 
Socioeconoaic-
adjuated 
PLTEAR -3.949" -3.874* -3.884* 
(16.16) (16.28). 
PLTtAR2 0.176* 0.176* 0.179* 
(4.11) (4.13). (4,28). 
RACE -0.358 -0.770= 0.920* 
(0.39) (0.85) (1.02) 
SERLEN 0.007 0.008 0.007 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) 
_8ERU»i -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 
(0.51) (0.50) (0.49) 
SERLEN2 -O.OOl -0.001 -0.001 
(0.69) (0.70) (0.72) 
_Sm(LEN2 O.OOl 0.001 0.001 
(0.61) (0.60) (0.62) 
RAGEM -0.224 -0.129 -0.201 
(0.63) (0.37) (0.58) 
RACER2 -0.122 -0.149 -0.207 
(0.25) (0.31) (0.44) 
RACER3 3.40 * 3.362* 3.405* 
(8.15). (8.21) (8.35) 
JtAGERl -0.354* -O.399C -0.362* 
(1.26). (1.44)^  (1.31). 
_RA<rBR2 -0.601* -0.578* -0.594* 
(1.92) (1.88) (1.94) 
RCORORTl 1.748* 1.631* 1.680* 
(4.87) (4.62) (4.78) 
RCOHORH 1.373* 1.308* 1.337* 
(4.30), (4.17) (4.28) 
JlCORORTl 3.794» 3.803* 3.784* 
(10.77) (11.00) (10.99) 
R^COHORK 1.980* 1.989* 1.998* 
(6.11) (6.25) (6.31) 
Eom -0.236 -0.226 -0.410 
(0.60) (0.59) (1.07) 
*t-ratio# in parencbeaea, 
S^ignificance levels (uppercaae for 2-tail teats, lowercaae for 1-
tail teat*); A. a-1%; B, b-5%, C, clOK, D, d-20%. 
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Tailla 7.33. contlnuad 
Survivorship probability asaunption 
Variable Candar-aargad 
Sax'-raea* 
diatinee 
Soeioaconoole-
adQuatad 
E0U2 
E0U3 
BIW4 
_IDOl 
_EDU2 
J»03 
ES04 
Intareapt 
r2 
a 
-0.319 
(0.83). 
-0.396* 
(1.07) 
0.238 
(0.54). 
-0.680® 
(1.20) 
0.000 (0.0) _ 
0.616® 
(1.40 
93.934» 
(131.60) 
.619 
-0.297 
(0.79). 
-0.370* 
(1.02) 
0.249 
(0.57). 
-0.657* 
(1.89) 
0.435® 
(1.18) 
-0.003 (0.01) 
0.603® 
(1.41). 
94.001# 
(134.12) 
.618 
-0.043 
(0.11) 
-0.216 
(0.60). 
0.927® 
(2.15) 
-0.602® 
(1.74) 
0.429* 
(1.17) 
0.020 
(0.05)_ 
0.598® 
(1.40). 
93.856* 
(134.51) 
.619 
1,394 1,394 1,394 
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varlabia* (SBRLEN, _SERLEN, SCRLEN2, and _SBRLBN2) hava mixad algna and 
thay ara atatiaeically Inalgnlflcant, aaparataly and Jointly* 
Tha introduction of diaaggragatad aurvivorahip probabilitiaa, aithar 
by aax and raea or #a%, raca, marital atatua, ineoma, and education, 
doaa not aignificantly affact tha aggregate reaulta, vith the notable 
exception of RACB and the education variablea. 
d. Eatiaation of the married model uaing the annuity countarfactual 
for an indexed, eaminia teat adiuatad inaurance program The final 
permutation of the generaliied married model waa eatimated to explain the 
variation in the redistribution component calculated using an indexed 
annuity countarfactual a4)uated bf the OAl earnings teat formula. The 
regreaaion results sre reported in Table 7.34 by aurvivorahip 
aaaumption. 
Based on the gender-merged aaaumption, the eatimated coefficients 
for njEAR, FLTEAKl, RA6E1I3, JtAGER2. RCOROim. RC0R0RT2, JtOORORTl, and 
JtCQH0RT2 have the predicted sign and were aignificantly different from 
zero at a five percent level (see column I). The coefficient for _EDU1 
*a* significantly different from zero at a five percent level, but it did 
not have the predicted sign. Again, the coefficients for the education 
variables were mixed and atatiatically insignificant, separately (with 
the exception of JBDOl), but not jointly. 
Disaggregating survivorship probabilities by race and sex resulted 
in only modest changes in the coefficient estimates for RACE and RAGERl 
(see column 2). Further disaggregation of survivorship probabilities 
marital status, income, and education, also, resulted in only modest 
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Table 7.34. Karriad ragraaalon raaultai Modal 8 undar dlffarant 
auxvivorahlp aaaumpciona'** 
Survivorship probability aaauaption 
Sax-raca- Socioacononic 
Variable Oandar-margad diatinct actuated 
rtTEAR -3.786* -3.688* -3.689* 
(18.22) (18.17) (18.36)^  
FLT1AR2 0.205* 0.200* 0.206* 
(5.64) (5.64) (5.85)^  
RACE -0.234 -0.639 1.059® 
(0.30) (0.83) (1.40) 
SEXUm 0.005 0.006 0.005 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
_SIRLEÎI -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 
(0.32) (0.31) (0.28) 
SBRLENZ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.68) (0.68) (0.70) 
__SERLIH2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.45) (0.44) (0.44) 
RACEXl -0.039 0.081 0.007 
(0.13) (0.27) (0.02) 
RACm -0.221 -0.261 -0.299 
(0.54)^  (0.65) (0.75). 
RAGOO 3.262* 3.226* 3.240* 
(9.19). (9.30) (9.43). 
JtACEXl -0.234® -0.308® -0.270" 
(0.97). (1.32). (1.16). 
JtAGER2 -0.525* -0.492» -0.505* 
(1.97). (1.89). (1.96) 
RCOHORIl 0.949* 0.785* 0.844* 
(3.10). (2.63) (2.85) 
Rcosom 0.876* 0.788* 0.817* 
(3.22), (2.97). (3.11) 
JlCORORTl 2.344* 2.433* 2.401* 
(7.82) (8.31). (8.28) 
JtCOHOXn 1.046* 1.098* 1.098* 
(3.79) (4.08) (4.12) 
EDOl -0.171 -0.160 -0.355 
(0.51) (0.49) (1.10) 
t^-ratios in psreothasas. 
S^ignificance levels (uppercase for 2-tail tests, lowercase for l-
tail tests): A, a-lZ; B, b-5%# C. c-10%, D, d-20%. 
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Tbble 7.34. continued 
Survivorahip probability «••uoption 
Sax-raca- Socioeconomic 
Variablo Gandar-margad diatinct a<y uatad 
muz -0.240 -0.215 0.050 
(0.74) (0.67) (0.16) 
E0U3 -0.268* -0.241 -0.066 
(0.85) (0.78) (0.21). 
B0U4 0.170 0.188 0.998* 
(0.45). (0.51). (2.75)_ 
_EDU1 -0.606* -0.579* -0.529® 
(2.02) (1.97) (1.82) 
_EDU2 0.375 0.352 0.345 
(1.17) (1.13) (1.11) 
_EDU3 0.040 0.036 0.060 
(0.12)^  (0.11) (0.19)_ 
JBOW 0.506® 0.485® 0.469» 
(1.36) (1.34)_ (1.31). 
Xntarcapt 95.34* 95.379* 95.230* 
(156.93) (160.70) (162.03) 
.611 .610 .612 
9 1,394 1.394 1,394 
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change# in the parameter eatimatea. The eatimatea for model 8 employing 
aocioeconomie-aiy uated aurvivorahip probabilltiea are preaented in 
column 3 of Table 7.34. The coefficient for RACE doea not have the 
predicted aign and ia aignificantly different from aero at a ten percent 
level. The coefficient for EDUl ia generally more negative and _EDU1 
leaa negative aa aurvivorahip probahilitiea are more diaaggregated. The 
coefficient for EDU2 tuma poaitive when mortality diffarentiala by 
marital atatua, income, and education are included, and, more 
importantly, the coefficient for B0U4 ia poaitive and aignificantly 
different from aero at a one percent level. 
e. Cempariaon of modela 5. 6. and 8 controlling for differential 
aurvivorahip probabilltiea In thia aubaection, the effect of 
different program feature# on the alie and aign of the eatimated 
coefficient# will be inveatigated, under the aame aurvivorahip 
aaauaptiOR. In Table 7.35, the coefflcienta for modela S, 6, and 8 
u#ing gender-merged survivorship probabilitie# are preaented. 
Cempariaon# of model# S, 6, and 8 findinga baaed on aocioeconomic-
adjueted survivorchip probabilities appear in Table 7,36. 
Moat of the coefficient estimates are remarkably stable acroaa 
program featurea, but some important trenda are observed. Firat, the 
combined effect of FLTEAR and n#TEAK2 shows a weakening of the program's 
progressivity when the annuity counterfactual includes indexii^  and 
the earnings test. Second, the coeffici«*t for RA6EIU is positive when 
benefit indexing is included in the annuity counterfactual, but becomes 
negative when, in addition to indexing, the earnings test is adopted. 
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TSibl* 7.35. Married ragraaaion raaulta: Conpariaon of modala 5, 6, and 
8 uaing gandar-margad aurvivorahip probabilltiaa 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Modal 5 Modal 6 Modal 8 
fLTEAR -4.071 -3.894 -3.786 
rLTIAR2 0.154 0.190 0.205 
RACE -0.305 -0.197 -0.234 
SBKLBft 0.007 0.006 0.005 
_SERLEN -0.043 -0.031 -0.012 
SBftLm 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
_SERLIN2 0.001 0.000 0.000 
RAGERl -0.056 0.081 -0.039 
RAGE112 -0.429 -0.473 -0.221 
RA6EII3 0.774 1.113 3.262 
_RACIR1 -0.534 -0.394 -0.234 
JtAGEXZ -0.291 -0.306 -0.525 
RCORORTl 1.874 1.056 0.949 
ROOHOm 1.493 0.965 0.876 
JtCORORTl 5.404 3.691 2.344 
JlCOROtK 3.556 2.345 1.046 
ESUl -0.126 -0.084 -0.171 
EDU2 -0.201 -0.148 -0.240 
E0IJ3 -0.088 -0.045 -0.268 
E004 0.203 0.140 0.170 
_EBOl -0.107 -0.138 -0.606 
_HMJ2 0.332 0.266 0.375 
_B003 0.047 0.058 0.040 
jam 0.051 0.020 0.506 
Ineercepe 92.560 94.233 95.34 
R2 0.849 0.848 0.611 
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Tkbl* 7.36. Kirriad ragrtatlon ratults: Compmrimon of model# 5, 6, and 
8 ualng aocio#conomic-a«y uatad aurvlvorahip probabilleiaa 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Modal S Modal 6 Modal 8 
FLTEAR -4.002 -3.791 -3.689 
FLTBAR2 0.157 0.190 0.206 
RACE 0.977 1.097 1.059 
SERUtt 0.008 0.007 0.005 
_9ERLEN -0.042 -0.030 -0.010 
SERLEN2 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
_SERLEN2 0.001 0.001 0.000 
RA6ER1 -0.044 0.117 0.007 
RA6ER2 -0.528 -0.565 -0.299 
RA6ER3 0.849 1.167 3.240 
JtAGERl -0.546 -0.435 -0.270 
JUGER2 -0.295 -0.297 -0.505 
RCORORTl 1.788 0.929 0.844 
RC0H0RT2 1.444 0.891 0.817 
JRCORORTl 5.359 3.711 2.401 
_RC0H0RT2 3.536 2.357 1.098 
EDOl -0.301 -0.270 -0.355 
BD02 0.084 0.151 0.050 
E0D3 0.091 0.159 -0.066 
EDO* 0.969 1.054 0.998 
_ED01 -0.038 -0.071 -0.529 
_BWÎ2 0.309 0.239 0.345 
_EDU3 0.055 0.064 0.060 
J8W4 0.055 0.009 0.469 
iRtereepe 92.520 94.167 95.230 
R^  0.846 0.845 0.612 
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However, the coefficient for RAGER3 becotMO progressively larger as the 
annuity counterfactual more closely replicates the OAl program. Looking 
at the comparable variables for men, the coefficient for JRA6ER1 
decreases in site, wheress the coefficient for _RACER2 increases in sise 
ss additional program features sre included in the snnuity 
counterfactual. Third, the coefficienta for the retirement cohort 
variables (RCOHORfl, RCOROMZ, _RC0H0RT1, _RC0R0RT2) systematically 
decrease across the model variations. 
Similsr results, slthough not identical measures, are observed in 
Table 7.36. 
3. Summery of regression findings 
a, Ufetim# earning variables (LTEAR. LmR2. FLTEAR. rLTEAR2) 
For sll permutations of the single end married models, the estimated 
coefficient for the household meaaure of lifetime eaminga was negative. 
This suggests that, when all other household characteristics were held 
constant, households with higher lifetime earnings received emaller 
redistritetion components. The relationship between percentage of 
redistribution and lifetime earnings was, however, nonlinear (the 
coefficient is negative and Bg is positive). Thus, the percentage of 
redistribution decreases at a decreasing rate as lifetime earnings 
increases. (Technically, the percentage of redistribution will at first 
decrease but later increase as lifetime earnings Increases; however, 
given the range of UEAR and FITEAR in this study, the measured 
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relationship batwaan tha pareantaga of radistribueion and lifaeima 
aarninga was nagaeiva.) 
Tha ineluaion of diaaggragatad survivorship probabilieias did not 
ravarsa tha ralationship bacvaan eha radistribueion maaaura and lifatima 
aarninga. For tha singla modal, accounting for mortality diffarantials 
by sax and raea ganarally waakanad tha ralationship batvaan tha 
radistribution and aarninga maasuraa. But, furthar diaaggragation by 
marital atatua, income, and education tandad to atrangthan tha 
ralationahip ovar comparable estimates using sex and race differentiala 
and, in aeveral cases, over the similar eatimatea for age-only mortality 
differentials. On the other hand, for married houaeholda, the 
ralationahip between the rediatribution meaaurea and lifetime aarninga 
IMS consistently weakened when sex-race and sex-raca-marital status-
income-education differentiala were introduced. Therefore, it ia not 
accurate to conclude that highly disaggregated mortality ratea reverse or 
substantially waken the progreasivity of the progrès. From the findings 
on married households, mortality rates disaggregated by aex and race 
challenge the program's progressivity slightly less than mortality rates 
disaggregated by sex, race, marital status, income, and education. 
Findings on the effect of benefit indexing on the relationship 
between the percentage of rediatribution and lifetime earnings are 
consistent across household types. For single households, the inclusion 
of indexing in the annuity counterfactual slightly weakens the negative 
relationship between the percentage of redistribution and lifetime 
earnings in the models with the earnings. That is, independent of the 
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dtgr«« of moreality rate diaaggragaeion» tha OAl program waa found to be 
laaa prograaaiva for aingla houaaholda after the ineluaion of benefit 
indexing in the annuity counterfactual. For all the married mdela, 
there ia a atronger negative relationahip between the percentage of 
rediatribution of lifetime aarninga without indexing. Nence, in all of 
the aingla married modela, the OAl program ia laaa prograaaiva when the 
annuity counterfaetual includes benefit indexing. 
The «idition of the earning# teat conaiatently weakena the 
relationahip between the percentage of rediatribution and lifetime 
aarninga for married houaaholda, but it conaiatently atrengthena the 
relationahip for aingla houaaholda. theae findinga are auggeative of 
different employant deciaiona by aingla and married houaaholda after 
retirement. The atrengthening of the relationahip for aingla houaaholda 
would aeem to indicate that aingla peraona with lower lifetime earnings 
were more inclined to work after retirement. After examining the data 
see, it was found that 25 single households were affected by the earnings 
test, of i*ich 65 percent were women. A majority of the households 
affected by the earnings test had lifetime earnings meaaurea below the 
aample average. The labor force attaclwent of women after retirement may 
reflect not only the sex distribution of the retirement population, but 
that single women typically have less physically demanding occupations 
which characteristically permit greater staying power. The opposite was 
true for the married population. Generally speaking, high income, 
married persons tended to continue working after retirement. The 
employment pattern of the married households is consistent with studies 
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on rceirciMne p#cc#rn# (Botkin, 1977, Pmcknan at al», 1968). In 1966, 
only 1.6 Billion of tha 17 odllion paraona aligibla for ratiramant 
banafita «ara affactad hf tha ratiramant taat. Fifty pareant of tha 1.6 
million banafieiariaa affactad by tha aaminga taat aamad $2,700 or mora 
in 1966. 
In ganaral, tha OAl program waa found to ba prograaaiva with raapaet 
to lifatima aarninga aeroaa all modal parmutationa. Tha atrangth of tha 
nagativa aaaociation batwan houaahold parcantaga of radiatribution and 
hotiaahold aaminga varied by marital atatua. In particular, tha program 
had atrongar prograaaiva feature# for aingle houaehold# relative to 
married houaehold#. Ihi# finding i# not too aurpriaing in light of the 
extra benefit# extended to wive# of covered worker#. 
b. Service length (SERLEN. SER1ZN2) For tha single model#, the 
coefficient# on SEMtEN and SR(&EW2 are negative and poaltlve, 
reapactivaly, and the coefficient# for SERLEN are algnlflcantly different 
from sero at a one percent level, but tha coefficient for SEEiENZ 1# 
#tatl#tlcally #ignificant in modal 2 only. Th« coefficient for SERLEN 
is remarkably stable across the models, whereas the estimated coefficient 
for 8ERlEIf2 modestly Increases Wien program features are added to the 
annuity counterfactuals. The estimated negative, nonlinear association 
between the percentage of redistribution and service length suggests that 
longer contribution periods significantly reduce the percentage of 
redistribution received In retirement, ceteris paribus. 
The comparable sex-coded estimates for married persons are mixed and 
statistically insignificant. Again, the estimated coefficients are 
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remarkably itabl* acroaa survivorship assumptions. Howavar, the 
coaffielanes for eha sarviea langth variables SBRLEN and ^ SBRLEN tand 
covard laro whan additional program faaturas ara introduead into tha 
annuity eountarfactual. 
e. Sax (SEX) Tha sax variable was included in the single model 
only. Without mortality differentials by sex, benefit indexing, and the 
earnings test, the coefficient for SEX is negative and statistically 
insignificant. However, with tiM inclusion of sex differentials in 
survivorship, the coefficient for SEX is positive and aignlficantly 
different from sero at a one percent level. Furtlwr disaggregation of 
mortality differencials by marital statua, income, and education 
increased the redistributional gains of single women over single men. As 
a result of their longevity, women received significant rediacributional 
gains from the CAI program, ceteris paribus. 
Single women, also, received further redlstritwtional gains when 
benefit indexing and survivorship differentials by sex were included in 
the annuity counterfactual. The addition of the earnings test did not 
appreciably affect the female^ o^-male difference in the percentage of 
redistribution after accounting for benefit indexing and mortality 
differentials. Overall, females received redistribution components 
approximately five percentage points larger than their male counterparts 
when indexing, post-retirement earnings adjustments, and mortality 
differentials ^  sex were reflected in the annuity counterfactual, 
d. Race (BACB) In the case of single households, the 
coefficient for RACE is small and statistically insignificant, with the 
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notable exception of model# 2 and 4 when benefit indexing and mortality 
differential# by #ex, race, marital #tatu#, income, and education were 
accounted for in the annuity counterfactual, the aign for the RACE 
coefficient i# mixed and dependent on counterfactual characteriatic#. 
Under the a##umption# of model 1, the coefficient for RACK i# poeitive, 
•uggeeting that nonwhite# received a rediatribution component «lightly 
larger than their white counterparta, ceteria paribua. the alight gain# 
of nonwhite# are probably ayoptomatic of earning# differential# by race 
prevalent in the labor market. White#, on average, receive higher 
earning# relative to non«diite#, concentrating nonwhitea at the lower end 
of the progre##ive benefit formula. Even with the adjuatment# for race 
differential# in mortality, the nonwhite redietributionel gain per#i#ted. 
thi# #eem# to #ugge#t that OAl benefit differential# by race were 
atronger than mortality differential# by race. Examining the 
#urvivor#hip probabilitie# by race and #ex in Table 13.5, it i# ob#erved 
that mortality differential# by race are fairly weak and the cign of the 
differential reveree# at advanced age#. Generally apeaking, however, 
disaggregated mortality rate# reduced the aize of the nomrtiite gain, and 
oft-time# reeulted in redietributionel lo##e#. 
the inclueion of benefit indexing in the annuity counterfactual and 
mortality differential# by race and sex reeult in estimated coefficients 
that are negative. Further disaggregation of mortality rates by marital 
status, income, md education, result in estimated coefficients that are 
negative and statistically significant. Identical results occur with the 
addition of the earnings test. 
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Looking at the married model#, the coefficients for RACE are 
negative and statistically insignificant except vhen mortality 
differentials are disaggrsgated by se%, race, marital status, income, end 
education. The negative relationship between rece end household 
percentsge of redistribution is strengthened vhen mortality differentials 
by sex and race are included; however, when mortality differentials by 
sex, race, marital status, income, and education are included, the 
estimated coefficient for race is positive and statistically significant 
except in model 7. the effect of benefit indexing and the earning test 
features on the coefficient estimate is dependent on the survivorship 
assumption; using the gender-merged end sex-rsce survivorship 
probabilities, the race differential is weakened with indexing but 
strengthened with the earning test; however, using the socioeconomic-
adjusted probabilities, the race differential is strengthened with 
indexing but weakened with the earnings test. 
The mixW snd contradictory results across married models and across 
the married and single models are perplexing. One contributing factor 
for the erratic performance of the race variable is the weak 
representation of nonwhites in the data set. Nonwbites accounted for six 
percent of the single households and two percent of married households. 
Clearly, any generalizations based on the size and sign of the estimated 
coefficients for RACE are tenuous and should not be taken too seriously. 
e. Age at retirement (RACERl, RACBR2. RAGBR3) Most of the 
evidence on the age of retirement suggests that single persons received 
the largest redistributional component by retiring at age 65, ceteris 
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jwrlbue. This finding it contistent with earlier mentioned criticisma of 
the actuarial adjuatment formulae, 
looking firat at RAGBRl, the variable for retirement prior to age 
65, the coefficient for RAGERl uaing ttM gender-merged aurvivorahip table 
ia negative and atatiatically inaignificant aeroaa all veraiona of the 
generalixad aingle model. The incluaion of diaaggregated mortality 
differential# reduce# the eiie of the negative rediatribution 
differential for peraon# who retired earlier than age 65, and, in aane 
caaee, reverse# the eign of the redietribution differential. The 
addition of the benefit indexing feature to the annuity counterfactuala 
reverse# the eign of tiM coefficient for RACERl, where## tlM eeming# 
t##t feature doe# not #ignific#ntly #ff«ct th# #1m or #ign of the 
coefficient. 
The coefficient for RA6B(2 i# negative and #t#ti#tic#lly 
ln#ignlficant for all permutation# of the generalised eingle model. The 
#tr#ngth of the negative relationahip decree### a# mortality 
differential# are dl#«ggr«gated. Similarly, benefit indexing and 
earning# t##t provision# further weaken the difference between the 
redietribution differential for peraon# retiring between age# 65 and 71 
relative to peraon# retiring at age 65, ceteri# paribus. 
The last age at retirement variable to be discussed is RA6ER3. The 
coefficient for RAGER3 is negative and significantly different from sero 
at a one percent level for all single models. The sise of the 
redistributional differential is augmented by mortality rate 
disaggregation, benefit indexing, and earnings test adjustments, with the 
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noCabl* exception of model 4 ueing mortality differential! by sex and 
race. 
Next, looking at the aex-eoded age at retirement variables for the 
marri«l model, the results for RACBRl are mixed and statistically 
insignificant. Early retirement for women does not significantly affect 
the site of the household redistribution meaaure relative to households 
Where the woman retired at age 65, ceteris paribua. ftowever, the 
household redistribution meaaure is slightly smaller when the woman 
retired between the agea of 65 and 71 relative to age 65, ceteris 
paribua. The sise of loss is slightly increased with increased disaggre­
gation of mortality rates and the introduction of benefit indexing, but 
it is slightly reduced with the earnings test Ihe last age of retire­
ment variable is RACE1I3. The coefficient for 1IA6ER3 is positive and 
significantly different fron awro at a one percent level for all models. 
Ihe strength of the positive relationship is augmented by mortality rate 
dissggregatioR, benefit indexing, and earnings test adjustments. It is 
not surprising that women who postponed retirement to sge 72 or later 
received abnormally high household redistribution measures. These women 
were most probably collecting special age-72 benefits, which are provided 
to aged persons who cannot claim benefits as a primary worker or 
dependent spouse and i*o have very few quarters of coverage; hence, OAl 
benefits were received by these women at a near-zero cost. 
The coefficients for JiUGERl and _RACEII2 are negative and 
significantly different from zero at a one percent level. The strength 
of the relationship is weakened by mortality disaggregation by sex and 
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race, but largely unaffected by further aoeioeconoaie diaaggregation. 
The houaehold rediatribution differential for aalea who retired after 
(before) age 63 inereaaed (deereaaed) in magnitude with the incluaion of 
benefit indexing and eaminga teat adjuatmenta in the annuity 
counterfaetual. 
f Retirement cohort (RCOHORTl. RC0H0RT2) Eatimatea of the 
coefficienta for RCOHORTl and RC0R0RT2 are poaitive and aignificantly 
different from lero at a one percent Imyel for all permutationa of the 
aingle and married generaliaed model*. Alao, the ait* of the coefficient 
for RCOHORTl exceeda the aim* of th* coefficiont for RC0H0RT2, augg**ting 
that the gaina from retiring in an earlier retirement cohort diminiah 
over time. 
For the eingl* model*, the effect of di*aggr«gat*d mortality rate* 
are mixed. When mortality differentiala diaaggregated by aex and race 
were uaed, the eatimated coefficient* for RCOHORTl and RC0H0RI2 diminish 
in aiso, redueii% the intercohort rediatributional differential. 
However, further disaggregation place* upward preaaure on the eatimated 
*iz« of the R<XW)KT1 and RCWOMZ coefficient*; hence, the intercohort 
rWiatributional differential widena. It appear* that the earlier 
cohort* had different educational and income characteriatic* which tended 
to reveree the influence of *e% and race differentials in survivorship on 
the redistribution neaaure. 
The addition of benefit* indexing and the earning* te*t to the 
annuity counterfactual *y*tematically narrow* the intercohort 
redistributional differential, as expected. Since this study evaluates 
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th« OAl program in 1972 and ratirtmant cohorta from 1962 to 1972 ara 
ineludad in tha data aat, banafit 1avala promiaad in raal taroa nuat ba 
augmantad ovar tha ratiramant interval from 1962 to tha yaar of program 
aaaaaamant, 1972. lha banafit adjuatmant acharna indaxad tha initial 
annuity banafit in tha ratiramant yaar by (1+e)*, whara e aquala .0275 
(tha annuitiaad rata for future price changea) and t aquala the 
difference between the retirement year and 1972. Bacauae of e% poat 
indexing, the intercohort radiatributional différentiel ia narrotfad. the 
narrowing effect of the eaminga teat feature waa alao expected aince the 
1969-1972 retirement cohort had the greateat likelihood of receiving 
labor eaminga in exceaa of the eaminga limit in 1972, which would place 
upward preaaure on the aise of later cohorta* rediatribution componenta, 
aubaequently narrowing the rediatributionel differential acroaa cohorta. 
For the married modela, aimilar reaulta are obtained for the female-
coded RCOHOVn and RCORORR coefficienta. That ia, diaaggregated 
mortality differentiala, benefit indexing, md the eaminga teat 
adjuatmenta tended to narrow the intercohort rediatributionel 
differential. However, the male-coded JRCOHORTl and _RC0H0RT2 
coefficienta are invariant to the level of mortality rate diaaggregation, 
but they tended to diminiah in aise with the addition of benefit indexing 
and the eaminga teat, ceteria paribua. 
g, level of education (EPPl. EPP2. gDP3. EDII») With the 
exception of the coefficient for EO04, the eatimated coefficienta for the 
education variablea in the aingle modela are generally negative and 
atatietically inaignificant. Ihet ia, the rediatributionel differential 
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by tdueaeion Itvtl it ntgaciv* albait imall for houaaholdt with Ittt than 
tight yttrt of tduettion or high tehool training rtlativt to houttholdt 
with tighth grade adueation only. Tht influtnet of difftrtnt morttlity 
rata aatunptiont trt nixtd. For houttholdt «rith Ittt thtn eight yttrt of 
tduettion or mort thtn 12 yttrt of tduettion, tht inelution of ttx tnd 
raet difftrtntialt in turvivorthip ttndtd to tithtr elininttt «fitting 
rtdittributional gaint or inertttt rediatributional lotttt rtlativt to 
houttholdt with tighth grtdt tduettiont. Rowtvtr, further dittggrtgation 
of mortality ratat by marital ttatua, ineooe, tnd tduettion gtntrtlly 
rtduetd the rtdittributional gtp bttwetn houttholdt with eight yttrt of 
education and thoae with 12 or more yeart of Wueation, but expanded the 
gap between houttholdt with eight yttrt of tduettion tnd thote with Ittt 
than tight yetrt. Thit rttult it reflective of the inverte relationthip 
between mortality and education and income levelt. Morttlity 
dittggrtgation ttndtd to eliminate the negative differential between 
houttholdt with 9-11 yeara of education and eight yetrt of tduettion. 
furthermore, benefit indexing narrowed the education rtdittributional 
differential. Ihtt, the eamingt tttt ttndtd to widtn the differential 
for houteholdt with 0-7 tnd 12 yetrt of education, while it narrowed the 
differential for houttholdt with 9-11 and 13 or more yeart of education. 
The eamingt teat effect tuggettt that pertont with 9-11 or 13 or more 
yeart of education tended to remain in the labor force after retirement. 
Again, the coefficient eatimatee for the tex-coded education 
varioblet are mixed and generally ttatittically inaignificant. However, 
a few general pattema are worth mentioning. For all education groupings 
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«xcluding EDU4, th« Inclusion of s«x and race differencials in 
survivorship cended co narrow Che educacion rediscribucional 
differencials, whereas furcher disaggregacion cended co improve Che 
rediscrihucion scscus of households wich any of che following educacion 
variables* QJUZ, BDU3, E0U4, JBDU3, and JEStlA. The inclusion of Che 
earnings cesc greedy increased che posicive rediscribucion differencial 
for males wich college educacion, while ic increased che negacive 
rediscribucional differencial for households wich any of che following 
educacion variableat lOtll, E0U2, SOUS, and _BDU1. Again, Chese reeulcs 
are refleccive of post-reciremenc employmenc psccems of married 
households. 
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VIII. SVMKARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Suomry 
Chapter 1 pr###oCed m brief overview of the federal old-ege 
Inauranee progrès end the method employed to laolate the dletributlonel 
impact of the loelel aecurlty program. Also, the four interrelated 
iaauee Inveatlgated in thia atudy were identified. 
Chapter 11 waa a detailed diseuaaion of the hlatorleel development 
of the QAl program with emphaaie on the followii^  progrn featureet 
apouaal benefits, progreaalve benefit formula, actuarial reduction for 
eerly retirement, delayed retirement credit, eemii% teat formula, and 
coat-of-living a^ Juatmenta. Each program feature was explained in terme 
of Ita original intent, redistributlve effect, and controveralal 
impllcationa, Wien applicable. 
Previous empirical studies on the distributional Impact of the 
social security program were reviewed in Chapter III. Virtually all 
empirical studies indicate that social security beneficiaries retiring 
prior to 1975 received above-normal rates of return on their contribution 
dollara; however, there was less agreement concerning the program's 
progresslvlty. Empirical evidence did support allegations that the 
intent of many program features were compromised by the program's design 
and demographic characteristics of the retirement population, While the 
cited studies differed In detail, the distributional impact measure (be 
it an internal rate of return, contribution-benefit ratio, or transfer 
component) was found to be sensitive to specific identifiable worker 
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charaetcclflties» much a# data of caticamant, marical statua, sax, taea. 
Incoma, aducaelon lavai, and aga at antry and ratiramant. Tha 
distributional significanca of aaeh «orkar charaetaristie was discussad 
in Chapter 111. 
A life-cycle model for evaluating the distributional impact of the 
OAl program waa presented in Chapter ZV. Two conditiona for an 
actuarially fair retirement program were apecified, which were 
subsequently used to explain the "disentanglement" of OAl benefits along 
ftmctional linea. 
Chapter V describes the methodology. The model aaatnptions 
regarding the fairness standard, interest ratea, survivorship 
probabilities, earnings test formula, snd behavioral responses were 
discussed in detail. Also, a description of the data set, computational 
formulas, annuity-type counterfactuals, and rediatribution componenta 
were presented. 
The generalised polynomial regression models hf marital status were 
described in Chapter VI. A generalised model was specified for the 
purpose of drawing inferences regarding the effect of worker and program 
characteriatica on the distributional impact of the OAI program. The 
dependent and independent variables were defined and described in 
Chapter VI. 
Descriptive statistics, in tabular array, on the benefit incidence 
for all households, single households, and married, both retired 
households and the results of the empirical analysis of this study were 
presented in Oiapter VII. The descriptive statistics indicated that: 
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1) all family typas raeaivad mora than their "money's worth" from the OAl 
program in 1972; 2) single famalea and married couplea were made better 
off, and aingle malea were made worse off in a sex-neutral retirement 
program; 3) traditional family atructurea received preferential treatment 
from the OA! program because the dependent spouse received retirement 
benefits without payment of extra contributiona; 4) dependent'a faenefita 
were equally distributed across quintile groups; and 5) the OAl program 
tended to be more regressive t^ th the introduction of the earnings test 
and socioeeonomic-adjuated aurvivorahip ratea. 
Evidence from, and interpretation of, the ordinary least-square 
multiple regression estimation of the polynomial models was presented in 
Chapter VII, The regression estimates did, in most cases, support the 
generalisations derived from the descriptive statistics. 
B. Conclusions 
four interrelated issues were addressed in this studys 1) Does the 
OAI portion of the social security program redistribute income in favor 
of low-income beneficiaries? 2) Does the current OAI program 
redistribute benefits in favor of wMwn, a# a group, at the expense of 
their male counterpart»? 3) Row does the wife's work statu# affect the 
distribution of OAI benefits within and across family types? 4) Are 
spousal benefits distributed principally to needy dependent spouses? 
Answers to these questions will be presented in this final section. 
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1. Overall program ###e##««nc 
Tha raaulea praianead In Chapter VII euggcst that for OAI 
benefieiariea the program waa progreeaive «dth respect to income. Thus, 
the progrn did tend to favor low-income benefieiariea in terma of the 
percentage of redistribution. Tabular reaulta shotfed that all income 
groupa received more than their "money's worth" from the OAI program in 
1972; however» the largeat relative gaina were realised by lotfincome 
groupa. Uaing different program aaaessment approachea, the OAI program 
in 1972 for the full data set waa found to be "mildiy and "generally" 
progreaaive across income groups, but it also exhibited strong regressive 
featurea, reaulting In lower relative retuma to middle-income 
beneficiaries. 
The progrw was found to be more effective in redistributing income 
in the abaence of the eaminga teat, price indexing, and diaaggregated 
survivorship probabilitiea. Firat, the earninga teat, in general, had 
ita greateat impact on high-income fsmiliea ($6,000+), which tended to 
increaae the percentage of redistribution received by high-income 
fsmiliea. According to the deaign of thia etudy, the OAI program waa 
found to be more regressive after the eaminga teat feature was included 
into the analyaia. Second, at leaat initially, all income claases 
received larger redistribution components fdien the annuity counterfactual 
waa defined to include price indexing. Although all income groups 
realized extra redistribution per dollar of OAI benefits when indexing 
vas included in the analysis, the greateat relative gains were realized 
by higher income groups because of their longer life expectancies on 
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«varagc. Prie# indexing, ieaelf, doe# noc alter the redistribution 
pattern, although it does slightly affect the levela of progressivité and 
regreaaivity aa measured by the "high-income-group-comparison" approach 
to progreaaivity aasessment. In addition to t)w sforementioned program 
features, demographic factora, such ss differential survivorship 
probabilitiea, do have an unintended effect on the equity of the program. 
Based on tabular results for the full data set, the program's overall 
progreaaivity tiaa found to be virtually invariant to the use of gender-
merged or se%-race-diatinct survivorship probabilitiee; however, alight 
progreaaivity changes were obaerved with the use of socioeconomic-
sd&usted survivorship probabilities. Specifically, the program had 
alightly weakened progressive featurea for low-income houaeholda and 
slightly strengthened regressive features for middle-income households 
tAien socioeconomic differentials in survivorship ware incorporated into 
the counterfactual design. 
The tabular results for the full data set are largely supported by 
the regression results. However, two cautionary notes should be 
mentioned regarding any direct comparison# between tabular and regression 
findings. First, the tabular and regression findings are based on 
different groupings of the same retirement population. That is, the 
tabular results discussed above were based on the full data set including 
single households and married households where at least <me member of the 
couple was retired in 1972. On the other hand, the regression results 
are based either on the single household or married households where both 
members were retired in 1972. Because of the different groupings, the 
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rctulct may appear eo be eoneradietory when taken together, although, 
when taken separately, they are eonaiatent with a priori reasoning. 
Second, the measures of income are different for the tabular and 
regression analyses. The tabular results «fere arrayed by family income 
in 1972, as reported on the 1973 census questionnaire. The regression 
results are based on lifetime earnings, a aummary statistic representing 
the accumulated value of annual taxable real earnings for the household 
unit. Each earnings measure haa obvious shortcomings and waa used to 
achieve different ends. The tabular results are directly comparable with 
Burhhauaer and Uarlick's (1981) presentation, whereaa the regression 
results are directly comparable with Freiden et al. (1976). Hence, the 
earnings mmasures, while complicating comparisons within the study, are 
perfectly uaeful acroas previous studies. 
The regression results support the findings of the program's 
progressivity. Recall, the estimated relationship between the percentage 
of redistribution and lifetime earnings (LTEAR or TLTEAX) was negative 
and nonlinear. The effect of the earnings test «ras mixed and dependent 
on marital status. The progressivity of the program was weakened for the 
married data set and strengthened for the single data set with the 
inclusion of the earnings test in the annuity counterfactual. Evidently, 
the "married" influence of the earnings test dominated when the data were 
*8#f*#*ked in the tabular results. Similarly, in all of the single 
married models, the OAI program wm less progressive when the 
counterfaetual included benefit indexing. The inclusion of disaggregated 
survivorship probabilities did not reverse the relationship between the 
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p«rc«ntagt of rtdistributlon and lifaCima earning#, and, in addition, the 
marginal effect, overall, vaa small. Proa the regre##ion finding#, 
mortality rate# diaaggregated by #ex and race challenge the program'# 
progre##ivity #lightly lee# than highly diaaggregated mortality rate# 
Contrary to Aaron*# #tudy (1974), the effect of #ocioecononic 
differential# in #urvivor#hip doe# not reveree the direction of 
rediatribution, but, rather, alightly "dampens" the extent of 
redietribution. 
2. The effect of se» differentials in survivorship on the program's 
performance 
The distributional impact of the OAl program was found to be 
sensitive to the "tailoring" of annuity benefits to reflect se* 
differentials in survivorship. Generally spesking, single females and 
marriW couples were made differentially better off, and single males 
worse off in a sex-neutral retirwent system relative to a sex-
discriminating actuarially fair retirement system. Single female 
beneficiaries, as a group, received «mnuity benefits that were 
approximately 16 percent larger in a sex-neutral retirosent system 
relative to a sex-race discriminating system, trtiereas their male 
counterparts, as a group, received benefits that were approximately seven 
percent mealier. Furthermore, when the mortality differentials were 
disaggregated by sex, race, marital status, income, and education, single 
female beneficiaries received annuity benefits that were approximately 
nine percent larger in a sex-neutral retirement system, whereas single 
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mal# twn«fieiarl«t received benefits chat were approximately 23 percent 
smaller. 
Similar comparisons were not as useful across married beneficiaries 
because the Joint-and-two-thirds annuity covered the lives of the husband 
and wife; hence, any sex differentials were largely muted by the dual 
coverage. Nonetheless, actuarially fair benefits for married persons 
were approximately three percent higher, independent of the sex of the 
primary annuitant, in a sex-neutrsl retirement system relative to a sex 
discriminating system. The sex-neutral bias in favor of married persons, 
a# a group, is a result of the Joint-and-two-thirds annuity, which 
insures the life of the shortsr-lived male, the longer-lived female, and 
the longest-lived survivor, who is typically the female, the sex-neutral 
bias increased when the socioeconomic discriminating system was used as 
the comparison system. 
Ibe estimated coefficient for SEX in the single generalized model 
was positive and statistically significant, supporting the tabular 
findings. Single female beneficiaries received redistribution components 
approxlmtely three percentage points larger than their male counterparts 
when survivorship probabilities were disaggregated by sex and race, 
ceteris paribus, the marginal gain Increased to 5.2 percentage points 
when survivorship probabilities were further disaggregated by marital 
status. Income, and education. 
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3. Th* of ch# wife*# work statu# on th« program performance 
The influence of the wife'# work atatua waa examined extenaively in 
section A of Chapter VII. To addreaa thi# iaaue, houaeholda, where both 
member# were retired in 1972, were divided into one-earner and two-earner 
household#. A two-earner hou#ehold waa defined aa a houaehold where 
both members qualified for primary-worker benefits. Alternatively, a 
one-earner houaehold meant only the male member qualified for primary-
worker benefits and the apouse waa collecting dependent*a benefita. 
Independent of sex and family type, all individuals received poaitive 
income tranafers free the OAl program in 1972. Overall, the traditional 
family structure received preferential treatment from the OAI program 
becauae the nonworking wife received retirement benefita without payment 
of extra contributions. 
first, the effect of the wife's work statua on wife-only benefit 
incidence was small. In absolute terms, working women paid in more 
dollars in the form of OAI contributions, and, in exchange, they received 
higher OAI benefit levels. Rovever, the difference in percentage of 
rediatribtttion per dollar of OAI benefits for working and nonworking 
women was extremely small, suggesting that women, independent of work 
status, were treated almoat equally in term# of redi#tribution. 
the finding of roughly equal treatment across women with different 
labor-homemaker choices did not apply to men married to women with 
different labor-homemaker cfMices. Generally speaking, the percentage of 
redistribution «m# generally higher for males in «me-eamer households 
relative to their male counterpart# in tw-eamer households. The 
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apparmc rtdlterlbutional dlffsrantlal waa aymptooatie of the vary low 
annuity benefit# received from the nonvorking wife*# joint-end-two-third# 
annuity. 
In concluaion, although women with différant work atatuae# paid in 
différant amomt# of OAI contribution#, thay ware traatad roughly equally 
in tarm# of the percentage of OAl benefit# repreaenting intergenerational 
tranafera. The radiatribution pattern for malaa by houaahold type waa 
almilart however, the abaolute aime of the percentage of radiatribution 
waa larger for one-earner malaa acroaa all income categoriea. While 
women ware treated roughly equally, working women received aignificantly 
amaller percentage of radiatribution when compariaon# ware made with 
working male#. The working woman received the amalleat return on her OAl 
contribution# relative to her male counterpart becauae of her retirement 
and employment characteriatica and the community property aaaumption 
underpinning the annuity-type coimterfactual, iaatly, the OAI program 
mw found to be more progre##ive and lea# regre##ive aero## income 
catégorie# for two-earner relative to one-earner hou#ehold# a# reflected 
by the "high-inc«ae-group-compariaoa" approach to pr^ re##ivity 
a##e##ment. 
4. The dietribution of apoogal benefit# 
The OAl program was found to allocate rediatribution components 
proportionately acroa# quintile group#, independent of family type and 
se%. Contrary to the 1937-1939 Advi«ory Council's intent, dependent'# 
benefits were, at best, proportionally distributed to dependent spouses 
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of male worker#. TWenty-evo of the poorest one-earner households 
received approximately 21 percent of intergenerational tranafers to 
dependent apouaea compared to 21 percent received by the 20 percent of 
the richeat one-earner houaeholda. Evidence from thia life-cycle atudy 
aupporta the earlier findinga of Bolden (1979). In concluaion, thia 
atudy demonatrated that aupplemental benefita may not be adequately 
aerving the 1939 obsjective of protecting a group of aged persona 
experiencing economic hardahip, auggeating, perhapa, that a more 
effective target definition ahould be uaed to determine "need" aaide from 
the work atatu# of th# female, which is currently uaed bf social 
aecurity. 
C. Concluding Ramarka 
This atudy attempted to estimate the extent to which the old-age 
insurance portion of the social aecurity program radiatributed incog* 
among subgroups comprising the same retirement population but 
distinguishable by socioeconomic traits, such as sex, race, marital 
status, income, and education* In estimating the distributional impact 
of the social security progrsm, the study stressed the importance of an 
intertemporal framework to evaluate a "lifetime" public program and the 
need to account for demographic factors, such as differential mortality 
rates. 
Overall, the 1972 OAl progam was found to be progressive; however, 
"other" program features and socioeconomic status were also found to 
Influence the effectiveness of the program in achieving its 
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radlstribueion obj«ceiv«. Prom « policy point of vi#w, this study has 
several noteworthy implications. First, evidanc# from this study showed 
that the OAI program, as legislated in 1972, was not distributionally 
neutral, and ita diatributional impact oft-times depended on factors 
incidental to the program. Second, the legislated preferential treatment 
of women, traditional family structures, snd earlier retirement cohorts 
draw into question and challenge the redistribution ot^ jective of the OAI 
program. Third, it was found that the intended and actual effects of 
statutory proviaiona may vary widely md may, as a reault, jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the progrsm in general. In the future, policymakers 
should be cognisant not only of the intended and actual effects of 
statutory provisions, but also of the wiintended effects of demographic 
factors, incidental to the program, on the overall equity of the social 
security system. 
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XI. AFPERDIX A. ESTXMATIOII OF MUUGET YIELOS ON U.S. 
GOVERNKENT SECURITIES AT CONSTANT 
MATURITY, 1937-1952 
195 
ïhe roll-over compounding achomo was «scimatcd using « historical 
iorias of market yields on U.S. government securities at constant 
maturity. Yields are reported on 1» 3, 9, 10, 20 and 30 year maturities 
for the 1953 to 1972 time period (Board of Governors, 1976b); ho«raver, 
disaggregated data were not available for earlier years, for the years 
prior to 1953, the missing yields were estimated using known yields on 3-
5 year taxable 0.8. notes, 1937-1970 (Board of Governors, 1943; U.S. 
President, 1976), and a historically complete series of basic yields on 
corporate bonds by tens to maturity (Board of Governors, 1943, 1976a). 
The private bond yield curve for each maturity in conjunction with the 3-
5 year taxable note series were used to replicate the yield curves for 
U.S. government securities for the missing years. The procedure employed 
to complete the series is discussed in detail below. 
Firstly, the basic yields on corporate bonds are reported at one-
year maturity intervals for corporate bonds with ten or fewer years to 
maturity. A 3-5 year yield series for prime corporate paper for 1937 to 
1970 was constructed by taking «i arithmetic average of the three-year 
and five-year yields for each year between 1937 and 1970. The 3-5 year 
yield for each year, 3-5 FMY, is represented by 
3-year PKÏ • 5-year PMY 
3-5 Wff 1 (11.1) 
where PKY^  * prim market yield in year y. Ihe 3-5 FHY^  was used as a 
standard of comparison to simulate the yield curves for U.S. government 
securities at constant maturity for the missing years. 
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Ntxe, yield# on U.S. government seenritie# at constant oaturitie# 
were calculated a# follow#* 
4 PMTfJ 
Cmj - <3-5 GMYy) X (11.2) 
wh#r# Qflf^  • eatimated U.S. government leeurity market yield at 
maturity i in year y, 
i " years to maturity (1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30), 
3-5 Qttty » yield for 3-5 year taxable U.S. seeuritiee for year y, and 
Ptn^  • yield on prim# eorporat# bond at maturity i in y##r y. 
The e#tim#t#d m#rk#t yi#ld# #r# ihown in T#bl# 11.1. 
UM #ccur#cy of th# abov# e#tim#tion proc#dur# W# t##t#d # 
coap#ring th# known U.S. gov#mm#nt Mcurity yislds to th# estimated 
yields for the 1953-1972 time period. Conperiaons are ahown for the 5, 
10, and 20 year maturities in Table 11.2. Th# sis# of th# estimation 
error is less than five percent for most maturitiea and years. 
Eatimation errors are largeat in yeara 1954, 1958, aW 1959. However, 
th# eatimation error is smeller than the error resulting from th# UM of 
th# prim# eorporat# bond yield in place of th# U.S. gov#mm#nt security 
rat# (s## figur# 11.1). 
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Tmbl* 11.1. Kirkcc yield# on U.S. government securities at constant 
maturity, 1937-1972 (percent per annuo) 
Year 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year 20-year 30-year 
1937 0.66 1.19 1.60 2.27 2.76 2.94 
1938 0.41 0.72 0.94 1.24 1.39 1.43 
1939 0.26 0.50 0.93 0.96 1.17 1.21 
1940 0.19 0.42 0.58 0.90 1.17 1.24 
1941 0.29 0.61 0.85 1.34 1.77 1.88 
1942 0.875 1.33 1.59 1.93 2.46 2.46 
1943 0.75 1.22 1.45 1.96 2.47 2.47 
1944 0.79 1.21 1.44 1.94 2.48 2.48 
1945 0.81 1.07 1.29 1.60 2.37 2.39 
1946 0.82 1.04 1.26 1.80 2.25 
1947 0.92 1.19 1.45 1.83 2.11 
1948 1.34 1.54 1.72 2.14 2.30 
1949 1.24 1.37 1.49 1.8 2.03 
1950 1.2 1.40 1.61 1.94 2.09 
1951 1.81 1.89 1.97 2.12 2.30 
1952 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.24 
1953* 2.14 2.47 2.65 2.85 3.06 
1954 1.05 1.63 1.99 2.40 2.64 
1955 2.04 2.47 2.65 2.82 2.90 
1956 2.99 3.19 3.20 3.18 3.14 
1957 3.62 3.98 3.69 3.65 3.54 
1958 2.27 2.84 3.06 3.32 3.48 
1959 4.24 4.46 4.46 4.33 4.13 
1960 3.63 3.98 4.09 4.12 4.06 
1961 2.98 3.54 3.75 3.88 3.92 
1962 3.10 3.47 3.70 3.95 3.99 
1963 3.36 3.67 3.83 4.00 4.05 
1964 3.85 4.03 4.07 4.19 4.19 
1965 4.14 4.22 4.25 4.28 4.27 
1966 5,20 5.23 5.10 4.92 4.77 
1967 4.88 5.03 5.11 5.07 5.01 
1968 5.69 5.68 5.69 5.65 5.45 
1969 7.12 7.02 6.93 6.67 6.33 
1970 6.90 7.29 7.38 7.35 6.86 
1971 4.88 5.65 5.99 6.16 6.12 
1972 4.96 5.72 5.98 6.21 6.01 
*Board of Governor», 1976b. 
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%bl# 11.2. Baelmation error 
5-year 10-year 20-year 
eatimation eatioation eatioation 
Year error error error 
1953 0.06 (2.3)* 0.14 (4.9)' 0.19 (6.2) 
1954 0.15 (7.5) 0.45 (19.0) 0.53 (20.0) 
1955 0.12 (4.5) 0.22 (7.8) 0.15 (5.2) 
1956 0.01 (0.3) -0.11 (3.5) -0.27 (8.6) 
1957 0.07 (1.9) 0.03 (0.8) -0.08 (2.3) 
1958 0.16 (5.2) 0.33 (10.0) 0.38 (10.9) 
1959 0.09 (2.0) -0.30 (6.9) -0.59 (14.3) 
1960 0.14 (3.4) 0.29 (7.0) 0.27 (6.7) 
1961 0.01 (0.3) -0.12 (3.0) -0.22 (5.6) 
1962 0.02 (0.5) -0.01 (0.3) -0.08 (2.0) 
1963 -0.04 (1.0) -0.06 (1.5) -0.15 (3.7) 
1964 -0.03 (0.7) -0.01 (0.2) -0.07 (1.7) 
1965 -0.01 (0.2) -0.02 (0.5) -0.03 (0.7) 
1966 -0.01 (0.2) -0.19 (3.9) -0.18 (3.8) 
1967 0.04 (0.8) 0.05 (1.0) 0.19 (3.8) 
1968 0.1 (1.8) 0.12 (2.1) 0.08 (1.5) 
1969 0.08 (1.1) -0.18 (2.7) -0.25 (3.9) 
1970 -0.01 (0.1) 0.05 (0.7) -0.07 (1.0) 
'Error a# a percentage of the known yield to wtnrity on U.S. 
government aecuritiea in each year. 
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Eatisatcd 
U.S. yield 
error 
Corporate 
bond 
error 
"""I I # i !• » I I > • I » '• 
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Year 
11.1. Coaiparison in five-year eatimation errors: Estimated U.S. 
yields relative to known yields for 1953-1970 and 
corporate bond yields relative to yields on U.S. security 
yields for 1953-1970 
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APPemiX B. DATA 8BT DESCRIPTION 
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The data aet uaad in ehla atudy ia a aubaaaple of the 1973 Exact 
Hatch File, a nationally repraaentative aample of all Americana in 1972. 
A reapondant in the Match File waa included in the aubaaaple if ahe or he 
waa a "gowd match," 62 or older in 1972, and receivad aocial aecurity 
benefita in 1972, Two data aeta were conatructad; aingle and married. 
The aingle data aet includad 353 reapondantat 138 malea (39 percent 
of all aingle raapondenta) and 215 famalaa (61 perçant of all aingle 
raapondenta). There are 2,771 couplaa includad in the married data aet, 
where at laaat <me maaber of the couple aatiafiad the aorting criteria. 
The total number of reapondenta included in the atudy waa 5,895. The 
following tablea deacrlbe the characteriatica of the data aeta. 
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Table 12.1. Summery aeetiselea 
Toeel populeelon 5,895 
Kerltel stetue 
Kerried 
Single 
5,542 
353 
(94% of sample) 
(6% of aample) 
Race 
White 
Nbnwhite 
5,643 
252 
(96% of sample) 
(4% of sample) 
Men 
Total 2,909 (49% of sample) 
Marital atatua 
Married 
Single 
2,771 
138 
(95%) 
(5%) 
Mkdian age 
Married 
White 
Nonwhite 
Single 
White 
Nonwhite 
69 
69 
69 
69 
Women 
Total 2,986 (51% of sample) 
Marital statua 
Married 
Single 
2,771 
215 
(93%) 
(7%) 
Medim age 
Married 
White 
Ronfihite 
Single 
White 
Ronwhite 
66 
61 
70 
69 
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Table 12.2. Aga diaeribueion by race, marital atatua, and aax 
Raca, 
marital 
atatua, 
and aax 
Age in 1972 
Leaa than 
61 62-64 65 66-72 
More than 
72 Total 
Whit# 
Married 
Men 
Women 
SO 
610 
282 
512 
197 
174 
1,344 
1,035 
783 
325 
2,656 
2,656 
Nonmarried 
Mn 
Women 
0 
0 
18 
13 
13 
12 
64 
125 
33 
53 
128 
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(tonvhite 
Married 
Men 
Women 
1 
60 
15 
12 
8 
4 
60 
32 
31 
7 
115 
115 
Ronmarried 
Men 
Women 
0 
0 
2 
5 
0 
0 
7 
4 
1 
3 
10 
12 
721 859 408 2,671 1,236 5,985 
Table 12.3. Year of retiremwt diatribucion by auiriCal ataCua, aex, and age 
Year of retirement 
Marital atatus, 
sex, and age 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973+ Total 
Nonmarried men 
62-64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 6 0 20 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 3 2 0 13 
66-72 1 1 10 7 7 14 7 9 7 4 4 0 71 
73 and over 8 7 4 5 4 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 34 
9 8 14 12 11 15 12 15 11 18 13 0 138 
Nonmarried women 
62-64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 0 18 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 4 0 12 
66-72 5 8 7 9 19 15 24 13 14 10 5 0 129 
73 ax^  over 21 4 6 9 10 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 56 
26 12 13 18 29 18 26 15 23 21 14 0 215 
Married men 
61 < 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 51 
62-64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 88 113 28 297 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 26 25 74 1 205 
66-72 0 30 46 82 124 179 187 235 181 139 126 66 9 1,404 
73 and over 210 204 116 82 54 42 34 30 15 9 8 1 9 814 
210 234 162 164 178 221 221 265 275 242 247 254 98 2,771 
Married «romen 
61 < 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 670 670 
62-64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119 161 159 85 524 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 32 14 18 2 178 
66-72 0 54 74 110 131 158 158 175 85 57 34 15 16 1,067 
73 and over 120 69 49 26 20 17 2 6 7 4 5 1 6 332 
120 123 123 136 151 175 160 181 204 212 214 193 719 2,771 
Tabltt 12.4. DiBCrlbutlon by yetars of school coapleced and family Income In 1972, men only 
Family Income In 1972 
Harried men Noomarrled mm 
Years of *4,001- $6,001- $4,001- $6,001-
school completed $0-4,000 6,000 10,000 $10,001+ $0-4,000 6,000 10,000 $10,001+ 
Total number 724 697 711 639 77 17 18 26 
%tal iwrcent 26 25 26 23 56 12 13 19 
Elementary 
Leas than 8 yaara 313 182 140 74 33 1 4 6 
8 years 211 215 200 134 21 9 6 6 
High school 
1-3 years 94 137 124 105 11 2 0 1 
4 years 63 106 149 155 7 4 3 7 
Coll ege 
1=3 years 25 31 45 59 2 1 3 1 
4 or more 18 26 53 112 3 0 2 5 
Table 12,5. Dlscrlbuclon by years of sdiool completed and family Income la 1972, Homen ooly 
family Income In 1972 
Harried women Honmarrled women 
Year* of $4,001- $6,001- $4,001- $6,001-
school completed $0-4,000 6,000 10,000 $10,001+ $0-4,000 6,000 10,000 $10,001+ 
Total number 724 697 711 639 100 41 38 36 
fbtal percent 26 25 26 23 46 19 18 17 
Elementary 
Less than 8 years 241 154 85 40 21 3 4 3 
8 years 202 177 144 98 14 7 4 2 
High school 
1-3 years 127 118 149 108 11 2 6 4 
4 years 120 174 230 214 36 20 15 11 
College 
1-3 years 23 54 61 86 4 3 3 4 
4 or more 11 20 42 93 14 6 6 12 
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"Cibla 12.6. Olaerlbucion of claim atatua by sax, oarieal statua, and 
Sax, marital 
atatua, and aga 
Primary 
vorkar 
Claim atatua 
Oapandant 
apouaa 
Not 
collecting 
Man* 
Karriad 
61 < 
62-64 
65 
66-72 
73+ 
0 
268 
204 
1,389 
803 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
51 
29 
1 
13 
11 
Nonmarriad 
62-64 
65 
66-72 
73+ 
20 
13 
71 
34 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Woman» 
Karriad 
61 < 
62-64 
65 
66-72 
73+ 
0 
234 
96 
521 
147 
0 
218 
80 
531 
179 
670 
72 
2 
15 
6 
Nonmarriad 
62-64 
65 
66-72 
73+ 
18 
12 
129 
56 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 4,015 1,010 870 
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mi. APPENDIX C. TABLES 
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Table 13.1. Annual return rate on U.S. government bonds and stock 
market, 1937-1972' 
Annual nominal return rate Aversge 
Average of annual real 
U.S. government Stock columns (1) rate of 
Period bonds market ami (2) return 
(1) (2) (3) 
1937 2.74 4.38 3.56 -0.04 
1938 2.61 -24.93 -11.16 -9.26 
1939 2.41 8.99 5.7 7.1 
1940 2.26 -3.71 -0.725 -1.725 
1941 2.05 -5.28 -1.615 -6.615 
1942 2.46 -5.79 -1.665 -12.365 
1943 2.47 33.14 17.805 11.705 
1944 2.48 12.91 7.695 5.995 
1945 2.37 23.72 13.045 10.745 
1946 2.19 15.89 9.04 0.54 
1947 2.25 -6.73 -2.24 -16.64 
1948 2.44 8.13 5.285 -2.515 
1949 2.31 8.58 5.445 6.445 
1950 2.32 25.18 13.75 12.75 
1951 2.57 25.52 14.045 6.145 
1952 2.68 14.73 8.705 6.505 
1953 2.94 6.42 4.68 3.88 
1954 2.55 23.06 12.805 12.305 
1955 2.84 35.08 18.96 19.36 
1956 3.08 9.20 6.14 4.64 
1957 3.47 8.38 5.925 2.325 
1958 3.43 8.16 5.795 3.095 
1959 4.07 24.09 14,08 13.28 
1960 4,01 ,90 2.455 0.855 
1961 3.90 20.18 12.04 11.04 
1962 3.95 -2,68 0.635 -0.465 
1963 4.00 14.54 9.27 8.07 
1964 4.15 18.24 11.195 9,895 
1965 4.21 11.13 7.67 5.97 
1966 4.66 .24 2.45 -0,45 
1967 4.85 10.93 7.89 4,99 
1968 5.25 10.31 7,78 3,58 
1969 6.10 2.52 4,31 -1,09 
1970 6.59 3,84 5,215 -0,685 
1971 5.74 23,88 14,81 10,51 
1972 5.63 13.63 9 63 6,33 
.^8. Bureau of the Census (1960, 1975). 
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Table 13.2. Conmummr price Index, U.S. elcy average, all 
iteaa, 1937-1972* (1967 - 100) 
Year CSonaumer price index* Inflation 
all iteaa rate (percent) 
1937 43.0 3.6 
1938 42.2 -1.9 
1939 41.6 -1.4 
1940 42.0 1.0 
1941 44.1 5.0 
1942 48.8 10.7 
1943 51.9 6.1 
1944 52.7 1.7 
1945 53.9 2.3 
1946 58.5 8.5 
1947 66.9 14.4 
1948 72.1 7.8 
1949 71.4 -1.0 
1950 72.1 1.0 
1951 77.8 7.9 
1952 79.5 2.2 
1953 80.1 0.8 
1954 80.5 0.5 
1955 80.2 -0.4 
1956 81.4 1.5 
1957 84.3 3.6 
1958 86.6 2.7 
1959 87.3 0.8 
1960 88.7 1.6 
1961 89.6 1.0 
1962 90.6 1.1 
1963 91.7 1.2 
1964 92.9 1.3 
1965 94.5 1.7 
1966 97.2 2.9 
1967 100.0 2.9 
1968 104.2 4.2 
1969 109.8 5.4 
1970 116.3 5.9 
1971 121.3 4.3 
1972 125.3 3.3 
«0.8. President (1976). 
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Tabla 13.4. Sa%-naucral survivor probabillciaa 
Aga Aga 
40* .997 71 .96037 
41 .9967 72 .95704 
42 .99638 73 .95334 
43 .99603 74 .94923 
44 .99565 75 .94471 
45 .99524 76 .93977 
46 .99479 77 .93435 
47 .99427 78 .92835 
48 .99367 79 .92169 
49 .99300 80 .91441 
SO .99226 81 .90652 
51 .99148 82 .89798 
52 .99071 83 .88878 
S3 .98995 84 .87890 
54 .98918 85 .87826 
55 .98839 86 .85686 
56 .98751 87 .84478 
57 .98648 88 .83209 
58 .98527 89 .81891 
59 .98389 90 .80540 
60 .98239 91 .79153 
61. .98083 92 .77751 
62*» 
.97918 93 .76370 
63 .97748 94 .75031 
64 .97569 95 .73732 
65 .97378 96 .72494 
66 .97372 97 .71355 
67 .97124 98 .70333 
68 .96873 99 .69443 
69 .96614 100 .68653 
70 .96338 101 .67910 
"For ago# 40-61, National Cantor for Haalth Statiatiea, Tabla 1 
(1964). 
o^r agaa 62 and oldar, Bayo (1972), 
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Tmhl# 13.5. Agc-cex-racs spcelflc stirvlvor probablllelas 
Whit# Nonwhlt# 
Age Mm Women Htn Women 
40* .99668 .99810 .99251 .99439 
41 .99632 .99791 .99186 .99389 
42 .99591 .99771 .99125 .99344 
43 .99546 .99748 .99069 .99304 
44 .99496 .99724 .99016 .99267 
45 .99442 .99697 .98962 .99231 
46 .99383 .99669 .98899 .99186 
47 .99314 .99638 .98817 .99125 
48 .99234 .99604 .98708 .99043 
49 .99144 .99568 .98578 .98942 
SO .99045 .99527 .98435 .98833 
51 .98942 .99483 .98290 .98721 
52 .98838 .99440 .98146 .98608 
53 .98736 .99399 .98006 .98496 
54 .98632 .99358 .97869 .98383 
55 .98525 .99313 .97727 .98269 
56 .98407 .99260 .97573 .98148 
57 .9827 .99195 .97411 .98017 
58 .98109 .99114 .97238 .97870 
59 .97926 .99019 .97053 .97713 
60 .97729 .98912 .96863 .97541 
61. .97524 .98797 .96665 .97368 
62** .97466 .90910 .97301 .98529 
63 .97244 .98806 .97073 .98376 
64 .97003 .98689 .96823 .98203 
65 .96742 .98557 .96558 .98018 
66 .96528 .98464 .96148 .97737 
67 .96207 .98259 .95772 .97464 
68 .95882 .98052 .95397 .97192 
69 .95549 .97836 .95024 .96921 
70 .95201 .97606 .94650 .96645 
71 .94833 .97354 .94268 .96356 
72 .94440 .97073 .93870 .96045 
73 .94018 .96757 .93451 .95708 
74 .93560 .96401 .93004 .95342 
75 .93061 .96001 .92527 .94943 
76 .92518 .95552 .92022 .94511 
77 .91929 .95049 .91488 .94049 
*For age# 40 to 61, National Center for Health Statletlce, 
Table» 5-9 (1964). 
**For age# 62 and older, Bayo (1972), 
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fmbU 13.5. continued 
Ag« 
White Nonvhite 
Men Women Men Women 
78 .91289 .94485 .90925 .93557 
79 .90593 .93855 .90326 .93042 
80 .89836 .93154 .89690 .92504 
81 .89018 .92381 .89015 .91941 
82 .88131 .91532 .88309 .91353 
83 .87172 .90605 .87574 .90733 
84 .86144 .89597 .86803 .90078 
85 .85043 .88507 .86000 .89376 
86 .83865 .87334 .85183 .88628 
87 .82610 .86086 .84357 .87843 
88 .81276 .84774 .83502 .87026 
89 .79861 .83414 .82626 .86181 
90 .78389 .82005 .81773 .85341 
91 .76880 .80551 .80995 .84531 
92 .75358 .79050 .80329 .83785 
93 .73865 .77522 .79782 .83118 
94 .72419 .75987 .79349 .82519 
95 .71002 .73031 .79020 .81929 
96 .69570 .71678 .78780 .81277 
97 .68189 .70438 .78578 .80543 
98 .66897 .69313 .78296 .79758 
99 .65743 .68316 .77940 .78979 
100 .64690 .67395 .77496 .78227 
101 .63610 .67395 .76960 .77523 
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xiv. appnmix d. cmiparisor or comfouhding schemes 
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Table 14.I* Comparison of accumulated contributiona 
Psmily income 
level in 1972 
Mtan difference 
between ROATC 
and TATC* 
Fercentage of 
population 
0 - 1,000 $-276.00 .9 
1,001 - 1,500 -134.00 1.1 
1,501 - 2,000 -185.00 2.7 
2,001 - 2,500 -206.00 3.9 
2,501 - 3,000 -233.00 4.9 
3,001 - 3,500 -216.00 5.6 
3,501 - 4,000 -252.00 7.4 
4,001 - 5,000 -306.00 14.2 
5,001 - 6,000 -349.00 12.2 
6,001 - 8,000 -391.00 16.0 
8,001 - 10,000 -467.00 9.4 
10,001 - 20,000 -501.00 16.5 
20,001+ -489.00 5.2 
Total $-308.00 100 
*ROATC is Che beneficiary's acctinulaced concribuciona crediced 
Co bia/her account uaii% Che roll-over compounding achene. TA7C ia Che 
beneficiary'a accumulated contributiona baaed on the traditional 
compounding scheme* 
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APPENDIX B. RBSmJS 
Table IS.l. Aggregate data for Table 7*1 
Total Ty|W-6 Total Percent of* 
OKI actuarially arnowt of total 
benefits fair benefit* intergeeerational Intergenerational Cumulative* 
In 1972 (total) transfers transfers percent 
0- 1,000 6,975 174 6,801 0.11 O.ll 
1,001- 1,500 43,673 3,127 40,546 0.64 0.75 
1,501- 2,000 104,007 9,010 94,997 1.51 2.26 
2,001- 2,500 236,281 20,545 215,736 3.43 5.69 
2,501- 3,000 302,978 28,388 274,590 4.63 10.32 
3,001- 3,500 387,296 41,054 346,242 5.50 15.82 
3,501- 4,000 575,508 65,193 510,315 8.11 23.93 
4,001- 5,000 1,044,646 120,014 924,632 14.69 38.62 
5,001- 6,000 887,077 107,522 779,555 12.39 51.01 
6,001- 8,000 1,190,461 147,815 1,042,646 16.57 67.58 
8,001-10,000 702,368 82,856 619,512 9.84 77.42 
10,001-20,000 1,242,319 131,220 1,111,099 17.66 95.08 
20,001+ 366,117 39,503 326,614 5.19 100.27 
Total 7,089,706 796,421 6,293,285 100.27 
T^otale may not add to 100 becaiMe of rouodtng. 
T«bl« 1S*2« Changes in the percentage of redlatrlbutlon due to Indexing for married, both retired 
households 
Cender-^ ergAd, earnings adjusted Sex-race-dlstinct, earnings a4Justed 
îype-l Typc-é (2)-<l) îype-2 Type-5 (4)-{3) 
Total family —— ——— Change in ———— Change in 
income (I) (2) percentage of (3) (4) percentage of 
in 1972 Nonindexed* Indexed* redistribution Nonindexed* Indexed* redistribution 
0- 1,000 97,4 97.7 0.3 97.5 97.8 0.3 
1,001- 1,500 93.1 93.9 0.8 93.3 94.1 0.8 
1,501- 2,000 90.7 91.8 1.1 90.9 92.0 1.1 
2,001- 2,500 90.4 91.3 0.9 90.5 91.6 1.1 
2,501- 3,000 89.6 90.6 1.0 89.7 91.0 1.3 
3,001- 3,500 88.2 89.4 1.2 88.4 89.7 1.3 
3,501- 4,000 87.4 88.6 1.2 87.6 88.9 1.3 
4,001- 5,000 86.8 88.2 1.4 87.1 88.6 1.5 
5,001- 6,000 86.0 87.5 1.5 86.3 87.9 1.6 
6,001- 8,000 85.4 87.1 1.7 85.7 87.5 1.8 
8,001-10,000 85.9 87.7 1.8 86.2 88.1 1.9 
10,001-20,000 87.4 88.9 1.5 87.6 89.3 1.7 
20,001+ 87.1 88.6 1.5 87.3 88.9 1.6 
*Raw data used to calculate the percentage of redistribution for each family income 
classification Is available upon request. 
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15.3. Chang## in eh# p#re#ntag# of radistribueion under different 
survivorship probability aaaumptiona, nonaarning taat 
a4)uat#d for married» both retired households 
Annuity-type# indexed Change in percentage 
Total family of redistribution 
income Type-l® Type-2* Type-3* 
in 1972 (4) <5) (6) (5)-(4) (6)-(4) 
0- 1,000 97.7 97.8 97.6 0.1 -0.1 
1,001- 1,300 93.9 94.1 92.9 0.2 -1.0 
1,501- 2,000 91.8 92.0 91.3 0.2 -0.5 
2,001- 2,500 91.1 91.4 91.1 0.3 0.0 
2,501- 3,000 90.3 90.6 90.3 0.3 0.0 
3,001- 3,500 89.1 89.5 89.1 0.4 0.0 
3,501- 4,000 88.3 88.6 88.4 0.3 0.1 
4,001- 5,000 87.9 88.3 88.2 0.4 0.3 
5,001- 6,000 87.1 87.6 87.5 0.5 0.4 
6,001- 8,000 86.4 86.8 86.8 0.4 0.4 
8,001-10,000 86.6 87.1 87.1 0.5 0.5 
10,001-20,000 87.1 87.5 87.6 0.4 0.5 
20,001+ 87.0 87.4 87.7 0.4 0.7 
Mean 87.6 88.0 88.0 0.4 0.4 
*Raw data uaad to calculate the percentage of rediatribution for 
each family incoma clasaification ia available upon requaat. 
Table 15.4. Summary percentage point conpartaona for married, both retired households by annuity 
type, aex, and twusdiold type 
Type-l Type-2 Typc-3 Type-4 Type-5 Type-6 
Two One IWo One Two One tm One TW One Two One 
earner earner earner earner earner earner earner earner earner earner earner earner 
Booreat to ridxeat 
percen^ e point gap 
F e m a l e 6  7  
Hale 7 3 
Household unit 7 4 
Highest percentage 
of redfaitrlbutlon 
Female 87 90 
Male 93 96 
Household unit 91 94 
lowest percentage 
of redlatrlbutlon 
Female 78 79 
Male 86 91 
Household unit 83 87 
6 6 6 6 6 
6 3 6 3 6 
6 4 6 4 6 
88 90 88 90 89 
93 96 93 96 94 
91 94 91 94 92 
79 79 79 79 81 
86 91 86 91 87 
83 87 84 88 85 
6 5 7 4 6 
3 6 4 5 3 
4 6 4 5 4 
91 89 92 89 92 
96 94 97 94 97 
95 92 95 92 95 
81 81 81 81 81 
92 88 92 88 92 
88 85 89 86 89 
Table 15.5. tfale to (ornai* differenccts In percontago of redlatrlbutlon controlling for family income 
and family t^ ** 
Total family T)Fpe-2 Tjrpe-3 
income 
in 1972 Female Male Difference Female Mtle Difference Female Male Difference 
fWo earner 
0- 2,000 87 93 46 88 93 +5 88 93 +5 
2,001- 2,500 88 93 +5 88 93 45 88 93 +5 
2,501- 3,000 88 92 44 88 92 44 88 92 44 
3,001- 3,500 84 88 +4 85 88 43 84 88 44 
3,501- 4,000 81 88 47 82 89 47 82 89 47 
4,001- 5,000 80 87 47 80 87 47 80 87 +7 
5,001- 6,000 78 87 49 79 87 48 79 87 48 
6,001- 8,000 79 86 47 80 86 46 80 86 46 
8,001-10,000 80 86 46 81 86 45 81 86 45 
10,001-20,000 84 87 +3 84 87 43 84 88 44 
20,001+ 81 86 45 82 87 45 82 87 45 
Mean 5.7 5.3 5.5 
One earoer 
0- 2,000 90 96 46 90 96 46 90 96 46 
2,001- 2,500 90 96 46 90 96 46 91 96 45 
2,501- 3,000 85 94 49 86 94 48 86 94 48 
3,001- 3,500 84 93 49 85 93 46 85 93 48 
3,501- 4,000 82 92 +10 82 92 +10 82 92 +10 
4,001- 5,000 83 92 49 83 93 +10 83 93 +10 
5,001- 6,000 79 91 +12 79 91 +12 79 91 +12 
6,001- 8,000 80 91 +11 81 91 +10 81 91 +10 
8,001-10,000 79 91 +12 79 91 +12 79 91 +12 
10,001-20,000 82 92 +10 82 92 +10 83 92 49 
20,001+ 83 93 +10 84 93 49 84 93 49 
Mean 9.6 9.2 9.0 
Table IS.6. Family type differencea in percentage of rediatributimi controlling for family income 
and aex 
Type-l %)rpe-2 %)Fpe-3 
Total family 
income IWo One Dif- IWo One Dif- TWo One Dif-
in 1972 earner earner ference earner earner ference earner earner ference 
Fwaalea 
0- 2,000 87 90 •3 88 90 •2 88 90 •2 
2,001- 2,500 88 90 •2 88 90 •2 88 91 •3 
2,501- 3,000 88 85 -3 88 86 -2 88 86 -2 
3,001- 3,500 84 84 0 85 85 0 84 85 •1 
3,501- 4,000 81 82 *1 82 82 0 82 82 0 
4,001- 5,000 80 83 •3 80 83 •3 80 83 •3 
5,001- 6,000 78 79 •I 79 79 0 79 79 0 
6,001- 8,000 79 80 •1 80 81 •I 80 81 •1 
8,001-10,000 80 79 -1 81 79 -2 81 79 -2 
10,001-20,000 84 82 -2 84 82 -2 84 83 —1 
20,001+ 81 83 •2 82 84 •2 82 84 •2 
Mean 
Males 
0- 2,000 93 96 •3 93 96 •3 93 96 •3 
2,001- 2,500 93 96 +3 93 96 •3 93 96 •3 
2,501- 3,000 92 94 •2 92 94 •2 92 94 •2 
3,001- 3,500 88 93 •5 88 93 •5 88 93 •5 
3,501- 4,000 88 92 *4 89 92 •3 89 92 •3 
4,001- 5,000 87 92 •5 87 93 «6 87 93 +6 
5,001- 6,000 87 91 «4 87 91 *4 87 91 •4 
6,001- 8,000 86 91 •5 86 91 •5 86 91 •5 
8,001-10,000 86 91 •5 86 91 •5 86 91 •5 
10,001-20,000 87 92 •5 87 92 •5 88 92 •4 
20,001+ 86 93 •7 87 93 •6 87 93 +6 
Mean 
Table IS.7. Nonindexed t» indeKed differences in percentage of redietribution control:ing for 
family income and household unie 
type-l iype-2 iype-3 
Non- Dif­ Men- Dif­ Men- Dif­
indexed Indexed ference# indexed Indexed ferences indexed Indexed ferences 
IWo'-eamer 
0- 2,000 91 92 •1 91 92 •1 91 92 •1 
2,001- 2,500 91 92 •I 92 93 •I 92 93 •I 
2,501- 3,000 90 91 •1 90 91 •I 90 91 •I 
3,001- 3,500 87 88 •1 87 88 •I 87 88 •1 
3,501- 4,000 86 87 *1 86 87 •1 86 87 •1 
4,001- 5,000 84 86 •2 85 86 •1 85 86 •1 
5,001- 6,000 84 85 •I 84 86 •2 84 86 *2 
6,001- 8,000 83 85 •2 83 85 •2 84 86 •2 
8,001-10,000 83 85 •2 84 86 •2 84 86 •2 
10,001-20,000 86 87 •I 86 87 •I 86 88 •2 
20,001* 84 86 •2 85 86 •I 85 87 •2 
One-earner 
0- 2,000 94 95 •I 94 95 •I 94 95 •I 
2,001- 2,500 94 95 •I 94 95 •I 95 95 0 
2,501- 3,000 91 92 •I 91 92 •I 91 92 •I 
3,001- 3,500 91 91 0 91 92 •I 91 92 •I 
3,501- 4,000 89 90 •I 89 90 •I 89 90 •1 
4,001- 5,000 90 90 0 90 91 •I 90 91 •I 
5,001- 6,000 87 88 •1 87 89 •2 87 89 *2 
6,001- 8,000 88 89 •1 89 89 0 88 89 •I 
8,001-10,000 87 89 •2 88 89 •1 88 89 •1 
10,001-20,000 89 90 •I 89 90 •I 89 90 •I 
20,001* 90 91 •I 90 91 •I 90 91 •I 
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m. APPOIDIX r. DISACCREGAnOII or THE 1937 Co 1930 
REPORTED EARNINGS MEASURE 
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To correctly calculate the lifatima aarninga owaaura, the 1937-1950 
aunaary taxable aarninga meaaure had to be diaaggregatad into year-
apacific reported aarninga meaaurea. Thia vaa accoapliahed by uaing the 
year-apacific eatimatad annual quartara of coverage fron 1937 to 1950 and 
the 1937-1950 auanary taxable earninga meaaure. The following procedure 
waa employed to eatimate the year-apacific reported earninga for 1937 to 
1950. Firat» the eatimatad reported earninga for year i (EREP^ ) waa 
calculated by 
EQC. - * 
"^ 1 " ( t (T0TAL50) (16.1) 
i-1937 ^  
where EQC^  equala the eatimatad quarter of coverage in year i, TEQC 
equala the total eatimatad quartera of coverage for 1937 to 1950, 
equala the average annual earninga for full-time employee in manufac-
50 
turing in year i, I w,/14 equala the average annual earninga for 
i»l937 * 
full-time employee in manufacturing over the 1937-1950 time period, and 
TOTALSO equala the total reported earninga for the 1937-1950 time period, 
aa reported on the Longitudinal Exact Hatch File. Hence, the eatimatad 
reported earninga are divided over the time interval proportionally to 
the eatimatad «inual quartera of coverage and average annual earning# in 
manufacturing from 1937 to 1950. 
Becauae the eatimated reported earning# meaaure# were adjuated for 
the change# in averse earning# over time, the #um of the e#timated 
reported earning# measure# will not, in all likelihood, equal the total 
227 
reported earninge reported in the longitudinal Exact Hatch File. The 
eatimation error ia 
50 
BIAS - TOTALSO - t BREP. (16.2) 
i«1937 
The eatimation error may be poaitive or negative depending on the 
location of the ettim.«ted quartera of coverage over the 1937-1950 time 
interval. The worker'a eatimated reported earninga are proportionally 
adjuated by the eatimation error. That ia# the eatimation error ia 
apread over the time ^ riod ao aa to preaerve the proportion of eatimated 
reported earninga in year i to the total eatimated reported earninga from 
1937 to 1950. The proportion of estimated reported earninga in yeer i 
(EREP^ ) to the total eatimated reported earninga from 1937 to 1950 ia 
represented by 
EXEP^  
•  " T  raw, 
i-1937 * 
for i equal to 1937 to 1950. The adjuatment factor for each year (ADJ.) 
ia 
A®J. • PRO. * BIAS (16.4) 
for i equal to 1937 to 1950. Finally, the adjustment factor for each 
year is used to adjust the eatimated reported earnings for the tme year. 
Bence, the reported earnings for year i (REP.) is 
REP. • ERBP- • ADJ. (16.5) 
